

# Peace and Stabilisation Programme The Horn of Africa 2018-2022

## Programme Document

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<b>1</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>PROGRAMME CONTEXT</b>	<b>3</b>
2.1	THE HORN OF AFRICA: CONFLICT, VIOLENT EXTREMISM, CRIME AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT	3
2.2	GENDER DIMENSIONS	5
2.3	HUMAN RIGHTS DEFICIENCIES	5
2.4	CORRUPTION	6
2.5	SUMMARY OF KEY DRIVERS OF CONFLICT TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE PROGRAMME	6
<b>3</b>	<b>STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION</b>	<b>8</b>
3.1	JUSTIFICATION, PRINCIPLES AND DANISH STRENGTHS	8
3.2	COMPLEMENTARITY WITH OTHER INSTRUMENTS AND FRAMEWORKS	9
3.3	HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH	11
3.4	LESSONS LEARNED APPLIED	11
3.5	PROGRAMME RESULTS FRAMEWORK	12
3.6	AID EFFECTIVENESS	13
3.7	CONTEXTUAL RISKS AND SCENARIOS	14
3.8	BUDGET AT THEMATIC PROGRAMME LEVEL	18
<b>4</b>	<b>THEMATIC PROGRAMME 1: REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CAPACITY AND STABILISATION AND SECURITY IN SOMALIA</b>	<b>19</b>
4.1	STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION	19
4.2	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (OUTCOME LEVEL)	20
4.3	THEORY OF CHANGE	21
4.4	SUMMARY OF ENGAGEMENTS	23
<b>5</b>	<b>THEMATIC PROGRAMME 2: COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM</b>	<b>27</b>
5.1	STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION	27
5.2	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (OUTCOME LEVEL)	28
5.3	THEORY OF CHANGE	28
5.4	SUMMARY OF ENGAGEMENTS	30
<b>6</b>	<b>THEMATIC PROGRAMME 3: REGIONAL AND GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ENFORCEMENT ACROSS LAND AND MARITIME BORDERS</b>	<b>32</b>
6.1	STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION	32
6.2	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (OUTCOME LEVEL)	33
6.3	THEORY OF CHANGE	34
6.4	SUMMARY OF ENGAGEMENTS	35
<b>7</b>	<b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b>	<b>39</b>
7.1	REPORTING, MONITORING AND EVALUATION	42
7.2	FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT	43
7.3	SUMMARY FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES	43
7.4	COMMUNICATION OF PROGRAMME RESULTS	43
<b>8</b>	<b>BUDGET</b>	<b>44</b>

## Acronyms

<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>AML/CFT</b>	Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism
<b>APP</b>	African Programme for Peace, Phase III
<b>ASI</b>	Adam Smith International
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CAS</b>	Comprehensive Approach to Security
<b>CFT</b>	Counter Financing of Terrorism
<b>CIVAD</b>	Civilian Advisor to EASF
<b>CN</b>	Concept Note
<b>CVE</b>	Countering Violent Extremism
<b>DCA</b>	Delegated Cooperation Agreement
<b>DCD</b>	Defence Command Denmark
<b>DFID</b>	United Kingdom Department for International Development
<b>DKK</b>	Danish Kroner
<b>EASF</b>	Eastern Africa Standby Force
<b>EFIC</b>	Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Centre
<b>EFIC</b>	Ethiopia Financial Intelligence Centre
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FATF</b>	Financial Action Task Force
<b>FGS</b>	Federal Government of Somalia
<b>FIU</b>	Financial Intelligence Unit
<b>FMS</b>	Federal Member State
<b>GCTF</b>	Global Counterterrorism Forum
<b>GMCP</b>	Global Maritime Crime Programme
<b>HOA</b>	Horn of Africa
<b>HRBA</b>	Human Rights Based Approach
<b>ICEPCVE</b>	IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
<b>IGAD</b>	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
<b>IPSTC</b>	International Peace Support Training Centre
<b>ISSP</b>	IGAD Security Sector Program
<b>JDC</b>	Joint Donor Committee
<b>JFA</b>	Joint Financing Arrangement
<b>KN</b>	Kenya Navy
<b>MDA</b>	Marine Domain Awareness
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>MILAD</b>	Military Advisor to EASF
<b>MOD</b>	Ministry of Defence
<b>MOJ</b>	Ministry of Justice
<b>MOU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>MPU</b>	Maritime Police Unit
<b>NACS</b>	Nordic Adviser and Coordination Staff
<b>NAVAD</b>	Navy Advisor to EASG
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NRP</b>	National Rehabilitation Programme
<b>NSP</b>	National Stabilisation Plan of Somalia
<b>P/CVE</b>	Preventing / Countering Violent Extremism
<b>PAP</b>	Process Action Plan
<b>POLAD</b>	Police Advisor to EASF
<b>PREVENT</b>	Prevention of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism
<b>PSED</b>	Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document
<b>PSF</b>	Peace and Stabilisation Fund
<b>PSO</b>	Peace Support Operation
<b>PSP-HOA</b>	Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa, 2018-2022

<b>PVE</b>	Preventing Violent Extremism
<b>QIP</b>	Quick Impact Project
<b>RDE</b>	Royal Danish Embassy
<b>SCP</b>	Danish Somalia Country Programme 2015-2018
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SNA</b>	Somali National Army
<b>SNP</b>	Somali National Police
<b>SNSF</b>	Somali National Security Forces
<b>SSF</b>	Somalia Stability Fund
<b>STRATCOM</b>	Strategic Communication
<b>TCC</b>	Troop Contributing Country
<b>TOCT</b>	Transboundary Organised Crime & Trafficking
<b>TP1</b>	Thematic Programme 1 on Strengthening stabilisation and security actors
<b>TP2</b>	Thematic Programme 2 on Countering Violent Extremism
<b>TP3</b>	Thematic Programme 3 on Promoting exercise of authority across land and maritime borders
<b>TPM</b>	Third Party Monitoring
<b>UK FCO</b>	United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>USD</b>	United States Dollar
<b>WGSC</b>	Whole of Government Steering Committee

# 1 Introduction

This document provides the overview of Denmark's Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa (the Programme) 2018-2022 with an expected total budget of DKK 219 over a 4-years implementation period starting July 2018. The total commitment includes DKK 179 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and expectedly DKK 40 million non-ODA contribution from the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The Programme is the third phase of Denmark's peace and stabilisation support to the Horn of Africa and lessons from past phases have informed the programme formulation.

The Programme is part of the portfolio under the overall Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund. It takes its point of departure and strategic guidance from the *Concept Note for a third phase of the Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa 2018-2022 (CN 2017)* endorsed by the Whole-of-Government Steering Committee (WGSC) and the Danida Programme Committee, and their remarks and considerations to the CN 2017.

The Programme focus and prioritisation of engagements have been guided by Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017-18, taking into consideration Danish interests at stake, the nature and availability of effective partnerships, and potential influence through Denmark's expertise and experience. The Programme contributes to achieving the Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDGs) with its focus to peace and stability as critical enablers for the broader SDG 2030 agenda in the region. The Programme design has further been informed by Denmark's new *Defence Agreement 2018 – 2023, Denmark's integrated stabilisation engagement in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world, The World 2030 - Denmark's Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action* and its pillar on Peace, stability and protection, as well as Danish approaches to anti-piracy and countering violent extremism.

The Programme adheres to the overall PSF principles - in particular the focus on direct peace and stabilisation efforts and avoiding duplication and overlap with instruments supported by other Danish funding sources; the whole-of government approach, risk preparedness, a regional focus, the value added of Danish contributions and finally on enhancing the efficiency of the Danish engagement through partnerships and joint efforts with other international partners. Hence, the Programme aims at complementing other Danish instruments and is based on an integrated whole of government approach joining defence, police, civilian and development efforts using both ODA and non-ODA funding.

The programme comprises engagements in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. However, it is focused around the ongoing conflicts in Somalia with its regional ramifications. The Programme also complements Denmark's Africa Programme for Peace (APP) particularly the part supporting the implementation of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture through the African Union (AU) and the regional mechanisms. Furthermore, Denmark's Country Policy Papers for Kenya, Ethiopia and in particular the draft Somalia Policy Paper have guided the formulation.

The Programme is conscious of the high risks involved in any peace and stabilisation engagement, not least in a fragile, conflict-affected and violent context as Somalia. This is sought mitigated through active and continuous risk management which includes a risk matrix with defined risk mitigating measures. Programme implementation and management will also continuously address the many challenges and therefore there is a need to accept a rather high level of flexibility to enable programme management to adapt to the unfolding situation and to seize opportunities.

The formulation of the Programme has applied the PSF Guidelines (2014) and the Danida Aid Management Guidelines (AMG January 2018). Hence, the following outlines the motivations,

strategic direction, theories of change, structure, and expected outcomes of the Programme and its Peace and Stabilisation Engagements. Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSED) – one for each engagement – have been prepared based on consultations with the partners.

The main objective of the Programme is:

- *Improved peace and stability in the Horn of Africa by strengthening local, national and regional actors' capacity and ability to manage conflict and insecurity, counter threats and exercise legitimate authority.*

Recognizing that the conflict in Somalia is caused and maintained by a wide range of interconnected factors, the programme targets Somalia as the epicentre of regional insecurity with collateral effects in both Kenya and Ethiopia. The Programme has identified eight Peace and Stabilisation Engagements under the three Thematic Programmes (TPs):

1. Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.
2. Reduced levels of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa with a particular focus on Somalia through prevention and disengagement.
3. Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders

## 2 Programme Context

### 2.1 The Horn of Africa: Conflict, violent extremism, crime and forced displacement

The Horn of Africa (HoA) is home to some of Africa's fastest growing economies and countries across the region act with increased political and military self-confidence on the regional and global scene. Despite this progress, the HoA nonetheless remains one of the most insecure conflict areas in the world. The region hosts the generation long conflict in Somalia that came out of a complete state collapse in 1991 and is affected by the armed conflicts in Yemen and South Sudan. Root causes and structural drivers of fragility and instability in the region include inconclusive political settlements, violent extremism, weak security and governance structures and insufficient border demarcation and control. The conflict drivers are exacerbated by natural disasters, drought and climate change. In addition, natural resource exploitation leads to frictions over resource-sharing exacerbated by considerable transnational organised crime. These factors all lead to continuous conflict cycles and numerous displacements and migration. The result is a region characterised by ungoverned spaces in which terrorism, piracy, irregular migration, and transnational organized crime flourish – all of which pose direct and indirect threats to Denmark's security and welfare.

**Fragility, and violent conflict in Somalia.** Somalia remains one of the most unstable and fragile countries in the world. Perpetrators of violence include al-Shabaab, other extremist groups, states' forces and clan militias affiliated with political elites. The Somali security forces (Somali Police Force and Somali National Army) are also seen as entangled in clan politics and are very far from being able to administer security, rule of law and upholding basic human rights. The state formation process has advanced the last years but remains complicated, creating tensions between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States.

**Territorial tension and control in Somalia.** The AU force, AMISOM, with significant assistance from its regional and international partners, has made military gains and expanded the territory under control by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) by pushing back al-Shabaab from key population centres since 2012. However, al-Shabaab still holds sway over large portions of the countryside in central and southern Somalia and is able to carry out serious and frequent attacks within and outside Somalia. The Somali security forces are often incapable of holding territory and depend on AMISOM's continued presence. The ineffective state of the Somali Security Forces was documented in the Operational Readiness Assessment which constitutes the baseline for the transition from AMISOM-led security to Somalia-led security as stipulated in the UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (August 2017) that determined a reduction in troop numbers with a concomitant increase in police numbers.<sup>1</sup>

**Terrorism and extremism.** Violent extremists operating in the HoA are mainly "home-grown", operating out of authority vacuums or "safe havens". While some violent extremist groups are focussed mostly on local issues, global networks such as Al Qaeda have sought to engage groups in global jihad. The same goes for Islamic State, which is reported to have an expanding presence in the region. Al-Shabaab remains a key player in Somalia and the region, exploiting local grievances. Youth and minority groups (clans) remain excluded from political processes and economic development, making them prone to radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremist groups. Al-Shabaab remains one of the most successful home-grown terrorist groups in Africa. In addition to Somalia, it is active to some extent in the six countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda, and has mounted attacks in all of them, except for Tanzania.

**Transnational organized crime, including human smuggling.** Transnational organized criminal networks in the Horn of Africa have attracted increasing attention. Organized crime covers a broad spectrum from trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs to piracy. The region generates a large and vulnerable stream of smuggled migrants, who are abused and exploited during their journey. Organized crime is a product of instability and weak authorities, not least weak law enforcement. Also differences between legal systems, lack of trust, and lack of effective national and regional coordination obstruct cooperation on transnational criminal justice.

There is strong interconnectedness between transnational organized crime and terrorism. Terrorist organisations, including al-Shabaab, benefit from cross boundary trade in illicit goods arriving by sea to Somalia. Weak border security contributes to movement of terrorists across borders and the transnational movement of illicit goods and cargo. However, maintaining secure maritime, land and air borders is highly challenging in the Horn of Africa.

**Forced displacement** (refugees, IDPs and returnees) is an indicator of the region's fragility, instability and violent conflict. The region is home to one of the largest refugee and internally displaced populations in the world. Kenya and Ethiopia are among the top 10 refugees hosting countries and host around 300,000 and 250,000 Somali refugees respectively. In addition, both countries host a significant number of other refugee nationalities including from South Sudan. The number of Somalis affected by conflict and/or drought (people of concern) totalled 2.4 million by the end of 2017 (UNHCR 2017). The region's capacity to host more migrants and refugees seems close to saturated, as exemplified by the political pressures to close the Dadaab refugee camp in North Eastern Kenya. The region is a hub of mixed migration flows and corridors that ultimately connect to and contribute to migrant arrivals in Europe and Denmark.<sup>2</sup>

**Piracy and maritime insecurity.** While the extent of piracy has been reduced significantly, it remains an eminent threat to Danish shipping interests. Recent occurrences in the Indian Ocean clearly demonstrate that the region does not possess the full capacity to exercise authority over its territorial waters, spanning over one sixth of Africa's coastline. Other types of maritime crime are intertwined with the financing of violent extremist groups including transportation of fighters and weapons, human trafficking and diversified smuggling networks, generating significant illicit financial flows. Hence, maritime security off the region's coasts continues to be a Danish priority. Amongst the HoA nations only Kenya has a functioning Navy while Somalia, Somaliland and Djibouti have only rudimentary maritime police/coastguard units. Maritime security is crucial also for the region's landlocked economies as well as for Danish commercial interests.

**Kenya and Ethiopia** are regional hegemonies with combined economies that make up about 50 pct. of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states' economies. Both are key Troop-Contributing Countries (TCC) to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and influential members of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). As states sharing land and, in the case of Kenya, maritime borders, with Somalia, they face several transboundary threats and challenges that either directly emanate from - or are aggravated by the situation in Somalia. The three countries' international borders intersect in the so-called Mendera triangle, which is a potential flashpoint in relation to many of the region's threats.

**Gulf States.** Spill-over from the war in Yemen and the opposing Sunni and Shia aligned forces combined with the growing engagement of the Gulf States in the HoA poses a challenge to the region and its development partners. The inflow of attention and funding represent appealing alternatives to more conventional approaches by development partners and OECD aid effectiveness principles of accountability and transparency. The growing attention of Gulf States towards the HoA and the manifestation of their proxy interests represent an important factor in the political dynamics in Somalia. The Gulf States and Turkey have, for example, provided



significant amounts of funding to address the region's humanitarian crisis - but can on the other hand contribute to undermining ongoing state building processes based on their national interests.

## **2.2 Gender dimensions**

Women in the HoA experience disproportionate marginalisation and exclusion, which in turn increases their exposure to negative impacts from conflict and violence. The gender gap comprises lack of access to healthcare, education, political participation and economic opportunities, as well as disregard for human rights, including very high levels of Female Genital Mutilation<sup>3</sup>. Of the countries covered by the programme, Kenya ranks number 146 out of 188 countries on the most current Gender Inequality Index (GII), with Ethiopia ranking 174 and Somalia (though not included in the 2016 GII) assessed to be ranking among the bottom five. The short- and long-term gendered consequences of the conflict in Somalia are profound as conflict and instability exacerbate already entrenched gender inequalities in patriarchal societies. The protracted conflict has resulted in widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

Women play an active role in al-Shabaab and Islamic state both in Somalia and Kenya as well as in clan conflicts in Somalia. This includes intelligence gathering, financial contributions and enabling financial transfers, recruitment, support roles and more rarely active fighting. On the other hand, women also play an important role in peace processes, especially community level reconciliation, including disengagement of al-Shabaab combatants (sons). Moreover, women, in Somalia in particular, constitute the social and economic fabric at community level to a large extent.

The Programme addresses a broad variety of gender related issues. The SSF for instance has a strong focus on women's empowerment and inclusion in peace and mediation processes, such as by supporting women's voice and participation in the formation of district councils or their socio-economic opportunities in areas under stress (indicator included in the results framework). The support to the International Peace Support Training Centre and AMISOM stabilisation activities will also include gender related activities as has been the case hitherto. Targeted initiatives towards protection of women, including against sexual and gender based violence, is expected to be supported under the bilateral Somalia Country Programme 2019-2023.

## **2.3 Human rights deficiencies**

The human rights situation in the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, remains challenging across a number of fundamental human rights. Patterns of (political) repression including intimidation against media and activists are widespread. Moreover, governments' inability or unwillingness to respond to serious allegation of unlawful killings, torture and other serious violations create a reinforcing environment of impunity. Another issue is security forces' and related services' inability to operate in a human rights compliant manner – being it AMISOM, coast guard or police. Often it is the result of a unidimensional (“tough”) approach to security combined with lack of training and absence of standard procedures.

The human rights situation in Somalia remains dire, especially when it comes to protection of civilians. In the period January 2016 to October 2017 UNSOM documented a total of 4,585 civilian casualties (2,078 killed and 2,507 injured), 60 per cent of which were attributed to al-Shabaab. State- and non-state actors also carried out extrajudicial executions; sexual and gender-based violence; arbitrary arrests and detention; and abductions. Somali children are disproportionately affected by the conflict, and are exposed to grave violations during military operations, including killing, maiming, and arrest and detention by Somali security forces.

Generally, a human rights based approach (HRBA) has been applied throughout programming to ensure human rights sensitivity and awareness across engagements (see section 3.3). The

support to the International Peace Support Training Centre and AMISOM will comprise dedicated human rights, humanitarian law and protection related activities as has been the case hitherto. Targeted initiatives towards protection of children, including rehabilitation of children associated with al-Shabaab, is expected to be supported by the bilateral Somalia Country Programme 2019-2023.

## 2.4 Corruption

Corruption is rampant in the Horn of Africa and rent-seeking behaviour absorbs funds earmarked for public expenditure and thus undermines everything from social services provision to security sector services. Corruption is also an enabler for conflict and insecurity as it penetrates security forces, fuels al-Shabaab and undermines state-building in Somalia. Initiatives to reform institutions to counter corruption threaten entrenched elites and patronage systems, feeding on corrupt practises including misuse of humanitarian and development funds. Somalia ranks at the very bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (176 of 176 countries). Corruption continues to perpetuate al-Shabaab’s claim to relevance, as it feeds off the grievances of communities that are excluded from political processes and resource sharing. Denmark supports anti-corruption efforts in Somalia under the bilateral country programme.

Corruption is also a serious problem in Kenya, which ranks number 145 on the index – both at the upper-most levels manifested in elite capture, and at a community level where business and political interests are entangled in a self-sustaining system of identity-based patronage. Kenya has nevertheless introduced measures to prevent corruption with the new constitution adopted in 2010. Although Ethiopia has a relatively (relative to Somalia and Kenya) better score on the index ranking 108 due to a strong legislative framework to prevent corruption, corruption and rent seeking still flourish with rare enforcement of anti-corruption legislation.

The Programme’s measures to address corruption include delegating to partners with reliable financial management systems with which Denmark has prior experience; clarity in engagement documentation of the standards expected; reserving the right to discontinue engagements in the event of mismanagement; Third Party Monitoring (TPM) where necessary; and close and on-going monitoring by engagement managers. Risk management options for PSP-HOA, which have been written into the engagement documents, include application of TPM, periodic audits of how partners have used Danish funding, and reclamation of funds.

## 2.5 Summary of key drivers of conflict to be addressed by the Programme

The Programme only addresses a subset of the multifaceted and multilevel drivers of conflict outlined in the section above and annex 1. It mostly focusses on more immediate response or direct prevention of conflict drivers in contrast to the Country Programmes that tackle some of the root causes of conflict such as poverty and unemployment, weak general governance and corruption, and marginalisation. Key drivers of conflict to be addressed by the Programme are summarised in the table below.

*Table 1: Key drivers of conflict to be addressed by the Programme*

Category	Conflict drivers
Political, identity, socioeconomic drivers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Clan) elite contestation over power, people and territory, at the local, state and federal level with marginalizing impact. Legacies of violence and trauma.</li> <li>• Violent Extremism with al-Shabaab continuing to oppose the Federal Government and Federal Member States and controlling large sections of the Somali countryside. Al-Shabaab (and other militia and terrorist groups) continues to attract members from economically or socially disfranchised groups.</li> </ul>

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- Organized crime often with transnational features.

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Institutional drivers (facilitators)

- Weak and fragile national governance and security institutions with low legitimacy not capable of exercising legitimate authority (military, police, border security, financial intelligence).
  - Weak regional peace and security institutions; suboptimum border cooperation and law enforcement.
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### 3 Strategic Considerations and justification

Denmark's strategic interests related to the Horn of Africa are converging around global challenges such as refugee and irregular migration flows, violent extremism and terrorism, and the security and safety of the critical maritime transport route between Europe and Asia. The programme and its priorities is justified by its relevance in tackling some of the drivers of conflict outlined above.

Accordingly, the objective of the programme as previously outlined is: Improved peace and stability in the Horn of Africa by strengthening local, national and regional actors' capacity and ability to manage conflict and insecurity, counter threats and exercise legitimate authority. The Programme's overall objective and its underlying thematic programme objectives are closely aligned with the objective of the Somalia Policy Paper which is to support the development of a stable, peaceful and resilient Somalia in inclusive economic development that can offer its citizens a positive future and where the government is able to exercise authority with the aim that the situation in Somalia no longer threatens regional and international peace, security and prosperity.

In this way the Programme contributes to the implementation of Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017-2018 as it engages directly on the Strategy's priority theme "Migration, instability and terrorism". In line with the foreign and security policy and the strategic guidance provided in The World 2030, the Programme includes a specific focus on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism both because of the severe impact of violent extremism in the region, but also because of Denmark's commitment to combating violent extremism as a global challenge.

This section outlines the justification and rationale behind the programme, the principles which underpins the programme logic; complementarity with other instruments and initiatives; lessons learned; results framework; risks; and budget figures at thematic level.

#### 3.1 Justification, principles and Danish strengths

The aim of the Programme is to maximise the impact of Denmark's foreign and security policy through targeted prioritisation of areas of engagement and engagement partners by applying the criteria outlined in the Foreign and Security Policy Review ("Taksøe-rapporten"), i.e. weighing Danish interests at stake, the nature and availability of effective partnerships, and influence through Denmark's expertise and experience of using civilian, police and military capacities.

**Whole-of-Government approach.** In addition to the strategic pointers already mentioned above and in the introduction of this Programme Document, the purpose of the Programme is to support bilateral and multilateral efforts that underpin broad stabilisation initiatives in their individual capacity and collectively as a comprehensive and regional engagement. Accordingly, the Programme addresses security issues in a comprehensive manner with a broad range of initiatives and in a way that integrates various instruments. Moreover, it takes into consideration other Danish and international interventions in the same area and ensure coordination with other actors.

The Programme's mix of ODA and non-ODA funds makes it especially suited for a comprehensive approach. The Whole-of-Government approach has been operationalised both through more abstract complementary of engagements such as civilian stabilisation efforts by Somalia Stability Fund and military efforts of AMISOM supported by training, as well as in very concrete civilian and military cooperation through deployment of Danish defence, navy, police and civilian expertise, facilitating, for example, integrated planning within EASF.

**Regionality and risk preparedness.** Regional conflict and fragility situations occur as the result of interlinked processes with local causes and transnational connections. Recognizing that the conflict in Somalia is caused and sustained by a wide range of underlying and interconnected drivers, the programme targets Somalia as the epicentre of regional instability with collateral effects in both Kenya and Ethiopia. Hence, the programme comprises engagements in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Individual engagements at the national level have been prioritised for their potential important contribution to the region’s overall ability to prevent and manage instability and conflict. Support to EASF, regional peace support training centres and IGAD CVE activities benefits other Eastern African countries as well.

The Programme is focussed on generating stabilisation outcomes and accepts comparably high levels of risk. It is designed to operate in the “sharp end” of Denmark’s international engagement. Further, it exploits its ability to work in the civil-military nexus in a highly politicised and volatile context. Finally, it sets targets that often differ from conventional development targets and deliberately opt out of engagement types that may be relevant but that fall outside the realm of a stabilisation programme and would fit better under other available programming modalities.

**Strategic partnerships.** The Programme draws on and benefits from the dialogue and partnership with organisations across the HoA, which have been established and developed over the course of the previous phases as well as through different phases of the Danish Africa Programme for Peace. Partnership relations have been built at political and programmatic levels and across the civilian and defence domain and have secured rare levels of access and policy impact. The programme will prioritise to cultivate strategic partnerships with similar conflict-focussed programming instruments such as the UK Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), and with regional peace and security actors such as IGAD and the AU and involved partner governments. Building on the established relationship with IGAD under the Africa Programme for Peace, the Programme adds another layer of regional collaboration on P/CVE. The existing programme with UNODC is expanded into a regional strategic partnership supporting maritime and land border management.

**Danish interests and strengths.** The programme focuses specifically on areas where Denmark has significant economic and security interests such as maritime security, countering violent extremism, stabilisation, curbing irregular migration, and enhancing regional peacekeeping capacity. These are engagement areas where suitable and capable partners can be identified; and interventions are likely to generate outcomes aligned with Danish interests. It deploys military, policing and civilian expertise with a strategic regional peace support force (EASF), the most important navy in the region (Kenya), CIMIC and C-IED training of AMISOM, and work with key UN actors (UNSOM, UNODC) thus bringing Danish capacities directly to bear.

**International principles.** In addition to the PSF principles, including the regional approach and risk preparedness mentioned above and whole-of-government approach outlined below, the Programme adhere to the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, including always taking the context as the starting point, ensuring to do no harm, and the importance of efficient coordination among governments, other stakeholders and international partners (see the section on Whole-of- Government above).

### **3.2 Complementarity with other instruments and frameworks**

**Complementarity with Danish bilateral programmes.** The Programme compliments other Danish instruments and interventions in the Horn of Africa. The Somalia Stability Fund and AMISOM’s civilian affairs, for instance, contribute to basic state-building at Federal Member state level as well as local and community level. In this way, the PSP HoA complements the Danish bilateral Country Programme for Somalia that also supports Local Governance. As such,

the Danish engagements provide broad support to the implementation of the Wadajir Framework, the Somalia Government's framework for stabilisation and for rebuilding governance. It also responds to the UN's approach to stabilisation, the "Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability". Another example of direct complementarity is the Programme's support to al-Shabaab disengagement, where the next bilateral Somalia Country Programme (2019-2023) is expected to support the rehabilitation of children associated with al-Shabaab.

The Country Programme for Kenya has, under its Thematic Governance Programme, a focus on improved capacity and effectiveness of Civil Society Organisations, government and security oversight bodies to counter violent extremism, and more broadly to prevent political and natural resource conflicts. These efforts include Civil Society Organisations' engagements around preventing violent extremism and electoral conflict mitigation initiatives, addressing politically instigated communal violence in the Counties of Kisumu, Bungoma and the whole of the Coast region. Also the Danish Defence (currently) has deployed staff to the international Combined Maritime Forces 150 and 151 which complements support to Kenya Navy and coast guard/maritime law enforcement units (Kenya and Somalia) supported under the Programme.

In all three countries, Denmark is heavily engaged in humanitarian relief and resilience-building efforts through international organisations as well as Danish NGOs - work which is evidently undermined by violence and conflict.

**Complementarity with the Danish Africa Programme for Peace (APP).** The overall APP objective is to promote peace and security as a basis for sustainable development in Africa. This is done through support to the development of an operational African conflict prevention capability, strengthening of the African security and governance architecture and promotion of the relationship between civil society and the regional organisations. APP primarily works directly with capacity development of the African organisations that constitute the building blocks of the African Peace and Security Architecture and African Governance Architecture, such as The African Union (AU), ECOWAS and IGAD. Thus while the two instruments are distinct, they have the same overarching objective, to promote peace, security and stability. One way of viewing the relationship is to see APP as working at the "strategic normative" and continental/regional level, while the PSP HOA works at the "strategic operational" and regional/country level, with direct peace and stabilisation activities in relevant countries. IGAD, for instance, receives support for capacity development under the APP and is engaged in mediation processes in Somalia while it is also a partner under the PSP HOA with more narrow tasks related to CVE.

**Complementarity with international security and stabilisation support.** The Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) in Somalia was adopted at the London Conference as part of the Security Pact in May 2017. It provides the conceptual framework for the international community's commitments and cooperation to support the security sector in Somalia, including the implementation of the National Security architecture and ultimately the transfer of security responsibility from AMISOM to Somalia. It consists of four main strands: 1) Enabling effective AMISOM operations; 2) Accelerating the development of Somali National security institutions and forces, including police and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); 3) Support to the Somali Government's stabilisation plans and Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority/Accountability; 4) Countering/Preventing Violent Extremism (C/PVE). The programme contributes to all strands: 1 – peace support training centres supporting AMISOM; 2 – police through AMISOM Stabilisation and Al-Shabaab disengagement; 3 - SSF, AMISOM stabilisation); and 4 - al-Shabaab Disengagement.

### **3.3 Human rights based approach**

The Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) has been mainstreamed in the PSP HoA design by incorporating crosscutting requirements in all programmes and through the inclusion of specific expected results that advance the four principles of participation and inclusion, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency. The principles are also reflected in the PSEDs and in specific measures. This includes, for example, requirements related to duty-bearing responsibilities of Somali government authorities related to disengaged al-Shabaab combatants (partnership with UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office), and safeguards against the use of Danish funds in cases that can be related to the death penalty (UNODC). Seconded advisors from the Danish Defence and Danish National Police will integrate HRBA in their work with their counterpart institutions.

### **3.4 Lessons learned applied**

The formulation process for the PSP HoA 2018-2022 has in particular benefitted from: (i) the hosting of an International Stabilisation Conference in Nairobi in December 2016, (ii) an Internal Strategy Seminar held in Addis Ababa in April 2017, (iii) a 2017 mid-term review of PSP HoA II and (iiii) commissioned analytical work on countering violent extremism.<sup>4</sup> This learning process has informed the Programme with lessons from previous phases of the programme, analysis of current trends and developments relating to conflict and stabilisation dynamics in the region and in Somalia, and violent extremism. In the following some of the main lessons learned are presented including how the Programme is responding to these lessons.

The 2014 Evaluation Report of the PSF reiterated the need for the new PSF programmes to make extra efforts in identifying strategic and targeted short term peace and stabilisation engagements to maximise opportunities for impact. This was seen as particularly important for smaller international partners such as Denmark. Hence, the formulation process has focused on limiting the priorities, sharpening the stabilisation profile of the TPs and the engagements and identifying complementarities between different Danish regional and country engagements.

The 2017 Mid Term Review (MTR) found that the Programme 2015-2017 had been deliberate in choosing well-performing regional engagements by directing efforts towards trans-boundary challenges and opportunities which are likely to be most effectively addressed through a regional approach. Thus, a whole-of-government approach has been applied whereby civilian, police and defence capacities from across government institutions have been drawn upon to address multi-dimensional regional peace and stabilisation challenges. Furthermore, the programme is developed with a focus on complementarity and avoiding the duplication or crowding out of initiatives in the development and humanitarian domains. The formulation process has also been focused on continuation of engagements that are performing well and has only introduced necessary, often minor, adjustments to these engagements and only when necessary, more radical changes reflecting a changed context.

Programming, implementation and monitoring in Somalia is challenging, and even more so without a continuous, Danish physical presence neither on the civilian nor the defence side. This situation is likely to continue during the implementation period of the Programme. Hence Third Party Monitoring mechanism will be introduced for risk-prone engagements that are not already covered by other partners Third Party Monitoring systems (applies for AMISOM).

Stabilisation efforts are meant to achieve results in the short and medium term but proper analysis, trust-building, lesson-learning and partnership-strengthening take time. This points towards a need for longer programme implementation periods. Hence, the implementation period for the Programme has been increased from 3 years in Phase II to 4 years - July 2018 to June 2022.

There is a need for continuing institutionalisation of the decentralised management arrangements for the Programme, including the streamlining of reporting channels. Additional training on PSF reporting and monitoring procedures took place in January and February 2018. Practical implications of the decentralised management arrangement have been captured in Chapter 6. The

Programme emphasises the importance of firmly and concretely operationalising gender perspectives and always ensuring that women are included in the engagements (see section on “Gender dimensions”). Women play a crucial role in all phases of peacebuilding, and not least in the very first stabilisation efforts. Involvement and participation of women in all aspects of the interventions under this Programme is instrumental if lasting stabilisation outcomes are to be achieved. The Programme will also continue to work with youth, such as in relation to al-Shabaab disengagement and defectors’ rehabilitation or support under the Somalia Stability Fund to involvement of youth in peace processes or economic activities for youth of marginalized communities. This also implies working in a concerted effort with the relevant country programmes in the region.

### 3.5 Programme Results Framework

Below is presented the overall Results Framework (also see Annex 3) and the theories of changes (ToC) are presented. The table below summarises the ToCs informing the design of the TPs to show the key assumptions, processes of change and outcomes to which the TPs will *contribute*. It also presents substantive linkages between the thematic programme objective and the kinds of available engagements identified through the formulation process.

*Table 1: Programme Results Framework (objectives and outcomes)\**

<b>Programme Objective</b>	<i>Improved peace and stability in the Horn of Africa by strengthening local, national and regional actors’ capacity and ability to manage conflict and insecurity, counter threats and exercise legitimate authority.</i>
<b>TP1 Objective</b>	Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.
Impact indicator	Score of security apparatus, group grievances and state legitimacy respectively as measured by the Fund for Peace (“Fragility Index”). EASF demonstrates during field training exercise in late 2019 or 2020 that it is capable to deploy and carry out a mission relative to the mission objective.
Theory of Change	<i>If regional, national and local security and stabilisation actors in the Horn of Africa are strengthened, then major security challenges can be better addressed and legitimate national security forces can gradually become the main providers of security in Somalia.</i>
Outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• East African peace support personnel (military, police and civilians) are able to conduct effective PSOs according to AU/UN international standards</li> <li>• Increased security and stability in south central Somalia</li> <li>• State authority and legitimacy in Somalia is enhanced, and political and communal conflict is reduced</li> </ul>
<b>TP2 Objective</b>	Reduced violent extremism in geographical areas of programme implementation through prevention and disengagement efforts.
Impact indicator	Reduced impact of violent extremist attacks in the region as measured by Global Terrorism Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace and/or similar indexes.
Theory of Change	<i>If local, national and regional actors develop and introduce national strategies, systems and structures which focus on prevention of violent extremism and promotion of disengagement from violent extremist groups, receiving and reintegrating low risk individuals and groups into their communities, then the basis for recruitment is reduced and members of violent extremist groups</i>



	<i>are offered a path away from violence.</i>
Outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IGAD’s Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism is delivered on</li> <li>• Improved regional capacity for preventing and countering violent extremism</li> <li>• Increased defection from al-Shabaab</li> </ul>
<b>TP3 Objective</b>	Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders
Impact indicator	Reduced transnational organised crime across the borders of the three countries of the programme as assessed by UNODC and other relevant agencies/organisations such as the Global Initiative against Transnational organised crime
Theory of Change	<i>If the region’s governments are capacitated to regulate and manage their shared borders and seize opportunities for collaboration, then the risk of conflicts along the border decreases, migration can be managed and reduced and threats from transnational crime decrease.</i>
Outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Member States have increased law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and analytical capacity to counter corruption, illicit and unregulated flows of people and goods including effective enforcement structures in selected sea/dry ports</li> <li>• Ethiopia has strengthened capacity to enforce legislation against illicit financial flows according to international standards leading to successful prosecutions</li> <li>• The Kenyan Navy has increased operational capacity and maritime awareness</li> </ul>

*\*Indicators are indicative and will be finalized when the entire results framework has been completed in terms of indicators, baselines and targets when PSEDs have been agreed/ signed with partners.*

### 3.6 Aid effectiveness

The design of the Programme against the OECD DAC criteria is summarised below.

*Table 2: PSP HoA and Aid effectiveness*

<b>DAC Criteria</b>	<b>PSP HoA Measures</b>
Relevance	The relevance of the Programme is demonstrated by the high degree of harmonisation and alignment at regional and national levels with IGAD strategies, the EASF strategic plan, AMISOM work-plans, regional and national priorities on maritime security, regional efforts to address trans-boundary crime, including money laundering and human trafficking. In Somalia, the engagements are aligned with the Somalia Security Pact and the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS). In Kenya, the engagement has been developed together with the Kenyan Navy. In Ethiopia, the engagement is aligned with the government’s strategies relating to anti money laundering.
Effective	The Programme is effective in that it concentrates on a subset of stabilisation issues relating to the situation in Somalia, with significant importance to peace and stability in the region. Denmark is engaged in the development-humanitarian-security nexus with humanitarian assistance, country programmes and defence cooperation. The Programme thus contributes to enhance effectiveness of other engagements.
Efficiency	The Programme is implemented through collaboration and coordination with a limited number of partners as the Programme applies a range of implementation modalities; bilateral support, delegated cooperation, support to multilateral agencies, embedded advisors to mention some. Hence, the Programmes aims at

	finding a balance between the potential for Danish influence and reducing transaction costs and risks. The Programme relies on the partners' M&E systems where these are deemed strong enough and engages Third Party Monitoring (TPM) capacities if and when needed.
Sustainability	The Programme is implemented by relying on partner systems where possible, such as in the collaboration with the African Union (AU), IGAD and United Nations or through aligning closely with organisational plans such as the engagement with EASF. The Programme also engages in joint funding mechanisms set up by international partners and delegated cooperation agreements thus also reducing dependence on only Danish funding. Every engagement has been formulated with a view to an eventual Danish exit and transfer of responsibility and financing to the partners.
Impact	The impact of the Programme are expected to be: (i) strengthened regional cooperation and (ii) regional and national institutions and systems enabled to, independently and collectively, address and contain stabilisation risks thereby (iii) reducing the array of collateral effects instability has on the region and beyond - including those linked to Danish national interests.

### 3.7 Contextual risks and scenarios

The risks the Programme faces range from minor to significant in terms of the contextual, programmatic and institutional risks. The identified risks that may counteract the successful implementation of engagements and achievements of expected results are many and they are also assessed to potentially have major impact on the programmatic environment. The approach taken is contained in the risk response and mitigation measures outlined in Annex 5, which includes potential scenarios that may cause changes to the programme or its individual engagements. The programme is designed by defining programme objectives and identifying potential risks and scenarios in a manner so as to avoid to make changes in the objectives when changes in scenarios and risks occur. However, there may be a need for other changes such as changing the partner, geographical area, level of engagement, budgeting, time lines etc. Annex 5 provides concrete guidance to engagement managers on options to detect and respond to risks, while recognising that how these options will be used in the case of each engagement will depend on the situation faced.

Escalation of conflict and/or political instability is a key concern in all of the engagement areas, though Somalia is evidently most prone to active violent conflict. At the local level, particularly in Somalia, insecurity also hinders access to implementation areas and implementation modalities and monitoring systems therefore need to be set up with partners that have the capacity to mitigate these challenges. There is a close relationship between the management of risks identified in Annex 5 and the ToC detailed for each Thematic Programme in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Programme and engagement managers will be required to actively manage risk within the overall programme and each engagement needs to reconfirm and potentially adjust the underlying ToC.

While it is hard to predict developments particularly in Somalia, the table below outlines three scenarios, which may in different ways impact - negatively or positively - the operational space for the PSP HOA III. The engagements developed for the Programme largely responds to the "most likely scenario" i.e. an anticipation that things will develop without radical positive or negative developments. Assumptions relating directly to political dynamics in Somalia are a lot less certain compared e.g. to the political stability of Kenya, however.

The planning scenario for Somalia is based on the assessment underpinning the Somalia Security Pact of May 2017, entailing a combination of sustained military advances against al-Shabaab, combined with progress on the operational effectiveness of security forces and a constitutional

order strong enough to manage a temporary increase in intra-governmental contestation with coordinated international support. This will allow for a gradual change of character and composition of AMISOM as a transition to national institutions takes hold at federal-, state- and community levels. Conditions for voluntary return of IDPs and refugees would improve.

The table below does not consider possible extreme external events such as a collapse in Eritrea, massive spill-over from the conflict in Yemen, or new inter-state regional conflict but focuses on more likely scenarios with direct impact on the PSP.

Worst-case Scenario	Most likely Scenario	Ideal Scenario
<b>Security and political developments in Somalia</b>		
Government collapse (assassination of leadership or the like, dissolving of Cabinet etc.)	Government w. some capacity and sustained engagement structures	Merits-based appointments, reforms and increasing GOS capacity
Collapse of state formation process resulting in conflict. Somaliland increasingly asserting independence	Frail but on-going state formation. Status quo on Somaliland situation	Constructive settlements around state structures. Radically improved working relationship w. Somaliland
Resurgence of Al-Shabaab	Al-Shabaab carries out asymmetrical attacks. Does not hold territory but controls significant rural areas	Diminishing al-Shabaab presence and ability to undertake attacks
Failed attempts at reforming security sector	Timid incremental improvements of security sector	Leadership and emerging merits-based reform of security sector
Intensified clan identification and division	Emerging reconciliation/ cohesion efforts at local level.	Diminishing tension along critical fault lines within and between clans
Increasing negative engagement of external actors	Moderately increasing both constructive and challenging engagement of external actors	Formalised constructive engagement of external actors on key issues. Government rejecting interference
<b>Commitment to and effectiveness of AMISOM</b>		
Key Troop and Police Contributing Countries rapidly disengaging from supplying troops, commanders and equipment	AMISOM contributions aligned with transition plan but with sub-standard equipment	AMISOM provided with key enablers allowing more effective military campaigns and functioning as a deterrent
Major security events with high numbers of casualties	Gradually reduced number of AMISOM casualties	Minimal AMISOM casualties
Loss of liberated areas	Continued incremental military gains and inability of Al-Shabaab to apply other strategies than asymmetrical warfare but still significant pockets of al-Shabaab control	Further consolidation of AMISOM/government control with minimal pockets of al-Shabaab control
Key donors pulling out of financing agreements	Funding sustained aligned with transition plan	Increasing budgets for AMISOM
Major human rights abuses continuously reported leading to backlash on many fronts	Confirmed reports of human rights abuses by AMISOM troops with limited repercussions	Effective human rights monitoring mechanisms implemented within AMISOM and externally in

		AMISOM Human Rights Section
Dysfunction of the civilian AMISOM pillar	Some but inadequate activity and reporting from AMISOM Civil Affairs	New leadership and strengthening of AMISOM Political Section and mandate leading to more effective bridging of military and civilian stabilisation efforts
Inability to generate formed police units and individuals police commanders	Inadequate bridging of mission components but meeting targets for Formed Police Units	AMISOM military component effectively handing over to AMISOM Police and SNP
<b>Regional political cooperation</b>		
Worsening regional cooperation impacting on regional initiatives such as AML, border collaboration, EASF and IGAD CVE	Some challenging regional dynamics but overall collaborative environment	Increased trust between regional actors. Appetite for regional collaboration at political as well as operative levels across a range of sectors
<b>Developments in Kenya and Ethiopia</b>		
Political conflict flaring up shifting political attention towards domestic issues to the detriment of regional engagement. Backlash against engagement in Somalia.	Domestic stability and governments prioritising regional collaboration within sectorial and historic constraints	Increased “East-Pan-Africanism” leading to high-level commitment to regional collaboration translating into enhances regional collaboration in key focus sectors
<b>Programme Response</b>	<b>Programme Responses</b>	<b>Programme Response</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reduced funding and increasing technical assistance. Increasing analytical work, including conflict analysis.</li> <li>- Review of work plans</li> <li>- Identification of new partners and/or modalities.</li> <li>- Enhanced political dialogue.</li> <li>- Consolidate and safeguard results rather than expand activities.</li> </ul>	This is the scenario the Programme formulation is based on.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increase focus on longer capacity development of local actors rather than short term legitimacy building.</li> <li>- Reduce funding for immediate stabilisation (peace dividend) and increase for longer term state-building.</li> <li>- Expand support to broader geographical scope</li> <li>- Extend more trust and responsibility to implementing partners.</li> </ul>

### 3.8 Budget at thematic programme level

Table 3 summarises the budget at thematic programme level, noting that it does not differentiate between the programme's three funding sources. A detailed budget is presented in Annex 4.

*Table 3: Thematic Programme indicative budget per year (four years)*

Thematic Programme	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Total DKK million
<b>1</b> Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.	19.8	23.5	21.6	17.6	2.3	84.7
<b>2</b> Reduced levels of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa with a particular focus on Somalia through prevention and disengagement.	7.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	0	27
<b>3</b> Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders	24.9	8.8	9.8	10.8	1.9	57.2
Management, M&E, and knowledge (including TA and their security)	1.4	6.7	5.7	9.7	1.4	24
Unallocated	0	6.5	8.5	10	0	25
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>219</b>

## **4 Thematic Programme 1: Regional conflict management capacity and stabilisation and security in Somalia**

### **4.1 Strategic considerations and justification**

The objective of TP1 is: *Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.* The main purpose of the engagement is to continue and consolidate the further development of the EASF as a relevant and efficient response mechanism towards peace and security and to endow AMISOM with much needed capacities in order to increase its operational capacity. These efforts are complemented with support to civilian stabilisation efforts in Somalia undertaken by AMISOM to consolidate military gains and successively by the Somalia Stability Fund to sustain and build on those gains through supporting political settlements and reconciliation, state-building and confidence-building service delivery.

The overall outcomes of these efforts are expected to be:

- East African peace support personnel (military, police and civilians) are able to conduct effective Peace Support Operations according to AU/UN international standards
- Increased security and stability in south central Somalia
- State and local authority and legitimacy in Somalia is enhanced, and political and local conflict is reduced

### **Strategic considerations**

At the regional level, the East African Standby Force (EASF) has seen significant achievements and, while yet to be deployed, constitutes a promising component of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The region thus faces the paradox of having the most operationally capable regional standby force in Africa while also hosting several of the most protracted and violent conflicts on the continent. Kenya and Ethiopia are core members of the EASF and TCCs to AMISOM and are also contributing with bilateral military engagements outside AMISOM.

Somalia has made important progress towards establishing the main foundations for the Somali state formation to consolidate continuous peace and stabilisation efforts. The federal structure is advancing and in the process of being reaffirmed at the regional and local level. The National Leadership Forum comprising federal and FMS leaders is functioning as a high level political forum for consultation. However, there is no consolidated national political settlement, which genuinely addresses underlying grievances often associated with resource and power sharing, and clan identity - nor has Somalia seen consolidated reconciliation efforts at the local level.

African Union peacekeepers (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) have made progress in reclaiming territory from al-Shabaab since 2012 though these gains remain fragile. State-building continues to be undermined by numerous sources of instability, including violent extremism and competition between multiple armed groups. As a result, the state and its institutions lack capacity to provide security guarantees, governance, rule of law, as well as basic social services. These deficiencies conversely makes it difficult to persuade communities to shift their loyalty from al-Shabaab to the Somali state.

### **Thematic programme focus**

The objective of TP 1 focuses on two interlinked areas. Firstly, it supports the EASF's and regional peace support training centres' capacity to contribute to regional peace and security. It seeks to further develop regional conflict management capacity through integrated training of military, police and civilian capacities under the EASF and supported through a Danish Whole-

of-Government approach involving specialised Danish capacities. The training includes military and police from key troop and police contributing countries to AMISOM. While AMISOM is not an Eastern African regional force, military forces are drawn from the region and the countries trained as part of the EASF. Contingents from these countries have benefitted from the training and operational preparedness standards that have been part of the Danish Armed Forces support to the EASF under the Nordic Defence Cooperation since 2008<sup>5</sup>. The supply chains to AMISOM, EASF and the national forces comprising them are often the same. In this TP Denmark is drawing on, and reinforcing the success of, its previous engagements to develop the capacity of the region's armed forces to respond to and deter conflict in the region, incl. Somalia.

Furthermore, TP1 aims to increase the operational preparedness of AMISOM to better handle the threat from C-IED in the Somalia mission theatre. The Danish Defence will through the close partnership with BPST support pre-deployment training of primarily Kenyan and Ugandan troop contributions in handling the IED threat. The pre-deployment training might be further expanded relative to the security dynamics in the mission area and according to requests from troop contributing countries.

Secondly, it will support civilian stabilisation efforts in areas at risk of falling back into the hands of al-Shabaab. It is critical that sub-federal level institutions (state and non-state; local and federal member state administrations) build trust with those they govern and that they deliver in their roles. These efforts are undertaken by AMISOM's civilian component in high-risk areas with immediate and short-term stabilisation needs through early peace support efforts, Quick Impact Projects and support to key institutions and structures at the local level, including police. They are complemented by activities funded through the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) - a multi-partner funding arrangement managed by the United Kingdom. While AMISOM stabilisation support will be focused on short term peace support projects and capacity development and infrastructure for the Somalia National Police, SSF seeks to consolidate these early gains through addressing key fault lines within and between communities, federal member states and the federal government and through political processes and basic institution building with the aim to increase legitimacy.

Consolidation of security gains by AMISOM requires effective stabilisation efforts and the ability of the Somali Security Forces to gradually take over security responsibilities. The engagements thus supports the objectives outlined in the CAS and the Somalia Security Pact as well as UNSCR resolution on gradual reduction in AMISOM's military component with concomitant increases in the police component and increased AMISOM support to the development of the SNP and FMS police forces, eventually paving the way for a conditioned AMISOM drawdown.

### **Regional priorities**

TP 1 supports on-going commitments by East African countries to build regional capacity to undertake peace support operations (PSO) in the region through supporting the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). The same countries, bilaterally and through IGAD and the African Union (AU) support - militarily and politically - the AMISOM PSO in Somalia including civilian efforts to ensure stability in areas at risk of falling back into the hands of al-Shabaab.

## **4.2 Results Framework (Outcome level)**

*Table 4: TP1 Results Framework, Outcome Indicators\**

<b>Thematic Programme Objective</b>	<b>Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.</b>
Impact Indicator	Fragility score as measured by the Fund for Peace incl. measures for



	security apparatus, group grievances and state legitimacy. EASF demonstrates during field training exercise in late 2019 or 2020 that it is capable to deploy and carry out a mission relative to the mission objective and prerequisites in place for a step-by-step transition of the responsibility of the security in Somalia from AMISOM to SNA/SNP.
Engagement 1.1	<b>Strengthening regional conflict management capacity through EASF</b>
Outcome	Contribute to EASF's attainment of "Full Autonomy" by the end of 2020 by demonstrating that vital institutional capacities are in place and that planning, conducting and evaluation of needed training activities/exercises can take place without substantial support from partners.  Enhancement of EASF's ability to plan, prepare and operate as a multilateral, integrated and multifunctional force ready to respond to threats towards peace and security in the region and across the continent.
Outcome indicators	Decisive institutional capacities such as EASF Movement Coordination Centre (MCC), EASF Early Warning and EASF CIS are prepared by 2020 according to existing concepts  EASF plan/conduct/evaluate by 2020 most training activities autonomously (100 % African instructors) only supported by partners in the mentor role.  EASF demonstrates during various exercises (MAPEX, CPX and FTX) in 2019 and 2020 that its member states can provide requisite force contributions, deploy, and operate its FHQ and its Mission Headquarters (MHQ) according to evaluation- and advisor reports.
Engagement 1.2	<b>AMISOM Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia</b>
Outcome	<i>AMISOM engages more effectively in early stabilisation efforts in liberated and at-risk areas in Somalia to sustain military gains</i>
Outcome indicator	Increase in number of functioning police stations, answering to functioning local administrations, in AMISOM, SNA and SNP held areas
Engagement 1.3	<b>SSF- led Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia</b>
Outcome	State legitimacy is enhanced and political and communal conflict is reduced
Outcome indicator	Status of communal conflicts in targeted areas. Status of political conflicts in targeted areas. Government legitimacy.

*\*Indicators are indicative and will be finalized when the entire results framework has been completed in terms of indicators, baselines and targets when PSEDs have been agreed/ signed with partners.*

#### 4.3 Theory of Change

If Denmark continues to support the further development of preventive conflict management capacity in EASF as a regional response mechanism to challenges towards peace and security and as a platform for regional dialogue and cooperation, then the Eastern African region will become a more stable and peaceful place, which is a prerequisite for development, prosperity and job

opportunities. Furthermore, if Denmark continues to support training of AMISOM troop contributions with its partners in the regional peace support training centres, then AMISOM will have improved capacity to neutralise Al-Shabaab in Somalia as a prerequisite for the gradual transition of the responsibility for the security in Somalia to SNA/SNP, which will be essential for a peaceful and prosperous Somalia in the longer term. Moreover, if Denmark supports activities that strengthen the legitimacy, visibility and efficiency of Somali authorities and contributes to conflict resolution that addresses fault-lines for political conflict, it will weaken al-Shabaab and contribute to longer term stability in Somalia.

*Table 5: TP1 Theory of Change\**

Assumption 1	If the FGS and AMISOM are capable of engaging with, absorbing and operationalizing support for planning, capacity-development and early recovery efforts in newly liberated and contested areas in Somalia, and...
Assumption 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If EASF provides a suitable framework for capacity development of the Force, and</li> <li>• EASF is willing and capable to absorb the support provided by Denmark, other Nordic countries and other partners, and</li> <li>• EASF member states continue to demonstrate political will and commitment, and</li> <li>• AMISOM is willing and capable to absorb the support provided by Denmark and other partners as a part of the pre-deployment training, and</li> </ul>
Assumption 3	Context-specific efforts in newly accessible or at-risk areas will contribute to creating the conditions under which local political settlements can be negotiated, stability can be sustained, and peace dividends can be delivered, then if...
Inputs	Denmark provides: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financial support, strategic guidance and technical expertise for EASF and support to AMISOM pre-deployment training and...</li> <li>• Financial support and strategic guidance for early recovery, stabilisation and critical local governance interventions then...</li> </ul>
Short term changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional security organizations engaged in Somalia develop their strategic, tactical and technical skills leading to the limitation of Al-Shabaab ability to operate freely in Somalia and improvement of the security situation; and</li> <li>• AMISOM better trained to provide security in the newly accessible or at-risk areas; transportation routes are secured, enabling freer movement of people and goods; and</li> <li>• The foundations for the Somali security forces (including police) to sustainably control territory begin to be established; and</li> <li>• Local administrations begin to be formed based on governance and service delivery that is more inclusive, accountable, non-discriminatory and transparent; and</li> <li>• Local political settlements outside Al-Shabaab's influence are promoted, leading to...</li> </ul>

Medium term changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regional standby forces and security organisations have stronger management and operational capacities to support deployment and sustain readiness; and</li> <li>Somalia local administrations, including local police services, in newly accessible and at-risk areas have greater presence and capacity and assume greater responsibility for security from AMISOM; and</li> <li>Al-Shabaab’s appeal is undermined and combatants increasingly defects; leading to...</li> </ul>
Long term changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Local/regional political settlements in South Central Somalia take root; and</li> <li>al-Shabaab is discredited as provider of public services at local level including justice and security services,</li> <li>AMISOM gradually withdraws from Somalia without jeopardising the security situation; and</li> <li>Regional standby forces/security organisations able to address Peace Support Operations’ needs without significant international support.</li> </ul>

\* *Time wise, short term refers to the first half of programme duration (0-2 years). Medium term refers to the second half of programmes duration (2-4 years). Long term (impact) refers to results that are expected to emerge by the end programme and beyond (4+).*

Apart from the Defence Attaché, four Danish advisors (military, police, civilian) will support the regional institutions and be an integral part of the engagement. At the same time it is essential to realise that the military advisers (like the police) are a prerequisite and a platform for accessibility to military organisations. Without deployed military advisers, Denmark would not be able to work in and influence organisations like the EASF (military component) and the Kenyan Navy.

#### 4.4 Summary of Engagements

##### Engagement 1.1 Peace Support Operations in Somalia and in the region – EASF

**Objective.** The objective of the engagement is: *Strengthening regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.*

The importance of EASF as a platform for cooperation and dialogue among its 10 Eastern Africa member states cannot be overestimated. Former belligerent armed forces, etc. are now working together on a daily basis in EASFs four permanent institutions (EASF Secretariat, EASF Planning Element, EASF Force Headquarters and EASF Log Base) and regular meetings take place among chiefs of defence and ministers of defence. EASF is therefore instrumental to regional integration and enhancement of mutual confidence and security among the countries in the region.

**Summary description.** Continuing support for EASF will enhance its capacity to implement the EASF 2015-2020 Strategic Plan, including in the delivery of effective training and pre-deployment exercises for EASF’s components (military, police and civilian). EASF is also indirectly relevant to AMISOM’s operations in Somalia as mentioned above. All of the AMISOM troop contributing countries<sup>1</sup> (TCCs) are also EASF members. The capacity of EASF members is directly relevant to AMISOM. At the same time, the programme contributes to the capability of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) to undertake critical conflict management

<sup>1</sup> Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.

operations in the region and hence is an investment in future regional stability. EASF is currently in a process of exploring and analysing how its standing capabilities can be utilised in periods where the Force is not deployed. Possible options include potential training role of SNA/SNP in Somalia. Denmark is furthermore supporting AMISOM with training provided in close partnership with the British Peace Support Team to troop contingents from primarily Kenya and Uganda within, but not limited to, the thematic areas of C-IED and CIMIC. The training takes place as a part of the pre-deployment training before rotation with troops in AMISOM.

**Partner.** An essential part of the Nordic Defence cooperation in Eastern Africa has been support to EASF and since 2009 a Nordic military advisor group has been placed together with the EASF headquarter in Nairobi, Kenya. A strong partnership has developed, and the Nordic countries have played an important role in the development of EASF. Denmark has used the PSF/PSP HoA 2011-2014 and 2015-2018 to provide this support. It should be noted that it has been decided that NORDEFECO assistance to EASF gradually will be scaled down towards 2020. As a result, the Danish adviser will be withdrawn at the end of 2019.

**Management and financing modality.** The Defence Attaché in RDE Nairobi will be the Engagement Manager. The Defence Command (DCD) will be the engagement owner for the financial and technical contributions to capacity-development of EASF (DKK 21 million). The financial management of this engagement is under DCD.

### **Engagement 1.2 AMISOM Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia**

**Objective.** The objective of the engagement is: *AMISOM engages more effectively in early stabilisation efforts in liberated and at-risk areas in Somalia thereby sustaining military gains with the view to transfer responsibility for security from AMISOM to Somalia security actors.*

**Summary description.** The purpose of the Danish support is to enable AMISOM to engage effectively in stabilization and early recovery in south central Somalia, thereby enabling the FGS to extend its state authority in order to prevent al-Shabaab from regaining territory and political influence. It will be critical to support the UN-mandated transition from AMISOM-led security to Somali-led security as stipulated in the “Transition Plan”, including to support an enhanced AMISOM focus on policing. This engagement supports AMISOM, through the AU, in providing non-military stabilisation support to liberated or at-risk communities. The aim is that military gains by AMISOM can be sustained and pave the way for Somali security forces (army and police) to take over. Local administrations begin to be formed based on governance and service delivery that is more inclusive, accountable, non-discriminatory and transparent.

The engagement is implemented in alignment with the Somali National Security Architecture and the Comprehensive Approach to Security in Somalia (CAS) agreed in June 2017 following the Somali Security Pact agreed at the London Conference in May 2017. This support enables AMISOM to deliver QIPs and PSPs in areas under their control and in support of the AMISOM mandate. Currently, liberated and contested areas of South Central Somalia cannot be held and stability sustained without a continued AMISOM military presence in the short term. The Danish support contributes to the areas mentioned above by focusing on three types of engagements:

- Promotion of reconciliation platforms through workshops, conferences, town halls and community mobilization and sensitization;
- Implementation of community initiated QIPs and PSPs including the rehabilitation of water, health, education and social infrastructure;
- Capacity development and infrastructure development of the Somalia National Police as stipulated in the National Security Policy (NSP). The NSP is a FGS accepted stabilization

document stipulating timeframes for police activities. AMISOM will therefore support the NSP as relates to police activities.

**Partner.** This engagement builds upon Denmark's relationship with the AU and AMISOM established under PSP Phase II. It has been designed with lessons from Phase II in mind and provides a unique source and support to the AU / AMISOM. Key lessons include the importance of close and continues dialogue, incl. higher level dialogue with the AU and AMISOM leadership.

**Management and financing modality.** The RDE Addis Ababa will be the engagement owner for the financial support to AMISOM operations (DKK 24 million). Quarterly technical meetings between AMISOM and the embassies in Addis Ababa and Nairobi will maintain coherence between the AMISOM, SSF, the Somalia Country Programme, and engagement 1.1. The modality used will be a direct contract under a MoU between Denmark (RDE Addis) and the AU Peace Support Operations Division.

### **Engagement 1.3 Somalia Stability Fund Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia**

**Objective.** The objective of this engagement is: *Immediate local political settlements processes sustain stability and allow peace dividends to be delivered.*

**Summary description.** The new strategy of the SSF will address: 1) Political conflict between the Federal Government and Federal Member states; 2) Inter- and intra-state conflict; 3) the need to extend state authority and address drivers of conflict; 4) the need to deepen popular participation and voice, particularly for women. The objectives are pursued through support to community-driven processes, to bolster community confidence in state and local authorities and through conflict prevention and mitigation. Also SSF include targeted activities on women and youth. The SSF bridges initial early recovery work and more conventional long-term state building initiatives such as the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and other capacity building programmes supported under the bilateral Somalia Country Programme. As such, the SSF places itself in the centre of the Wadajir and CRESTA/A frameworks and contributes directly to the implementation of the government-led stabilisation strategy. The expected outcome is dialogue and cooperation between local state and community actors involved in stabilisation.

Apart from the objective of strengthening the indigenous capacity to prevent, manage and solve conflict, the engagement with the SSF as a joint mechanism also constitutes an important strategic partnership with a number of likeminded stabilisation actors in Somalia including the lead donor UK. Moreover, the SSF is a prime knowledge partner when it comes to political economy analysis.

**Partner.** The SSF was conceived at the London Conference on Somalia of February 2012 associated with the Somalia New Deal Compact. Denmark commenced support to the SSF as part of PSP HoA II (2015-2017) supporting the SSF with a total of DKK 39.5 million under the 'Stabilisation' pillar of the SSF with a focus on supporting newly recovered areas. SSF has during the implementation period put more efforts into state-building, in contrast to stabilization support narrowly defined, such as early recovery, with the objective to enhance state legitimacy. It is a priority for Denmark to advocate for SSF to maintain a focus on providing immediate peace dividends in contested and newly recovered areas.

**Management and financing modalities.** The RDE Nairobi is engagement owner. The engagement will be managed under a Delegated Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with DFID. The management setup includes a Joint Donor Committee (JDC) where Denmark is an active member, with the UK as Lead Donor and a UK and Netherlands staffed Secretariat Office

responsible for managing the relationship with the Fund Manager (currently Adam Smith International).

## 5 Thematic Programme 2: Countering violent extremism

### 5.1 Strategic considerations and justification

The objective of TP2 is: *Reduced violent extremism in geographical areas of programme implementation through prevention and disengagement efforts with a focus on Somalia.* TP2 includes engagements that focus on prevention and disengagement through support to strengthened regional cooperation and critical infrastructures and initiatives that motivates individuals to disengage from al-Shabaab.

The overall outcomes of these efforts are expected to include the following achievements:

- IGAD's Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism is delivered on
- Improved regional capacity for preventing and countering violent extremism
- Increased number of disengaged Al-Shabaab members and successful reintegration into society.

### Strategic considerations

Violent extremism is feeding off a mix of factors such as civil wars, local conflicts and insurgencies, tapping into criminal networks, occupying weakly governed and sparsely populated spaces as safe havens and exploiting widespread grievances relating to poverty, unemployment, exclusion, lack of security, injustice and repression. These factors are actively used in radicalisation efforts and to recruit individuals to engage in violent extremist action using social media platforms. To counter this there is a need to develop a combination of local, national and regional technical capabilities, diplomatic convening power, and political will. IGAD has a long history of efforts to promote peace in the region including in Somalia. In 2005, its member states formed the Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) to end civil wars, defeat terrorism and restore law and order in Somalia, the precursor to the current mission in Somalia, AMISOM. IGAD and its member states remain committed and engaged in resolving the conflict in Somalia.

The threat from al-Shabaab in the region differs significantly between the countries and within sub-national regions of the countries. Addressing violent extremism requires differentiation of responses to the varied threats in the different contexts in the region. Whereas in Somalia itself disengagement and discrediting of the al-Shabaab narrative is of key priority in contributing to stability alongside more long-term preventive initiatives, regionally, prevention plays an essential role to curb the further spread of extremism and recruitment to violent extremism. Disengagement of returning regional foreign fighters and management of the risk of radicalisation and promoting rehabilitation in prisons of violent extremist offenders are other important topics that require national-to-regional policy harmonisation and guidance.

### Thematic programme focus

TP2 comprises a *CVE direct* engagement at country-level in Somalia and *CVE direct* regional level support to the operationalization of IGAD's regional P/CVE policies, strategies and capacities. Continued support to disengagement of combatants from Al-Shabaab will be provided through rehabilitation and reintegration support at the Serendi Centre, support to the National Disengagement Programme, and include a Strategic Communications component aimed at countering al-Shabaab's narrative to generate further defections. The engagements contributes to Strand 4 (CVE) of the Somalia Comprehensive Approach to Security.

The regional P/CVE dimension of engagement is aligned with the APP Phase IV support to Pillar 3 of IGAD's Peace and Security Strategy 2016-2020 and includes support to transboundary responses to violent extremism by IGAD member states and civil society.

TP2 builds on Denmark’s partnership with the UK FCO in Somalia that focuses on encouraging and sustaining disengagement from al-Shabaab, as well as Denmark’s long-term partnership with IGAD through other engagements, foremost with the Security Sector Program (SSP).

### Regional priorities

IGAD’s Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in East Africa (February 2017) identifies three categories of state vulnerability to violent extremism including: “the epicentre” (Somalia), “spillover states” (Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Ethiopia) and “at-risk states” (Tanzania, South Sudan and Sudan). The IGAD CVE strategy elaborates on the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy 2016-2020 that Denmark supports under the APP.

## 5.2 Results Framework (Outcome level)

Table 6: TP2 Outcome Indicator

Thematic Programme 2	Counter violent extremism in the Horn of Africa with Somalia as its epicentre through prevention and disengagement
Impact indicator	Reduced impact of violent extremist attacks in the region as measured by Global Terrorism Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace and/or similar indexes.
Engagement 2.1 Objective	IGAD’s Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism is delivered and improved regional capacity for preventing and countering violent extremism
Outcome	Improved regional capacity for preventing and countering violent extremism
Outcome indicators	Outcome and output indicators as well as targets will be taken from the results framework that IGAD is in process of developing for the implementation of the regional strategy on preventing and countering violent extremism in Eastern Africa. A results framework is not yet in place since the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, responsible for implementation of the regional strategy, was only inaugurated in April 2018.
Engagement 2.2 Objective	Increased number of disengaged al-Shabaab members successfully re-integrated into society.
Outcome	Increased defection from al-Shabaab
Outcome indicators	Number of al-Shabaab defectors received in Serendi over the engagement period
	Number of defectors who say they knew of Serendi before defecting
	Number of defectors defecting because of the FGS announced amnesty
	Number of defectors who say they defected because of Serendi

\* Time wise, short term refers to the first half of programme duration (0-2 years). Medium term refers to the second half of programmes duration (2-4 years). Long term (impact) refers to results that are expected to emerge by the end programme and beyond (4+).

## 5.3 Theory of Change

The theory of change for TP2 suggests that if Danish and other international support to P/CVE at regional and national levels with simultaneous support to reintegration of defectors from al-Shabaab can be effectively delivered on, it will improve the national responses to extremism, resulting in less extremism in the region, and weaken al-Shabaab thus contributing to the long-term peace and stability in the region.



Table 7: TP2 Theory of Change\*

Assumption 1	If improving local capacities in several countries on P/CVE issues can reduce the threats they generate, and...
Assumption 2	Inter-agency cooperation and the promotion of trust between security actors and communities will reduce the radicalisation of individuals and the incidence of violent extremism in the Region, and...
Assumption 3	National defector related frameworks, coordination and standards are developed and will ensure coercive efforts and minimising risk of human rights violations and
Assumption 4	Successful reintegration and enhanced knowledge about defection, experiences of rehabilitation and reintegration can be the evidence base for improved outreach and enhance disengagement rates, then if...
Inputs	Denmark provides <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financial and technical support for regional capacities to counter extremism and...</li> <li>• Financing and technical support for P/CVE efforts in Somalia, and...</li> <li>• Financial and technical support for al-Shabaab defection and rehabilitation, then..</li> </ul>
Short Term Changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional bodies are through an enhanced evidence base better able to support regional states to prevent the growth of violent extremism and support disengagement;</li> <li>• National standards for rehabilitation and reintegration is developed and adhered to;</li> <li>• Strong outreach to the front lines to share information about opportunities for defection;</li> <li>• Former al-Shabaab combatants receive support to demobilise and retrain; leading to...</li> </ul>
Medium Term Changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• P/CVE dialogue between IGAD member states improve policy on politically sensitive areas including a ‘whole of society approach’ to terrorism prevention</li> <li>• Local administrations, including in newly accessible areas of Somalia, have greater presence and capacity including security sector coordination for HBRA based reintegration of defectors;</li> <li>• Former al-Shabaab combatants can return safely to their communities, and;</li> <li>• National and regional partners have enhanced knowledge and practical experience in addressing and preventing individuals from engaging in ideologically motivated violence.</li> </ul>
Long Term Changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The rate of disengagement by al-Shabaab fighters increases, hampering its recruitment and operations and...</li> <li>• Successful disengagement and reintegration examples are used to further delegitimise al-Shabaab.</li> <li>• al-Shabaab is discredited as an alternative to the norms of Somali life, culture and livelihoods;</li> <li>• Extremism and extremists are further marginalised in local political settlements in the Horn of Africa.</li> </ul>

\* Time wise, short term refers to the first half of programme duration (0-2 years). Medium term refers to the second half of programmes duration (2-4 years). Long term (impact) refers to results that are expected to emerge by the end programme and beyond (4+).

## 5.4 Summary of Engagements

### Engagement 2.1 Support to the delivery of IGAD's Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

**Objective.** The objective of this engagement is *to improve regional capacity for preventing and countering violent extremism in the Horn of Africa through implementing IGAD's Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.*

**Summary description.** The implementation of IGAD's 'Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Eastern Africa' will be supported. This strategy was initiated under IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) coordination in 2016. It brought in the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE) established in 2017. The strategy argues that because violent extremists are operating regionally across territorial borders, effective response must also take a regional and global approach.

The engagement with IGAD comes at an early stage which is also an advantage as the work-plan is still being developed and can still be influenced through strategic dialogue with IGAD and through that the implementation of the regional strategy. Therefore, the specific activities supported during the Programme will be decided upon on an annual basis during the programme period with biannual assessments of the need for adjustment. A part of this process will include consultation with other actors contributing to the implementation of the strategy and taking stock of work already initiated such as Development and Implementation of national PCVE strategies.

Some possible areas of focus include: (i) increased regional policy exchange and uptake on CVE; (ii) improving Regional Dialogue between civil society and government actors in cooperation with the IGAD Centre of Excellence in Djibouti; (iii) furthering national CVE projects, such as the initiatives already implemented by the ISSP in Somalia including StratCom initiatives countering narratives and counter-radicalisation; (iv) enhancing knowledge of regional of violent extremism and other regionally relevant topics; and (v) support to the IGAD Sanctions Monitoring and Analysis Team under the ISSP Transnational Security Threats Initiative.

By 2022 the IGAD is expected to have: Supported implementation of the Regional Strategy, supported the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism to be increasingly sustainable; Evolved a regional platform for policy engagement and uptake of policy recommendations into the IGAD member states; Executed, where applicable, national programmes depending on the threats and opportunities in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, respectively

**Partner.** IGAD is well placed as a partner to this engagement due to its experience, strategic position and regional reach. IGAD is the only regional organisation in a position to play a normative role as well as ensuring a coordinated and comprehensive approach across the region. A number of specific activities related to P/CVE are implemented by the ICEPCVE and as such funds will be directed through IGAD to the Centre for implementation of its work plan.

**Management and financing modality.** During the first six month the ISSP will prioritise the various areas outlined in the strategy and produce a work plan and results framework to operationalise the strategy. Every six month the ISSP team will provide a progress overview and will in consultation with Denmark and other international partners agree to next steps of implementation. The RDE Addis will base the actual support on the progress attained. Progress will be measured based on the IGAD ISSP's monitoring framework. The financing modality will be an agreement with IGAD ISSP in line with Danish agreements under the APP.

## **Engagement 2.2 Countering al-Shabaab through disengagement of combatants and strategic communication**

**Objective:** The objective of this engagement is to: *Increase the number of disengaged al-Shabaab members and ensured their successful reintegration in the society.*

### **Summary description.**

The purpose of contributing to the Somali National Programme for Disengagement and strategic communication under this PSED is two-fold: (1) encourage sustained defection from al-Shabaab by creating an attractive exit path out of violent extremism, thus reducing al-Shabaab's combat capabilities as well as contributing to undermining its narrative and appeal and, (2) to rehabilitate and reintegrate al-Shabaab defectors into their communities in a manner that ensures their safety and provides them with viable economic opportunities and livelihoods as a viable alternative to al-Shabaab and other violent groups.

Defection and disengagement of al-Shabaab fighters is a corner stone for the transition to a stable Somalia. This is an important element of a comprehensive response to al-Shabaab as a source of organised violence, thereby contributing to stabilisation in Somalia and the broader region. Support within this engagement is implicitly relevant for youth since a significant proportion of al-Shabaab defectors are youth and the broad range of education activities offered at the rehabilitation centre is particularly well-targeted for youth.

The defector rehabilitation centre in Mogadishu receives defectors cleared as low risk by Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency. In total, since the case management system was set up and a formal exit process was established (October 2015) 226 defectors had been cleared through the Exit Board as of May 2018. The support to the rehabilitation centre in Mogadishu has evolved and significantly improved over the previous phases of Danish support. Initially, this support focussed on rehabilitation. Under the Programme, Denmark will be supporting all stages of the national programme and support a strategic communication component, currently under review by the UK. In summary, the support will include: (i) national coordination and policy development regarding handling disengaged combatants in accordance with international norms and standards, (ii) strategic communications and outreach campaigns to inform the target group of how to defect and the opportunities available in the rehabilitation centres, (iii) reception, rehabilitation and re-integration of disengaged combatants back in to the communities.

**Partner.** The Danish support under the PSED is fully aligned with the UK support to the National Rehabilitation Programme through a delegated cooperation agreement and in continuation of a well-functioning relationship based on a longstanding MoU. Denmark is on the Joint Steering Committee for the Mogadishu centre and attends as well national level meetings on NRP.

**Management and financing modality.** RDE Nairobi is Engagement owner. This engagement is administered through delegated cooperation with the UK. Denmark receives briefings and updates from the contractors and with the increased programme components on strategic communication, Denmark will also in this area be invited for steering meetings with the communication contractors that will be identified and selected.

Alongside the support provided via the UK, it is planned to second a CVE/disengagement advisor to UNSOM for an initial two-year period, with a possibility of extending for the full duration of the programme. It is intended to establish the position as a secondment under the Peace and Stabilisation Response instrument (FSB), or alternatively financed from unallocated funds under this Programme. The position will be subject to a separate approval procedure in accordance with established procedures for secondment of advisors to high risk areas.

## **6 Thematic Programme 3: Regional and governmental authority enforcement across land and maritime borders**

### **6.1 Strategic considerations and justification**

The objective of TP 3 is *Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders*. The support will aim at strengthening the capacity of regional and national actors to exercise their authority in relation to regional land and maritime borders through sustained support to Ethiopian authorities to intercept illicit flows of money and through supporting key national and regional authorities in their efforts to reduce illicit and unregulated flow of goods and people, which constitute a critically destabilising factor in the region.

The overall outcomes of these efforts are expected to include the following achievements:

- Member States have increased law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and analytical capacity to combat illicit and unregulated flows of people and goods including effective enforcement structures (including maritime) in selected sea/dry ports
- Ethiopia has strengthened capacity to enforce legislation against illicit financial flows according to international standards leading to successful prosecutions
- The Kenyan Navy has increased operational capacity and maritime awareness

### **Strategic Considerations**

The borders of the region are porous and have historically accommodated the movement of legitimate traders, pastoralists, seasonal migrants etc. Land borders are also often flashpoints for localised conflict, poor border management, and unregulated flows of goods and people. The HoA maritime domain spans the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Aden and the Red Sea. The region's sea borders are virtually unpoliced and serve as transport routes for a range of illegal actors benefitting from the lawlessness and war economy in and around Somalia and from Kenya as an entry point to East Africa. While piracy is temporarily reduced, the drivers of piracy have been left largely unchanged and coast guarding and naval capacity in the region remains inadequate to undertake patrolling and interception activities. The lack of maritime domain awareness (MDA) capacities in the region hinders legitimate authority within national territorial waters and is considered one of the main causes for the continued threat from piracy, trafficking of goods, and smuggling of humans.

Organised criminal activities, illicit financial flows and money laundering activities have significant regional destabilizing potential. Curbing criminal and terrorist access to financial support depends on the financial integrity of all members of the international community and is inherently related to global, European and Danish interest. Both the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) have identified a number of states in the HoA as demonstrating weak implementation of international standards on anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT).

### **Regional priorities**

Building the capacity of financial intelligence units (FIU) is a stated priority of IGAD's Regional CVE Strategy and all three focus countries of the PSP HoA. (i.e Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia). As of 2017, Ethiopia is the only IGAD country on the FATF list of jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies with weak measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). Ethiopia is proactively cooperating to address this and has expressed interest in strengthening its participation in regional exchanges, including those supported by the EU. A

range of regional initiatives seek to address transboundary crime and improve the management of borders and the flows of goods and people crossing them.

## 6.2 Results Framework (outcome level)

Table 8: TP3 Results Framework (Outcome Indicators)

<b>Thematic Programme 3 Objective:</b>	<b>Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders</b>
Impact indicator	Reduced transnational organised crime across the borders of the three countries of the programme as assessed by UNODC and other relevant agencies/organisations such as the Global Initiative against Transnational organised crime
Engagement 3.1	<b>Regional action on countering and prevention of human trafficking, and smuggling of weapons and drugs – UNODC</b>
Outcome	Member States have increased land and maritime law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and analytical capacity to combat organized crime, including drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, cybercrime (including online child sexual exploitation and abuse), wildlife and forest crimes, and other forms of transnational organised crime.
Outcome indicators	<p>Number of officials citing usefulness of training provided by UNODC in preventing, investigating and prosecuting drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, wildlife and forest crimes, cybercrime, money laundering, and other forms of transnational organized crime.</p> <p>Number of Member States in receipt of integrated UNODC assistance that have developed coherent policies to tackle illicit financial flows - linked to UNODC mandate areas - and predicate crimes.</p> <p>Number of Member States that have developed and operationalized action plans, policies and comprehensive strategies against TOC with support from UNODC.</p> <p>Number of networks supporting prosecutors, investigations, mutual legal assistance and countering and handling cases of TOC.</p>
Outcome 2	Member States have enforcement structures in selected sea/dry ports to minimise the risk of maritime containers being exploited for trafficking of various illicit goods, and other forms of organized crime.
Outcome indicator	Number of cases of illicit goods detected from close examined containers, based on profiling and risk assessment.
Outcome 3	Member States have improved capabilities and capacities of their criminal justice systems to carry out effective prevention and prosecution of maritime crimes
Outcome indicator	<p>Number of Member States that have adopted a legal framework, strategies and policies on maritime crime.</p> <p>Number of facilities refurbished or new facilities constructed and equipment provided by UNODC in use by Member States.</p>
Engagement 3.2	<b>Strengthen Anti Money Laundering Institutions and regional collaboration</b>
Outcome 1	Compliance with FATF recommendations
Outcome indicator	FATF positive Compliant and Largely Compliant assessments

Outcome 2	Increased enforcement against illicit financial flows and expanding public awareness
Outcome indicator	Number of cases initiated for suspected AML/CFT violations
Outcome 3	EU regional AML/CFT programme fully active in Ethiopia
Outcome indicator	Ethiopian engagement in regional activities under EU regional programme in country and in the region.
Outcome 4	More support to AML from Ethiopian Government and foreign partners
Outcome indicator	More support to AML from Ethiopian Government and foreign partners
Outcome indicator	PSF no longer required on AML
<b>Engagement 3.3</b>	<b>Promote the exercise of legitimate authority at sea to contribute to maritime security</b>
Outcome 1	Strand 1. Increasing the number of operational ships and radar stations and reducing downtime.
Outcome indicator	Maritime surveillance capacity, number of ships, measuring downtime.
Outcome 2	Strand 2. Interagency cooperation between Kenyan maritime agencies enhanced.
Outcome indicator	By 2022 development of a working framework between maritime agencies (including: KMA – KPA – KMP – KeFS – KN).
Outcome 3	Strand 3. Enhancing Kenya Navy capacity from Initial Operational Capability to Full Operational Capability within the expertise of the full bridge / navigation simulator, the test cell and other relevant areas according to “The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers” (STCW) requirements in order to achieve Centre of Excellence status by 2022. Enhancing Kenya Navy capacity from Initial Operational Capability to Full Operational Capability within the area of multi-agency training and Anti-Surface Warfare.
Outcome indicator	Number of certified personnel / instructors (subject matter experts) Number of training sessions and exercises

*\*Indicators are indicative and will be finalized when the entire results framework has been completed in terms of indicators, baselines and targets when PSEDs have been agreed/ signed with partners.*

### 6.3 Theory of Change

The theory of change for TP3 suggests that by focusing on a small number of niche interventions Denmark is able to contribute to strengthening regional maritime and land border security, countering violent extremism and reducing financial flows to violent extremist groups and illegal businesses including piracy.

*Table 9: TP3 Theory of Change\**

Assumption 1	Ethiopia is willing to continue to invest in strengthening and enforcing its AML/IFF regulations, then if..
Assumption 2	Kenya is willing to continue to invest in developing its maritime domain awareness and to assist other regional organisations such as EASF and nations to do the same, and...
Assumption 3	Strengthened regional AML/CFT cooperation will prevent illicit financial flows in support of P/CVE and CT, and...

Assumption 4	Support to regional border management agencies and forces can contribute to reducing human (trafficking and) smuggling, trafficking of weapons and drugs, then if...
Inputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Denmark provides:</li> <li>• Strategic and technical advice and targeted financial support to Kenyan Navy, relevant civilian Kenyan maritime actors, other maritime actors, and to Somali Maritime Police Units to improve maritime domain awareness systems around the coast of the Horn of Africa;</li> <li>• Strategic and technical advice to strengthen Ethiopia's AML-capacity and regional linkages;</li> <li>• Technical equipment and financial support to border policing and management services (on land and sea) in the Region; leading to</li> </ul>
Short term Changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kenya establishes an effective national MDA capability;</li> <li>• Somalia begins to establish an effective national MDA capability and to mature its response capacity;</li> <li>• Ethiopia continues progress within its AML-regime and puts in place necessary regulations and legislation to combat illegal financial flows internally and with other Horn of Africa nations;</li> </ul>
Medium term Changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kenya is the leading regional actor in championing effective national MDA capability in other countries in the Horn of Africa;</li> <li>• Somalia establishes an effective national MDA capability and matures its response capacities;</li> <li>• Ethiopia increases its enforcement of regulations and legislation restricting illicit financial flows, reducing financial flows to violent extremist groups and illegal businesses including piracy</li> </ul>
Long term Changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The seas around the Horn of Africa are better policed and managed, including maritime law enforcement, within international norms and in accordance with the needs of international maritime safety and trade;</li> <li>• Regional and national AML/CFT mechanisms are functional and contribute to the stability, safety and security of the region.</li> </ul>

\* *Time wise, short term refers to the first half of programme duration (0-2 years). Medium term refers to the second half of programmes duration (2-4 years). Long term (impact) refers to results that are expected to emerge by the end programme and beyond (4+).*

## 6.4 Summary of Engagements

### Engagement 3.1 Prevention of human trafficking and smuggling of weapons and drugs

**Objective.** The objective of this engagement is that: *Illegal flows of goods and people are intercepted at land and sea borders particularly where these are linked to terrorism and armed conflict.*

**Summary description.** Denmark will build on prior engagements and develop a strategic partnership with UNODC in support of prioritised activities foreseen in UNODC's Regional Programme for Eastern Africa 2016 -2021 (RP), which was adopted in 2016 as well as UNODC's Global Maritime Crime Programme. The programmes provide a coherent framework for harmonising Denmark's stabilisation support with other development partners, as well as alignment with priorities of countries in the region. UNODC's status as a member state organisation, which includes Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya and which works with state

organisations and authorities, provides an important state-centric dimension to addressing transboundary crime and instability. Activities fall mainly under this strategies' Pillar I: Countering Transnational Organized Crime and Trafficking and related activities under Pillar III: Terrorism Prevention. The engagement will support three priorities: maritime borders, land borders and prisons with focus on monitoring. The legacy linkages between the maritime and prisons activities relate to the incarceration of pirates (as part of Denmark's maritime patrolling) in prisons supported under the previous Peace and Stabilisation Programmes.

At the end of the project, Denmark will have contributed to countries in the region having increased law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and analytical capacity to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in persons, and other forms of transnational organized crime. Somalia and Kenya will have enforcement structures in selected sea/dry ports to reduce the risk of containers being exploited for illicit trafficking of goods and people.

The engagement will be supported by a Transboundary Organised Crime and Trafficking Police Expert (on assignment from the International Department of the Danish National Police ID-DNP). The purpose of the position is to provide technical advice on Countering Transnational Organized Crime and Trafficking in the HoA that directly or indirectly impact stability, irregular migration flows and violent extremism. The expert will be located in the UNODC Regional Office in East Africa and act as liaison with regular meetings at the RDE Nairobi.

**Partners.** Having been part of the Danish PSPs from 2011-2017, UNODC understands the development and security policies on which these programmes are based as well as Danish security interests, particularly in the maritime domain. Denmark has also played a key role in defining core activities under the Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) through its involvement in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which played a key role in setting up the GMCP's programme of support to prisons in Somalia

**Management and financing modality.** RDE Nairobi will be Engagement Owner. UNODC will manage the support from its Regional Office in East Africa in Nairobi under a UNODC Financing Agreement (DKK 28 milion). Activities will be implemented jointly under two UNODC Programmes: The Countering Transnational Organised Crime and Trafficking Programme (Land) and the Global Maritime Crime Programme GMCP (Sea and Prisons).

### **Engagement 3.2 Strengthening Ethiopia's capacity and regional engagement on countering Money Laundering and Illicit Financial Flows**

**Objective.** The objective of this engagement is *that illicit financial flows are effectively curbed and AML/CFT frameworks and regional coordination mechanisms are strengthened to promote increased financial transparency and integrity across the region and ensure perpetrators are being prosecuted, thereby reducing the risk of Ethiopia being used as a safe haven for illicit financial transactions which undermine regional stability.*

**Summary description.** Money laundering, illicit financial flows and terrorist financing represent major, interconnected challenges for East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Both the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) have identified a number of states in the Horn of Africa, which demonstrate weak implementation of international standards on anti-money laundering (AML) and in countering the financing of terrorism (CFT). As of 2017, Ethiopia is the only IGAD country on the FATF list of Jurisdictions with weak measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). Ethiopia is proactively cooperating to address these issues. As a region with predominantly informal and cash-based economies, East Africa is vulnerable to money laundering and terrorism financing. This vulnerability is compounded by absent, nascent, or incomplete financial regulatory mechanisms, limited law enforcement and judicial capacities to



respond to money laundering and financing of, or proceeds from, criminality potentially including terrorism.

Ethiopia has proactively made a high-level political commitment captured in its national action plan to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen its effectiveness and address any related technical deficiencies. At the national level, The FATF acknowledges (November 2017) that Ethiopia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by establishing committees aimed at implementing the national action plan and the FATF Action Plan, and issuing a risk-based AML/CFT supervisory manual.

The purpose of funding under this PSED is to support the further development of Ethiopia's institutional capacity in Anti Money Laundering (AML) and countering IFFs and contributing to full compliance with FATF standards by supporting, in close association with the European Union, Ethiopia's stated objectives in this regard. Ethiopia has requested Danish and European Union support to implement its action plan to accomplish the following objectives, (1) implementing the results of its national risk assessment; (2) fully integrating designated non-financial businesses and professions into its AML/CFT regime; (3) ensuring that the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are confiscated; (4) consistently implementing terrorism-related targeted financial sanctions and proportionately regulating non-profit organizations in line with a risk based approach; and (5) establishing and implementing WMD-related targeted financial sanctions.

The aim is that Ethiopia continues progress within its AML-regime and puts in place necessary regulations and legislation to combat illegal financial flows internally and with other Horn of Africa nations, including through relevant EU regional initiatives.

**Partner.** The national partners of this engagement are the Ethiopian Attorney General's Office and Financial Intelligence Center (EFIC) who will receive technical support from an international centre of excellence/commercial service provider to be contracted as Implementing Partner (see below). The EU is a key partner in Ethiopia and the region and has requested increased coordination and collaboration leveraging Denmark's experience and access in Ethiopia and conversely enhancing Ethiopia's regional engagement. This process will be taken forward during the remainder of the second phase of the Programme ending in June 2018.

**Management and financing modality.** RDE Addis Ababa will, through international competitive bidding, secure the services of a specialised Implementing Partner and sign a contribution agreement for a budget of DKK 14 million with the Implementing Partner reflecting the results, budget and management arrangements described in the PSED. RDE Addis Ababa will consult with EFIC, MOJ and other relevant stakeholders to establish a new agreement with the Government of Ethiopia, which will be signed by the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED). Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures. The agreement with the partner will reflect the implementing partner's responsibility for following financial management best practices.

### **Engagement 3.3 Promote the exercise of legitimate authority at sea to contribute to maritime security -Kenyan Navy**

**Objective.** The objective of this engagement is that: *Kenyan Maritime Domain Awareness and the capacity to exercise authority in territorial waters continues to increase while naval capacity benefits the regional security architecture.*

**Summary description.** This engagement will focus on three work strands: increasing the number of operational ships and radar stations and reducing operational downtime for ships;

establishment of a framework for cooperation between maritime agencies, both in Kenya and regionally; and reduction of skills gaps in the Kenya Navy through improvements in the training establishments.

Security in the Indian Ocean has been a particular problem for countries in the Horn of Africa, driven in large part by insecurity in Somalia. Considerable effort was devoted under earlier PSP programming to address problems of piracy. While these have diminished to some degree, it remains necessary for the countries in the Horn to develop their capacity – individually and collectively (e. g. EASF) – to address the maritime security challenges that remain and to combat the full range of illicit maritime activities that are, at least in part, fuelled by the continuing conflicts and insecurity in Somalia and the resultant lack of an effective maritime security mechanisms. In line with the strategic deliberations discussed in the Danish Counter-Piracy Strategy, it is the aim of multiple engagements under PSP-HOA III to develop an effective maritime security capacity in the Horn of Africa. This requires attention at several levels – individual countries (Kenya and Somalia), regional (EASF, where Kenya provides important support to the EASF maritime component) and continental (African Union).

The ability of countries in the Horn of Africa to manage their maritime domains will be crucial to their ability to protect themselves from threats to their security and marine resources. While the threat of piracy in the Indian Ocean has declined, the countries in the Horn of Africa continue to face numerous maritime related challenges to their physical, economic and environmental security.

Strand 1. Increasing the number of operational ships and radar stations and reducing downtime. The ships of the Kenya Navy patrol and provide national response capability in the Kenyan EEZ, support AMISOM in securing the coast of South Central Somalia from being used as a supply line by Al-Shabaab and provide the necessary training platforms for the Kenya Navy professional training. Strand 2. Establishment of a framework for cooperation between maritime agencies. Strand 3. Reduction of skills gaps and conformity to international standards in the Kenya Navy. This strand is the logical continuation of the previous Danish – Kenya maritime cooperation and supports the request to assist Kenya with the development of a Centre of Excellence for maritime training in the Kenya Navy’s Mombasa base as conveyed to the Danish Chief of Army Staff in January 2017 during his visit to Kenya.

By 2022 the Kenyan Navy is expected to have: (a) effectively established a Maritime Centre of Excellence at Mombasa which will have the necessary IMO accreditation to deliver training outside the Kenyan Navy, (b) established the basis for a Quality Management System (logistics/maintenance/ procurement) to improve vessel availability, (c) Established the basis of, and begun to functionalise, a Kenyan MDA system.

**Partner:** Kenyan Navy & maritime agencies and international partners such as UK, US, France etc.

**Management and financing modality.** The support will have a total budget of DKK 11 million and be agreed upon with partners and finally negotiated and agreed in a new version of the PSED. The support will be directly managed by the Defence Attaché (DA) in RDE Nairobi. The Danish Liaison Officer to the Kenyan Navy coordinates all bilateral naval and maritime activity and reports to the Defence Attaché in RDE Nairobi.

## 7 Programme Management

The Danish Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have since 2011 developed a constructive collaborative relationship in implementing the Peace- and Stabilisation Programmes. However, the modus for the implementation differs substantially. The Defence is implementing its engagements itself through the deployed adviser, whereas the MFA implements its engagements through third partners such as UN, regional organisations, private organisations etc.

Decentralised management of MFA financed engagements was introduced in the latter part of Phase II of the PSP HoA in 2016. Management of MoD financed engagements remain principally centralised at the Defence Command in Denmark but the actual day-to-day management of the engagements lies with the Defence Attaché in Nairobi as Engagement Manager. Furthermore, the MTR identified action points and lessons to fine-tune these management arrangements to ensure coherence between programme level delivery, outcomes and engagement level delivery.

This has been rectified in the present management structure. The main management tasks of the programme and adjacent engagements are carried out by the Programme Coordinator and Engagement Managers as defined below. Apart from the annual Whole-of-Government Steering Committee meeting with focus on the Programme progress and the annual Programme Committee meeting, the Programme Coordinator and Engagement Managers will meet on a quarterly basis to coordinate and review progress, risk and financial status (commitments and disbursements). The Programme Coordinator and Defence Attaché will have a monthly coordination meeting. More structured coordination will ensure coherence across the programme.

- **The Programme Coordinator** functions as per the PSF Guidelines Annex D and is based at the RDE Nairobi. The programme coordinator coordinates the overall programme implementation, including preparation of programme committee meetings and reporting.
- **The Defence Attaché** based in Nairobi represents the MOD and DCD in day-to-day management while adhering to MOD's centralised chain of command and procedures.
- **Engagement Managers** are designated staff by the **Engagement Owner** which is the unit overall responsible for the engagement – RDE Nairobi, RDE Addis, and Defence Command. The Engagement managers, including the Defence Attaché, will meet on a quarterly basis convened by the Nairobi embassy to take stock on programmatic and financial performance.

Table 10 below provides further detail on the broader governance institutions of the programme.

*Table 10: Programme management hierarchy and responsibilities*

Programme Management Level	Composition	Role and responsibility
<b>Whole of Government Steering Committee (WGSC)</b>	As per PSF Guidelines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Acts as the principal decision-making body of the PSF and responsible for ensuring the coherence of policies and strategies affecting the Danish stabilisation agenda.</li> <li>- On an annual basis the embassies will present programme progress to the WGSC</li> </ul>
<b>Secretariat</b>	Staff from the MFA's Department for Stabilisation and Security Policy (SSP) and the International Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Supports the WGSC</li> <li>- Responsible for overseeing the implementation of the stabilisation policy and PSF coordination and management.</li> </ul>

<b>Programme Management Level</b>	<b>Composition</b>	<b>Role and responsibility</b>
	of MOD. (PSF Guidelines)	- Oversees stabilisation and fragile states policy implementation.
<b>Programme Committee</b>	MFA Africa Department, MFA Department for Security and Stability, MOD International Department, RDE Addis and RDE Nairobi and other relevant authorities as required.	- Meets annually (or more often if urgent issues arise) with approximately 6 months between the Programme Committee meetings and the relevant WGSC meeting. - Ensure broader synergies with other regional programmes such as APP. - Guide programme implementation and direction and take stock on contextual developments and risks in the region. - Recommends possible actions and adjustments of the programme activities.
<b>Programme Coordination/coordinator</b>	The Programme Coordinator at the Embassy in Nairobi will coordinate the programme  Programme Coordination Meetings (quarterly) RDE Nairobi, RDE Addis Ababa, MOD/DCD (represented by the Defence Attaché)	- Organise quarterly programme progress meeting with the Nairobi and Addis embassies. Review progress, risks and financial status. - Prepares 6 monthly program level progress reports as per PSF procedures. - Organises annual Programme Committee meetings (see above). - Prepare for the annual progress reporting to the Whole-of Government Steering Committee.
<b>Engagement managers</b>	Staff assigned by the engagement owner to be responsible for the management of the engagement as per responsibility assignment in the table below	- Manage and oversee engagement implementation. - Prepare and/or review engagement level progress reports as per PSF procedures.

The eight engagements of the Programme will be managed from Nairobi and Addis Ababa. The RDE Addis Ababa will manage three engagements and RDE in Nairobi five engagements. CVE/Disengagement Advisor (Engagement 2.2) will refer to Nairobi. The International Department of the Danish Police will field a Transboundary organised Crime & Trafficking (TOCT) Policing Expert who will be based in Nairobi and support the strategic partnership with UNODC. The Defence Attaché manages the two engagements that are funded from the MoD appropriation (Engagement 1.1 and 3.3). The Defence Attaché manages the Whole-of-Government Team involved in regional peace support operations and maritime security (MILAD, NAVAD, POLAD and CIVAD see table 12). Overview tables of engagement owners and of advisors and secondments are found below.

*Table 11: Overview of engagement management responsibilities*

<b>Engagement</b>	<b>Engagement owner</b>
1.1 Strengthening regional conflict management capacity - EASF and Peace Support Training Centers.	Defence Command Denmark. Engagement manager is the Defence Attaché in Nairobi.

<b>Engagement</b>	<b>Engagement owner</b>
1.2: AMISOM-led Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia -	RDE Addis Ababa in close coordination with RDE Nairobi.
1.3: SSF-led Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia – SSF	RDE Nairobi
2.1: Support to the delivery of IGAD’s Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism - ISSP	RDE Addis Ababa
2.2: Countering Al-Shabaab through disengagement of combatants and strategic communication	RDE Nairobi
2.1: Regional action on against human trafficking, and smuggling of weapons and drugs – UNODC	RDE Nairobi
3.2: Curb illicit financial flows/AML	RDE Addis Ababa
3.3: Promote the exercise of legitimate authority at sea to contribute to maritime security	Defence Command Denmark. Engagement manager is the Defence Attaché in Nairobi.

*Table 12: Overview of advisors and secondments*

<b>Position</b>	<b>Engagement</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Remarks</b>	<b>Refers to</b>
Defence Attaché	1.1, 3.3	Nairobi	Continuation Phase II	Defence Command
Military Advisor (MILAD)	1.1	Nairobi	Continuation Phase II	Defence Attaché
Police Advisor (POLAD)	1.1	Nairobi	Continuation Phase II, is seconded staff of the International Department of the Danish National Police	Defence Attaché
Civilian Advisor (CIVAD)	3.1	Nairobi	New position, draft ToR prepared	Defence Attaché
Navy Advisor (NAVAD)	3.3	Mombasa	Continuation Phase II	Defence Attaché
CVE / Disengagement Expert (intended from Peace and Stabilisation response, FSB)	2.2	Mogadishu	CVE /Disengagement secondment to provide strategic support to UNSOM and FGS on CVE and disengagement.	Programme coordinator
Transboundary Organised Crime and Trafficking Police Expert	3.1	Nairobi	Seconded staff of the International Department of the Danish National Police	Programme coordinator

Exit/phasing out considerations are included systematically in all PSEDs. They define some conditions under which exit will be possible and when continued engagement is necessary. Conditions differ across engagements given the diverse nature of the engagements and contexts. Sufficient level of sustainability, ownership and capacity are some of the basic criteria for

considering exit (i.e. handing over to national partners) but also new donors' engagement is a potential factor. Denmark is phasing out of the PREVENT partnership between Denmark and the Kenya National Counter Terrorism Centre, for instance, as the engagement objectives generally have been achieved, and the Kenyan authorities now "own" the concept promoted by PREVENT. The same is expected to be the case for EASF during this programme period.

## 7.1 Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation

### Reporting

The PSP-HOA monitoring and evaluation system follows PSF Guidelines and incorporates lessons and follow the common PSF reporting formats for the Biannual Programme Report introduced in 2016. Where Denmark is the only donor, the standard PSED reporting format will be applied, whereas for engagements where several partners are involved the partners' report format will be accepted. Generally, quarterly progress and financial reporting is expected from implementing partners. Further training on the use of these reporting formats has been provided in January and February 2018 in Copenhagen and Nairobi, respectively.

The Programme Coordinator will compile biannual programme progress reports based on information obtained from Engagement Managers, including the Defence Attaché. Engagement Managers will receive engagement progress reports from implementing partners that will be shared with the Programme Coordinator. The biannual programme progress reports will inform discussions in the Whole-of-Government Steering Committee and the PSP HoA Programme Committee respectively (one meeting in each Committee every year). Generally, a final report from the implementing partner will be required upon completion of the engagement, however this may not be the case for engagements where several donors are involved and where timelines are not aligned. Finally, a final Programme Completion Report will be produced. This report will be coordinated by the Programme Coordinator.

In terms of substance (outcomes, outputs and indicators), reporting format has been aligned with implementing partners' own reporting systems to the extent possible and reflect the results frameworks listed in the PSEDs. Partner reporting responsibilities will be specified in the respective administrative agreements for each engagement. The Defence Attaché will forward relevant reports to MOD International Department via the Defence Command and share reports with the Programme Coordinator in Nairobi.

### Knowledge: Monitoring, review, studies

**Partner monitoring systems.** The ability of partners to provide robust monitoring of progress *and* risks has been a factor in the proposed arrangements. This is, for example, the case with the SSF and UK FCO – both arrangements include third party monitoring (TPM). For the AML engagement, the monitoring capacity is a parameter in the internationally competitive procurement of a service provider. The MOD funded engagements are monitored directly by the Defence Attaché (Nairobi) and the implementing advisors.

**Third Party Monitoring.** For engagements, which are either already covered by international partner's TPM or are monitored closely by embassy and defence staff, additional third-party monitoring will not necessarily add value. For some engagements, however, there will be a need for additional monitoring of the least – to Danish personnel - accessible locations and activities, or which contain the most uncertainty of methods, impacts and potential negative side effects. This includes the AMISOM stabilisation engagement, where a TPM agent will be contracted.

**Flexible Knowledge and Monitoring Retainer.** An operational monitoring and evaluation system will be established mainly based on partner reports, incl. TPM-reporting for engagements covered by international partner's TPM agents. The Programme will include a Monitoring Retainer contract arrangement, however, to provide monitoring consulting services and support in relation to required technical reviews/studies. Based on experience, there will be need for advisory support in relation to the establishment of the operational M&E system and for dialogue with partners on M&E frameworks and reporting. Moreover the same contractor can provide support when occasional, flexible and quick response technical review or analytical work are commissioned.

**Programme review and Evaluation.** A mid-term review will be undertaken after 24 months, i.e. tentatively in the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2020.

## 7.2 Financial Management

The financial management arrangements will reflect the nature and structure of the individual engagements. These arrangements will be specified in the respective administrative agreements and may vary but will, as a minimum, follow Danish requirements. They will reflect the principles and requirements of the programme's two funding sources (MFA and MoD funding). As outlined in the PSP-HOA's risk matrix in Annex 5, the programme is inevitably subject to some financial and fiduciary risks. If these risks become manifest, they should trigger consideration of steps such as initiating audits, reclaiming funds or adjusting work-plans with partners to reflect new feasibility and performance information.

## 7.3 Summary for anti-corruption measures

Administrative agreements with partners specify that Denmark's Anti-Corruption Policy and Code of Conduct apply and include the standard MFA Anti-Corruption Clause.<sup>6</sup> Upon suspicion or awareness of specific cases of corruption involving staff members and/or implementing partners in programmes and projects, the implementing is obliged to immediately notify the RDE Nairobi or RDE Addis.

## 7.4 Communication of programme results

A Programme Communication Plan has been developed. The plan contains multi-pronged communication activities aimed at a variety of audiences including, but not necessarily limited to: decision makers in the focus countries and the region; stakeholders in Denmark, stakeholders/general public in host country/region; thought leaders, i.e. engaging and influencing the expert communities and opinion-makers in the relevant programme areas.

The Communication of results will build on the ways and modalities that engagement partners use to communicate results. Given the various administrative modalities to be used for the engagements, this plan will build on specific clauses in the respective administrative agreements. For example, the SSF, UNODC, AMISOM and EASF have their established communication mechanisms, while a contract with the service provider for AML/CFT will specify communication responsibilities. Modalities to be specified may include social media, traditional media, online publishing of reports, workshops, public meetings, infographics etc.

The RDEs will draw on these to respond, where relevant, to specific internal and external communication needs and requests to communicate programme results, for example, related to high level Danish visits or at international summits and conferences etc. Communication activities over and above what is funded at engagement level is budgeted for under the *Management, M&E and Knowledge* budget line. See also Annex 7.

## 8 Budget

Table 13 summarises the budget at thematic programme level for a 48 months implementation period starting in July 2018 to June 2022. A detailed budget with estimated annual disbursements is presented in Annex 4. Budget allocations have considered the overall resource envelope based on the MFA and MOD budget appropriations, and an assessment by the embassies of priorities striking a balance between political and policy priorities as well as partner absorption capacity based on experience in the preceding iterations of the PSP, where relevant.

Table 13: Budget 2018-2022 (four years)\*

	TOTAL 2018-22		
	MFA	MOD	Total
<b>TP-1 Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia</b>			
Regional capacity - EASF and peace support training centers	7.5	18.00	25.50
AMISOM Civilian Stabilisation	24.0		24.00
Somalia Stability Fund	35.0		35.00
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>66.5</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>84.50</b>
<b>TP-2 Counter Violent Extremism through prevention and disengagement</b>			
CVE under IGAD Security Sector Program	9.0		9.00
Disengagement, National Defectors Program & counter narrative	18.0		18.00
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>27.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>27.00</b>
<b>TP-3 Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders</b>			
UNODC regional on organized crime (land and maritime)	28.0		28.00
Police advisor to UNODC program	4.0		4.00
Regional AML/CFT	14.0		14.00
Maritime security - Kenya Navy		11.0	11.00
	<b>46.0</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>57.00</b>
<b>Subtotal Engagements</b>	<b>139.5</b>	<b>29.00</b>	<b>168.50</b>
Management, knowledge (M&E, review, studies) and communications	14.0	11.0	25.00
Unallocated	25.0		25.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>219</b>

\* Finance Act: § 06.32.08.80 (MFA - ODA) and § 12.21.01.50. (MOD - non-ODA)

The “management, knowledge (M&E, review, studies) and communications” budget line covers management costs for the Defence engagements, including the costs associated with the Defence Attaché; budget for the M&E retainer contract, reviews, studies and TPM (AMISOM); as well as budget for communications, including events, related to the programme.

In terms of ODA-eligibility (cf. OECD DAC standards), the Programme includes ODA-funding from MFA (FL §06.32.08.80.) and non-ODA-funding from the MOD (FL §12.21.01.50.). Most Engagements are carried over from the previous programme. Those Engagement funded by MFA ODA budget have previously been assessed ODA-eligible. New engagements, including the IGAD CVE and UNODC engagements, are assessed to be in line with the OECD directives



as outlined and exemplified in the OECD ODA Case book from 2017. Moreover, in the partner agreements a clause will make clear that Danish funding from MFA ODA-budget can only be used for ODA-eligible activities.

### **Unallocated funds**

A comparative advantage of the PSF is its flexibility to respond to opportunities in fluid contexts, such as in Somalia. The PSP HoA 2018-2022 include DKK 25 million of unallocated MFA funds. The priority in programming these unallocated funds will be to extend or expand existing engagements or current thematic priorities as new options arise. The anticipated MTR will inform the distribution of unallocated funds. This also include the consideration of the continuation of advisor positions funded only for the first part of the programme (UNSOM, CIVAD, POLAD). It is intended to establish the UNSOM CVE position as a secondment under the Peace and Stabilisation Response instrument (FSB). If this is not feasible, it will be financed from unallocated funds under this programme.

Apart from this general principle, AMISOM will be considered specifically given the medium-term uncertainty around funding requirements because of the ongoing work on a transition plan for the transfer of responsibility of security from AMISOM to Somalia's authorities. Based on the scope of new mandates, the pace of the transition and needs on the ground, and AMISOM implementation performance, further stabilisation support in partnership with AMISOM will be considered after the MTR. Another area of priority for unallocated funds is relevant, additional activities implemented by the advisors/secondments under the programme.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12972.doc.htm>

<sup>2</sup> Human Trafficking and Smuggling in the Horn of Africa-Central Mediterranean Route. Sahan Foundation & IGAD SSP 2016

<sup>3</sup> A Gendered Perspective on the Impact of Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Cawo M. Abdi, 2011

<sup>4</sup> *ibid*

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.nordefco.org/Nordic-progress-in-East-Africa>

<sup>6</sup> "No offer, payment, consideration or benefit of any kind, which could be regarded as an illegal or corrupt practice, shall be made, promised, sought or accepted – neither directly nor indirectly – as an inducement or reward in relation to activities funded under this agreement, including tendering, award or execution of contracts. Any such practice will be grounds for the immediate cancellation of this agreement and for such additional action, civil and/or criminal, as may be appropriate. At the discretion of the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a further consequence of any such practice can be the definite exclusion from any projects funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs"