Peace and Stabilisation Programme
The Horn of Africa
2018-2022

Programme Document

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF DENMARK

DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

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*as per AMG guidance January 2018

To be available to Whole-of-Government Steering Committee on request:
• Peace and Stabilisation Engagement documentation (draft engagement documents and programme documents).
• National partner strategies (final or draft versions).
• Other documents deemed relevant.

Acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AML/CFT	Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism
APP	African Programme for Peace, Phase III
ASI	Adam Smith International
AU	African Union
CAS	Comprehensive Approach to Security
CFT	Counter Financing of Terrorism
CIVAD	Civilian Advisor to EASF
CN	Concept Note
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DCA	Delegated Cooperation Agreement
DCD	Defence Command Denmark
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DKK	Danish Kroner
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force
EFIC	Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Centre
EFIC	Ethiopia Financial Intelligence Centre
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
FMS	Federal Member State
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
GMCP	Global Maritime Crime Programme
HOA	Horn of Africa
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
ICEPCVE	IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre
ISSP	IGAD Security Sector Program
JDC	Joint Donor Committee
JFA	Joint Financing Arrangement
KN	Kenya Navy
MDA	Marine Domain Awareness
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MILAD	Military Advisor to EASF
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPU	Maritime Police Unit
NACS	Nordic Adviser and Coordination Staff
NAVAD	Navy Advisor to EASG
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRP	National Rehabilitation Programme
NSP	National Stabilisation Plan of Somalia
P/CVE	Preventing / Countering Violent Extremism
PAP	Process Action Plan
POLAD	Police Advisor to EASF
PREVENT	Prevention of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism
PSED	Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document
PSF	Peace and Stabilisation Fund
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PSP-HOA	Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa, 2018-2022

PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RDE	Royal Danish Embassy
SCP	Danish Somalia Country Programme 2015-2018
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SNA	Somali National Army
SNP	Somali National Police
SNSF	Somali National Security Forces
SSF	Somalia Stability Fund
STRATCOM	Strategic Communication
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TOCT	Transboundary Organised Crime & Trafficking
TP1	Thematic Programme 1 on Strengthening stabilisation and security actors
TP2	Thematic Programme 2 on Countering Violent Extremism
TP3	Thematic Programme 3 on Promoting exercise of authority across land and maritime borders
TPM	Third Party Monitoring
UK FCO	United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USD	United States Dollar
WGSC	Whole of Government Steering Committee

1 Introduction

This document provides the overview of Denmark's Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa (the Programme) 2018-2022 with an expected total budget of DKK 219 over a 4-years implementation period starting July 2018. The total commitment includes DKK 179 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and expectedly DKK 40 million non-ODA contribution from the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The Programme is the third phase of Denmark's peace and stabilisation support to the Horn of Africa and lessons from past phases have informed the programme formulation.

The Programme is part of the portfolio under the overall Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund. It takes its point of departure and strategic guidance from the *Concept Note for a third phase of the Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa 2018-2022 (CN 2017)* endorsed by the Whole-of-Government Steering Committee (WGSC) and the Danida Programme Committee, and their remarks and considerations to the CN 2017.

The Programme focus and prioritisation of engagements have been guided by Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017-18, taking into consideration Danish interests at stake, the nature and availability of effective partnerships, and potential influence through Denmark's expertise and experience. The Programme contributes to achieving the Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDGs) with its focus to peace and stability as critical enablers for the broader SDG 2030 agenda in the region. The Programme design has further been informed by Denmark's new *Defence Agreement 2018 – 2023, Denmark's integrated stabilisation engagement in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world, The World 2030 - Denmark's Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action* and its pillar on Peace, stability and protection, as well as Danish approaches to anti-piracy and countering violent extremism.

The Programme adheres to the overall PSF principles - in particular the focus on direct peace and stabilisation efforts and avoiding duplication and overlap with instruments supported by other Danish funding sources; the whole-of government approach, risk preparedness, a regional focus, the value added of Danish contributions and finally on enhancing the efficiency of the Danish engagement through partnerships and joint efforts with other international partners. Hence, the Programme aims at complementing other Danish instruments and is based on an integrated whole of government approach joining defence, police, civilian and development efforts using both ODA and non-ODA funding.

The programme comprises engagements in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. However, it is focused around the ongoing conflicts in Somalia with its regional ramifications. The Programme also complements Denmark's Africa Programme for Peace (APP) particularly the part supporting the implementation of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture through the African Union (AU) and the regional mechanisms. Furthermore, Denmark's Country Policy Papers for Kenya, Ethiopia and in particular the draft Somalia Policy Paper have guided the formulation.

The Programme is conscious of the high risks involved in any peace and stabilisation engagement, not least in a fragile, conflict-affected and violent context as Somalia. This is sought mitigated through active and continuous risk management which includes a risk matrix with defined risk mitigating measures. Programme implementation and management will also continuously address the many challenges and therefore there is a need to accept a rather high level of flexibility to enable programme management to adapt to the unfolding situation and to seize opportunities.

The formulation of the Programme has applied the PSF Guidelines (2014) and the Danida Aid Management Guidelines (AMG January 2018). Hence, the following outlines the motivations,

strategic direction, theories of change, structure, and expected outcomes of the Programme and its Peace and Stabilisation Engagements. Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSED) – one for each engagement – have been prepared based on consultations with the partners.

The main objective of the Programme is:

- *Improved peace and stability in the Horn of Africa by strengthening local, national and regional actors' capacity and ability to manage conflict and insecurity, counter threats and exercise legitimate authority.*

Recognizing that the conflict in Somalia is caused and maintained by a wide range of interconnected factors, the programme targets Somalia as the epicentre of regional insecurity with collateral effects in both Kenya and Ethiopia. The Programme has identified eight Peace and Stabilisation Engagements under the three Thematic Programmes (TPs):

1. Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.
2. Reduced levels of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa with a particular focus on Somalia through prevention and disengagement.
3. Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders

2 Programme Context

2.1 The Horn of Africa: Conflict, violent extremism, crime and forced displacement

The Horn of Africa (HoA) is home to some of Africa's fastest growing economies and countries across the region act with increased political and military self-confidence on the regional and global scene. Despite this progress, the HoA nonetheless remains one of the most insecure conflict areas in the world. The region hosts the generation long conflict in Somalia that came out of a complete state collapse in 1991 and is affected by the armed conflicts in Yemen and South Sudan. Root causes and structural drivers of fragility and instability in the region include inconclusive political settlements, violent extremism, weak security and governance structures and insufficient border demarcation and control. The conflict drivers are exacerbated by natural disasters, drought and climate change. In addition, natural resource exploitation leads to frictions over resource-sharing exacerbated by considerable transnational organised crime. These factors all lead to continuous conflict cycles and numerous displacements and migration. The result is a region characterised by ungoverned spaces in which terrorism, piracy, irregular migration, and transnational organized crime flourish – all of which pose direct and indirect threats to Denmark's security and welfare.

Fragility, and violent conflict in Somalia. Somalia remains one of the most unstable and fragile countries in the world. Perpetrators of violence include al-Shabaab, other extremist groups, states' forces and clan militias affiliated with political elites. The Somali security forces (Somali Police Force and Somali National Army) are also seen as entangled in clan politics and are very far from being able to administer security, rule of law and upholding basic human rights. The state formation process has advanced the last years but remains complicated, creating tensions between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States.

Territorial tension and control in Somalia. The AU force, AMISOM, with significant assistance from its regional and international partners, has made military gains and expanded the territory under control by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) by pushing back al-Shabaab from key population centres since 2012. However, al-Shabaab still holds sway over large portions of the countryside in central and southern Somalia and is able to carry out serious and frequent attacks within and outside Somalia. The Somali security forces are often incapable of holding territory and depend on AMISOM's continued presence. The ineffective state of the Somali Security Forces was documented in the Operational Readiness Assessment which constitutes the baseline for the transition from AMISOM-led security to Somalia-led security as stipulated in the UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (August 2017) that determined a reduction in troop numbers with a concomitant increase in police numbers.[1]

Terrorism and extremism. Violent extremists operating in the HoA are mainly "home-grown", operating out of authority vacuums or "safe havens". While some violent extremist groups are focussed mostly on local issues, global networks such as Al Qaeda have sought to engage groups in global jihad. The same goes for Islamic State, which is reported to have an expanding presence in the region. Al-Shabaab remains a key player in Somalia and the region, exploiting local grievances. Youth and minority groups (clans) remain excluded from political processes and economic development, making them prone to radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremist groups. Al-Shabaab remains one of the most successful home-grown terrorist groups in Africa. In addition to Somalia, it is active to some extent in the six countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda, and has mounted attacks in all of them, except for Tanzania.

Transnational organized crime, including human smuggling. Transnational organized criminal networks in the Horn of Africa have attracted increasing attention. Organized crime covers a broad spectrum from trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs to piracy. The region generates a large and vulnerable stream of smuggled migrants, who are abused and exploited during their journey. Organized crime is a product of instability and weak authorities, not least weak law enforcement. Also differences between legal systems, lack of trust, and lack of effective national and regional coordination obstruct cooperation on transnational criminal justice.

There is strong interconnectedness between transnational organized crime and terrorism. Terrorist organisations, including al-Shabaab, benefit from cross boundary trade in illicit goods arriving by sea to Somalia. Weak border security contributes to movement of terrorists across borders and the transnational movement of illicit goods and cargo. However, maintaining secure maritime, land and air borders is highly challenging in the Horn of Africa.

Forced displacement (refugees, IDPs and returnees) is an indicator of the region's fragility, instability and violent conflict. The region is home to one of the largest refugee and internally displaced populations in the world. Kenya and Ethiopia are among the top 10 refugees hosting countries and host around 300,000 and 250,000 Somali refugees respectively. In addition, both countries host a significant number of other refugee nationalities including from South Sudan. The number of Somalis affected by conflict and/or drought (people of concern) totalled 2.4 million by the end of 2017 (UNHCR 2017). The region's capacity to host more migrants and refugees seems close to saturated, as exemplified by the political pressures to close the Dadaab refugee camp in North Eastern Kenya. The region is a hub of mixed migration flows and corridors that ultimately connect to and contribute to migrant arrivals in Europe and Denmark.[2]

Piracy and maritime insecurity. While the extent of piracy has been reduced significantly, it remains an eminent threat to Danish shipping interests. Recent occurrences in the Indian Ocean clearly demonstrate that the region does not possess the full capacity to exercise authority over its territorial waters, spanning over one sixth of Africa's coastline. Other types of maritime crime are intertwined with the financing of violent extremist groups including transportation of fighters and weapons, human trafficking and diversified smuggling networks, generating significant illicit financial flows. Hence, maritime security off the region's coasts continues to be a Danish priority. Amongst the HoA nations only Kenya has a functioning Navy while Somalia, Somaliland and Djibouti have only rudimentary maritime police/coastguard units. Maritime security is crucial also for the region's landlocked economies as well as for Danish commercial interests.

Kenya and Ethiopia are regional hegemons with combined economies that make up about 50 pct. of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states' economies. Both are key Troop-Contributing Countries (TCC) to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and influential members of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). As states sharing land and, in the case of Kenya, maritime borders, with Somalia, they face several transboundary threats and challenges that either directly emanate from - or are aggravated by the situation in Somalia. The three countries' international borders intersect in the so-called Mandera triangle, which is a potential flashpoint in relation to many of the region's threats.

Gulf States. Spill-over from the war in Yemen and the opposing Sunni and Shia aligned forces combined with the growing engagement of the Gulf States in the HoA poses a challenge to the region and its development partners. The inflow of attention and funding represent appealing alternatives to more conventional approaches by development partners and OECD aid effectiveness principles of accountability and transparency. The growing attention of Gulf States towards the HoA and the manifestation of their proxy interests represent an important factor in the political dynamics in Somalia. The Gulf States and Turkey have, for example, provided

significant amounts of funding to address the region's humanitarian crisis - but can on the other hand contribute to undermining ongoing state building processes based on their national interests.

2.2 Gender dimensions

Women in the HoA experience disproportionate marginalisation and exclusion, which in turn increases their exposure to negative impacts from conflict and violence. The gender gap comprises lack of access to healthcare, education, political participation and economic opportunities, as well as disregard for human rights, including very high levels of Female Genital Mutilation[3]. Of the countries covered by the programme, Kenya ranks number 146 out of 188 countries on the most current Gender Inequality Index (GII), with Ethiopia ranking 174 and Somalia (though not included in the 2016 GII) assessed to be ranking among the bottom five. The short- and long-term gendered consequences of the conflict in Somalia are profound as conflict and instability exacerbate already entrenched gender inequalities in patriarchal societies. The protracted conflict has resulted in widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

Women play an active role in al-Shabaab and Islamic state both in Somalia and Kenya as well as in clan conflicts in Somalia. This includes intelligence gathering, financial contributions and enabling financial transfers, recruitment, support roles and more rarely active fighting. On the other hand, women also play an important role in peace processes, especially community level reconciliation, including disengagement of al-Shabaab combatants (sons). Moreover, women, in Somalia in particular, constitute the social and economic fabric at community level to a large extent.

The Programme addresses a broad variety of gender related issues. The SSF for instance has a strong focus on women's empowerment and inclusion in peace and mediation processes, such as by supporting women's voice and participation in the formation of district councils or their socio-economic opportunities in areas under stress (indicator included in the results framework). The support to the International Peace Support Training Centre and AMISOM stabilisation activities will also include gender related activities as has been the case hitherto. Targeted initiatives towards protection of women, including against sexual and gender based violence, is expected to be supported under the bilateral Somalia Country Programme 2019-2023.

2.3 Human rights deficiencies

The human rights situation in the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, remains challenging across a number of fundamental human rights. Patterns of (political) repression including intimidation against media and activists are widespread. Moreover, governments' inability or unwillingness to respond to serious allegation of unlawful killings, torture and other serious violations create a reinforcing environment of impunity. Another issue is security forces' and related services' inability to operate in a human rights compliant manner – being it AMISOM, coast guard or police. Often it is the result of a unidimensional ("tough") approach to security combined with lack of training and absence of standard procedures.

The human rights situation in Somalia remains dire, especially when it comes to protection of civilians. In the period January 2016 to October 2017 UNSOM documented a total of 4,585 civilian casualties (2,078 killed and 2,507 injured), 60 per cent of which were attributed to al-Shabaab. State- and non-state actors also carried out extrajudicial executions; sexual and gender-based violence; arbitrary arrests and detention; and abductions. Somali children are disproportionately affected by the conflict, and are exposed to grave violations during military operations, including killing, maiming, and arrest and detention by Somali security forces.

Generally, a human rights based approach (HRBA) has been applied throughout programming to ensure human rights sensitivity and awareness across engagements (see section 3.3). The

support to the International Peace Support Training Centre and AMISOM will comprise dedicated human rights, humanitarian law and protection related activities as has been the case hitherto. Targeted initiatives towards protection of children, including rehabilitation of children associated with al-Shabaab, is expected to be supported by the bilateral Somalia Country Programme 2019-2023.

2.4 Corruption

Corruption is rampant in the Horn of Africa and rent-seeking behaviour absorbs funds earmarked for public expenditure and thus undermines everything from social services provision to security sector services. Corruption is also an enabler for conflict and insecurity as it penetrates security forces, fuels al-Shabaab and undermines state-building in Somalia. Initiatives to reform institutions to counter corruption threaten entrenched elites and patronage systems, feeding on corrupt practises including misuse of humanitarian and development funds. Somalia ranks at the very bottom of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (176 of 176 countries). Corruption continues to perpetuate al-Shabaab's claim to relevance, as it feeds off the grievances of communities that are excluded from political processes and resource sharing. Denmark supports anti-corruption efforts in Somalia under the bilateral country programme.

Corruption is also a serious problem in Kenya, which ranks number 145 on the index – both at the upper-most levels manifested in elite capture, and at a community level where business and political interests are entangled in a self-sustaining system of identity-based patronage. Kenya has nevertheless introduced measures to prevent corruption with the new constitution adopted in 2010. Although Ethiopia has a relatively (relative to Somalia and Kenya) better score on the index ranking 108 due to a strong legislative framework to prevent corruption, corruption and rent seeking still flourish with rare enforcement of anti-corruption legislation.

The Programme's measures to address corruption include delegating to partners with reliable financial management systems with which Denmark has prior experience; clarity in engagement documentation of the standards expected; reserving the right to discontinue engagements in the event of mismanagement; Third Party Monitoring (TPM) where necessary; and close and on-going monitoring by engagement managers. Risk management options for PSP-HOA, which have been written into the engagement documents, include application of TPM, periodic audits of how partners have used Danish funding, and reclamation of funds.

2.5 Summary of key drivers of conflict to be addressed by the Programme

The Programme only addresses a subset of the multifaceted and multilevel drivers of conflict outlined in the section above and annex 1. It mostly focusses on more immediate response or direct prevention of conflict drivers in contrast to the Country Programmes that tackle some of the root causes of conflict such as poverty and unemployment, weak general governance and corruption, and marginalisation. Key drivers of conflict to be addressed by the Programme are summarised in the table below.

Table 1: Key drivers of conflict to be addressed by the Programme

Category	Conflict drivers
Political, identity, socioeconomic drivers	• (Clan) elite contestation over power, people and territory, at the local, state and federal level with marginalizing impact. Legacies of violence and trauma. • Violent Extremism with al-Shabaab continuing to oppose the Federal Government and Federal Member States and controlling large sections of the Somali countryside. Al-Shabaab (and other militia and terrorist groups) continues to attract members from economically or socially disfranchised groups.

	• Organized crime often with transnational features.
Institutional drivers (facilitators)	• Weak and fragile national governance and security institutions with low legitimacy not capable of exercising legitimate authority (military, police, border security, financial intelligence). • Weak regional peace and security institutions; suboptimum border cooperation and law enforcement.

3 Strategic Considerations and justification

Denmark's strategic interests related to the Horn of Africa are converging around global challenges such as refugee and irregular migration flows, violent extremism and terrorism, and the security and safety of the critical maritime transport route between Europe and Asia. The programme and its priorities is justified by its relevance in tackling some of the drivers of conflict outlined above.

Accordingly, the objective of the programme as previously outlined is: Improved peace and stability in the Horn of Africa by strengthening local, national and regional actors' capacity and ability to manage conflict and insecurity, counter threats and exercise legitimate authority. The Programme's overall objective and its underlying thematic programme objectives are closely aligned with the objective of the Somalia Policy Paper which is to support the development of a stable, peaceful and resilient Somalia in inclusive economic development that can offer its citizens a positive future and where the government is able to exercise authority with the aim that the situation in Somalia no longer threatens regional and international peace, security and prosperity.

In this way the Programme contributes to the implementation of Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017-2018 as it engages directly on the Strategy's priority theme "Migration, instability and terrorism". In line with the foreign and security policy and the strategic guidance provided in The World 2030, the Programme includes a specific focus on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism both because of the severe impact of violent extremism in the region, but also because of Denmark's commitment to combating violent extremism as a global challenge.

This section outlines the justification and rationale behind the programme, the principles which underpins the programme logic; complementarity with other instruments and initiatives; lessons learned; results framework; risks; and budget figures at thematic level.

3.1 Justification, principles and Danish strengths

The aim of the Programme is to maximise the impact of Denmark's foreign and security policy through targeted prioritisation of areas of engagement and engagement partners by applying the criteria outlined in the Foreign and Security Policy Review ("Taksøe-rapporten"), i.e. weighing Danish interests at stake, the nature and availability of effective partnerships, and influence through Denmark's expertise and experience of using civilian, police and military capacities.

Whole-of-Government approach. In addition to the strategic pointers already mentioned above and in the introduction of this Programme Document, the purpose of the Programme is to support bilateral and multilateral efforts that underpin broad stabilisation initiatives in their individual capacity and collectively as a comprehensive and regional engagement. Accordingly, the Programme addresses security issues in a comprehensive manner with a broad range of initiatives and in a way that integrates various instruments. Moreover, it takes into consideration other Danish and international interventions in the same area and ensure coordination with other actors.

The Programme's mix of ODA and non-ODA funds makes it especially suited for a comprehensive approach. The Whole-of-Government approach has been operationalised both through more abstract complementary of engagements such as civilian stabilisation efforts by Somalia Stability Fund and military efforts of AMISOM supported by training, as well as in very concrete civilian and military cooperation through deployment of Danish defence, navy, police and civilian expertise, facilitating, for example, integrated planning within EASF.

Regionality and risk preparedness. Regional conflict and fragility situations occur as the result of interlinked processes with local causes and transnational connections. Recognizing that the conflict in Somalia is caused and sustained by a wide range of underlying and interconnected drivers, the programme targets Somalia as the epicentre of regional instability with collateral effects in both Kenya and Ethiopia. Hence, the programme comprises engagements in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Individual engagements at the national level have been prioritised for their potential important contribution to the region's overall ability to prevent and manage instability and conflict. Support to EASF, regional peace support training centres and IGAD CVE activities benefits other Eastern African countries as well.

The Programme is focussed on generating stabilisation outcomes and accepts comparably high levels of risk. It is designed to operate in the "sharp end" of Denmark's international engagement. Further, it exploits its ability to work in the civil-military nexus in a highly politicised and volatile context. Finally, it sets targets that often differ from conventional development targets and deliberately opt out of engagement types that may be relevant but that fall outside the realm of a stabilisation programme and would fit better under other available programming modalities.

Strategic partnerships. The Programme draws on and benefits from the dialogue and partnership with organisations across the HoA, which have been established and developed over the course of the previous phases as well as through different phases of the Danish Africa Programme for Peace. Partnership relations have been built at political and programmatic levels and across the civilian and defence domain and have secured rare levels of access and policy impact. The programme will prioritise to cultivate strategic partnerships with similar conflict-focussed programming instruments such at the UK Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), and with regional peace and security actors such as IGAD and the AU and involved partner governments. Building on the established relationship with IGAD under the Africa Programme for Peace, the Programme adds another layer of regional collaboration on P/CVE. The existing programme with UNODC is expanded into a regional strategic partnership supporting maritime and land border management.

Danish interests and strengths. The programme focuses specifically on areas where Denmark has significant economic and security interests such as maritime security, countering violent extremism, stabilisation, curbing irregular migration, and enhancing regional peacekeeping capacity. These are engagement areas where suitable and capable partners can be identified; and interventions are likely to generate outcomes aligned with Danish interests. It deploys military, policing and civilian expertise with a strategic regional peace support force (EASF), the most important navy in the region (Kenya), CIMIC and C-IED training of AMISOM, and work with key UN actors (UNSOM, UNODC) thus bringing Danish capacities directly to bear.

International principles. In addition to the PSF principles, including the regional approach and risk preparedness mentioned above and whole-of-government approach outlined below, the Programme adhere to the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, including always taking the context as the starting point, ensuring to do no harm, and the importance of efficient coordination among governments, other stakeholders and international partners (see the section on Whole-of- Government above).

3.2 Complementarity with other instruments and frameworks

Complementarity with Danish bilateral programmes. The Programme compliments other Danish instruments and interventions in the Horn of Africa. The Somalia Stability Fund and AMISOM's civilian affairs, for instance, contribute to basic state-building at Federal Member state level as well as local and community level. In this way, the PSP HoA complements the Danish bilateral Country Programme for Somalia that also supports Local Governance. As such,

the Danish engagements provide broad support to the implementation of the Wadajir Framework, the Somalia Government's framework for stabilisation and for rebuilding governance. It also responds to the UNs approach to stabilisation, the "Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability". Another example of direct complementarity is the Programme's support to al-Shabaab disengagement, where the next bilateral Somalia Country Programme (2019-2023) is expected to support the rehabilitation of children associated with al-Shabaab.

The Country Programme for Kenya has, under its Thematic Governance Programme, a focus on improved capacity and effectiveness of Civil Society Organisations, government and security oversight bodies to counter violent extremism, and more broadly to prevent political and natural resource conflicts. These efforts include Civil Society Organisations' engagements around preventing violent extremism and electoral conflict mitigation initiatives, addressing politically instigated communal violence in the Counties of Kisumu, Bungoma and the whole of the Coast region. Also the Danish Defence (currently) has deployed staff to the international Combined Maritime Forces 150 and 151 which complements support to Kenya Navy and coast guard/maritime law enforcement units (Kenya and Somalia) supported under the Programme.

In all three countries, Denmark is heavily engaged in humanitarian relief and resilience-building efforts through international organisations as well as Danish NGOs - work which is evidently undermined by violence and conflict.

Complementarity with the Danish Africa Programme for Peace (APP). The overall APP objective is to promote peace and security as a basis for sustainable development in Africa. This is done through support to the development of an operational African conflict prevention capability, strengthening of the African security and governance architecture and promotion of the relationship between civil society and the regional organisations. APP primarily works directly with capacity development of the African organisations that constitute the building blocks of the African Peace and Security Architecture and African Governance Architecture, such as The African Union (AU), ECOWAS and IGAD. Thus while the two instruments are distinct, they have the same overarching objective, to promote peace, security and stability. One way of viewing the relationship is to see APP as working at the "strategic normative" and continental/regional level, while the PSP HOA works at the "strategic operational" and regional/country level, with direct peace and stabilisation activities in relevant countries. IGAD, for instance, receives support for capacity development under the APP and is engaged in mediation processes in Somalia while it is also a partner under the PSP HOA with more narrow tasks related to CVE.

Complementarity with international security and stabilisation support. The Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) in Somalia was adopted at the London Conference as part of the Security Pact in May 2017. It provides the conceptual framework for the international community's commitments and cooperation to support the security sector in Somalia, including the implementation of the National Security architecture and ultimately the transfer of security responsibility from AMISOM to Somalia. It consists of four main strands: 1) Enabling effective AMISOM operations; 2) Accelerating the development of Somali National security institutions and forces, including police and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); 3) Support to the Somali Government's stabilisation plans and Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority/Accountability; 4) Countering/Preventing Violent Extremism (C/PVE). The programme contributes to all strands: 1 – peace support training centres supporting AMISOM; 2 – police through AMISOM Stabilisation and Al-Shabaab disengagement; 3 - SSF, AMISOM stabilisation); and 4 - al-Shabaab Disengagement.

3.3 Human rights based approach

The Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) has been mainstreamed in the PSP HoA design by incorporating crosscutting requirements in all programmes and through the inclusion of specific expected results that advance the four principles of participation and inclusion, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency. The principles are also reflected in the PSEDs and in specific measures. This includes, for example, requirements related to duty-bearing responsibilities of Somali government authorities related to disengaged al-Shabaab combatants (partnership with UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office), and safeguards against the use of Danish funds in cases that can be related to the death penalty (UNODC). Seconded advisors from the Danish Defence and Danish National Police will integrate HRBA in their work with their counterpart institutions.

3.4 Lessons learned applied

The formulation process for the PSP HoA 2018-2022 has in particular benefitted from: (i) the hosting of an International Stabilisation Conference in Nairobi in December 2016, (ii) an Internal Strategy Seminar held in Addis Ababa in April 2017, (iii) a 2017 mid-term review of PSP HoA II and (iiii) commissioned analytical work on countering violent extremism.[4] This learning process has informed the Programme with lessons from previous phases of the programme, analysis of current trends and developments relating to conflict and stabilisation dynamics in the region and in Somalia, and violent extremism. In the following some of the main lessons learned are presented including how the Programme is responding to these lessons.

The 2014 Evaluation Report of the PSF reiterated the need for the new PSF programmes to make extra efforts in identifying strategic and targeted short term peace and stabilisation engagements to maximise opportunities for impact. This was seen as particularly important for smaller international partners such as Denmark. Hence, the formulation process has focused on limiting the priorities, sharpening the stabilisation profile of the TPs and the engagements and identifying complementarities between different Danish regional and country engagements.

The 2017 Mid Term Review (MTR) found that the Programme 2015-2017 had been deliberate in choosing well-performing regional engagements by directing efforts towards trans-boundary challenges and opportunities which are likely to be most effectively addressed through a regional approach. Thus, a whole-of-government approach has been applied whereby civilian, police and defence capacities from across government institutions have been drawn upon to address multi-dimensional regional peace and stabilisation challenges. Furthermore, the programme is developed with a focus on complementarity and avoiding the duplication or crowding out of initiatives in the development and humanitarian domains. The formulation process has also been focused on continuation of engagements that are performing well and has only introduced necessary, often minor, adjustments to these engagements and only when necessary, more radical changes reflecting a changed context.

Programming, implementation and monitoring in Somalia is challenging, and even more so without a continuous, Danish physical presence neither on the civilian nor the defence side. This situation is likely to continue during the implementation period of the Programme. Hence Third Party Monitoring mechanism will be introduced for risk-prone engagements that are not already covered by other partners Third Party Monitoring systems (applies for AMISOM).

Stabilisation efforts are meant to achieve results in the short and medium term but proper analysis, trust-building, lesson-learning and partnership-strengthening take time. This points towards a need for longer programme implementation periods. Hence, the implementation period for the Programme has been increased from 3 years in Phase II to 4 years - July 2018 to June 2022.

There is a need for continuing institutionalisation of the decentralised management arrangements for the Programme, including the streamlining of reporting channels. Additional training on PSF reporting and monitoring procedures took place in January and February 2018. Practical implications of the decentralised management arrangement have been captured in Chapter 6.The

Programme emphasises the importance of firmly and concretely operationalising gender perspectives and always ensuring that women are included in the engagements (see section on "Gender dimensions"). Women play a crucial role in all phases of peacebuilding, and not least in the very first stabilisation efforts. Involvement and participation of women in all aspects of the interventions under this Programme is instrumental if lasting stabilisation outcomes are to be achieved. The Programme will also continue to work with youth, such as in relation to al-Shabaab disengagement and defectors' rehabilitation or support under the Somalia Stability Fund to involvement of youth in peace processes or economic activities for youth of marginalized communities. This also implies working in a concerted effort with the relevant country programmes in the region.

3.5 Programme Results Framework

Below is presented the overall Results Framework (also see Annex 3) and the theories of changes (ToC) are presented. The table below summarises the ToCs informing the design of the TPs to show the key assumptions, processes of change and outcomes to which the TPs will *contribute*. It also presents substantive linkages between the thematic programme objective and the kinds of available engagements identified through the formulation process.

Table 1: Programme Results Framework (objectives and outcomes)*

Programme Objective	*Improved peace and stability in the Horn of Africa by strengthening local, national and regional actors' capacity and ability to manage conflict and insecurity, counter threats and exercise legitimate authority.*
TP1 Objective	Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.
Impact indicator	Score of security apparatus, group grievances and state legitimacy respectively as measured by the Fund for Peace ("Fragility Index"). EASF demonstrates during field training exercise in late 2019 or 2020 that it is capable to deploy and carry out a mission relative to the mission objective.
Theory of Change	*If regional, national and local security and stabilisation actors in the Horn of Africa are strengthened, then major security challenges can be better addressed and legitimate national security forces can gradually become the main providers of security in Somalia.*
Outcomes	- East African peace support personnel (military, police and civilians) are able to conduct effective PSOs according to AU/UN international standards - Increased security and stability in south central Somalia - State authority and legitimacy in Somalia is enhanced, and political and communal conflict is reduced
TP2 Objective	Reduced violent extremism in geographical areas of programme implementation through prevention and disengagement efforts.
Impact indicator	Reduced impact of violent extremist attacks in the region as measured by Global Terrorism Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace and/or similar indexes.
Theory of Change	*If local, national and regional actors develop and introduce national strategies, systems and structures which focus on prevention of violent extremism and promotion of disengagement from violent extremist groups, receiving and reintegrating low risk individuals and groups into their communities, then the basis for recruitment is reduced and members of violent extremist groups*

	are offered a path away from violence.
Outcomes	• IGAD's Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism is delivered on • Improved regional capacity for preventing and countering violent extremism • Increased defection from al-Shabaab
TP3 Objective	Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders
Impact indicator	Reduced transnational organised crime across the borders of the three countries of the programme as assessed by UNODC and other relevant agencies/organisations such as the Global Initiative against Transnational organised crime
Theory of Change	*If the region's governments are capacitated to regulate and manage their shared borders and seize opportunities for collaboration, then the risk of conflicts along the border decreases, migration can be managed and reduced and threats from transnational crime decrease.*
Outcomes	• Member States have increased law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and analytical capacity to counter corruption, illicit and unregulated flows of people and goods including effective enforcement structures in selected sea/dry ports • Ethiopia has strengthened capacity to enforce legislation against illicit financial flows according to international standards leading to successful prosecutions • The Kenyan Navy has increased operational capacity and maritime awareness

*Indicators are indicative and will be finalized when the entire results framework has been completed in terms of indicators, baselines and targets when PSEDs have been agreed/ signed with partners.

3.6 Aid effectiveness

The design of the Programme against the OECD DAC criteria is summarised below.

Table 2: PSP HoA and Aid effectiveness

DAC Criteria	PSP HoA Measures
Relevance	The relevance of the Programme is demonstrated by the high degree of harmonisation and alignment at regional and national levels with IGAD strategies, the EASF strategic plan, AMISOM work-plans, regional and national priorities on maritime security, regional efforts to address trans-boundary crime, including money laundering and human trafficking. In Somalia, the engagements are aligned with the Somalia Security Pact and the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS). In Kenya, the engagement has been developed together with the Kenyan Navy. In Ethiopia, the engagement is aligned with the government's strategies relating to anti money laundering.
Effective	The Programme is effective in that it concentrates on a subset of stabilisation issues relating to the situation in Somalia, with significant importance to peace and stability in the region. Denmark is engaged in the development-humanitarian-security nexus with humanitarian assistance, country programmes and defence cooperation. The Programme thus contributes to enhance effectiveness of other engagements.
Efficiency	The Programme is implemented through collaboration and coordination with a limited number of partners as the Programme applies a range of implementation modalities; bilateral support, delegated cooperation, support to multilateral agencies, embedded advisors to mention some. Hence, the Programmes aims at

	finding a balance between the potential for Danish influence and reducing transaction costs and risks. The Programme relies on the partners' M&E systems where these are deemed strong enough and engages Third Party Monitoring (TPM) capacities if and when needed.
Sustainability	The Programme is implemented by relying on partner systems where possible, such as in the collaboration with the African Union (AU), IGAD and United Nations or through aligning closely with organisational plans such as the engagement with EASF. The Programme also engages in joint funding mechanisms set up by international partners and delegated cooperation agreements thus also reducing dependence on only Danish funding. Every engagement has been formulated with a view to an eventual Danish exit and transfer of responsibility and financing to the partners.
Impact	The impact of the Programme are expected to be: (i) strengthened regional cooperation and (ii) regional and national institutions and systems enabled to, independently and collectively, address and contain stabilisation risks thereby (iii) reducing the array of collateral effects instability has on the region and beyond - including those linked to Danish national interests.

3.7 Contextual risks and scenarios

The risks the Programme faces range from minor to significant in terms of the contextual, programmatic and institutional risks. The identified risks that may counteract the successful implementation of engagements and achievements of expected results are many and they are also assessed to potentially have major impact on the programmatic environment. The approach taken is contained in the risk response and mitigation measures outlined in Annex 5, which includes potential scenarios that may cause changes to the programme or its individual engagements. The programme is designed by defining programme objectives and identifying potential risks and scenarios in a manner so as to avoid to make changes in the objectives when changes in scenarios and risks occur. However, there may be a need for other changes such as changing the partner, geographical area, level of engagement, budgeting, time lines etc. Annex 5 provides concrete guidance to engagement managers on options to detect and respond to risks, while recognising that how these options will be used in the case of each engagement will depend on the situation faced.

Escalation of conflict and/or political instability is a key concern in all of the engagement areas, though Somalia is evidently most prone to active violent conflict. At the local level, particularly in Somalia, insecurity also hinders access to implementation areas and implementation modalities and monitoring systems therefore need to be set up with partners that have the capacity to mitigate these challenges. There is a close relationship between the management of risks identified in Annex 5 and the ToC detailed for each Thematic Programme in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Programme and engagement managers will be required to actively manage risk within the overall programme and each engagement needs to reconfirm and potentially adjust the underlying ToC.

While it is hard to predict developments particularly in Somalia, the table below outlines three scenarios, which may in different ways impact - negatively or positively - the operational space for the PSP HOA III. The engagements developed for the Programme largely responds to the "most likely scenario" i.e. an anticipation that things will develop without radical positive or negative developments. Assumptions relating directly to political dynamics in Somalia are a lot less certain compared e.g. to the political stability of Kenya, however.

The planning scenario for Somalia is based on the assessment underpinning the Somalia Security Pact of May 2017, entailing a combination of sustained military advances against al-Shabaab, combined with progress on the operational effectiveness of security forces and a constitutional

order strong enough to manage a temporary increase in intra-governmental contestation with coordinated international support. This will allow for a gradual change of character and composition of AMISOM as a transition to national institutions takes hold at federal-, state- and community levels. Conditions for voluntary return of IDPs and refugees would improve.

The table below does not consider possible extreme external events such as a collapse in Eritrea, massive spill-over from the conflict in Yemen, or new inter-state regional conflict but focuses on more likely scenarios with direct impact on the PSP.

Worst-case Scenario	Most likely Scenario	Ideal Scenario
Security and political developments in Somalia		
Government collapse (assassination of leadership or the like, dissolving of Cabinet etc.)	Government w. some capacity and sustained engagement structures	Merits-based appointments, reforms and increasing GOS capacity
Collapse of state formation process resulting in conflict. Somaliland increasingly asserting independence	Frail but on-going state formation. Status quo on Somaliland situation	Constructive settlements around state structures. Radically improved working relationship w. Somaliland
Resurgence of Al-Shabaab	Al-Shabaab carries out asymmetrical attacks. Does not hold territory but controls significant rural areas	Diminishing al-Shabaab presence and ability to undertake attacks
Failed attempts at reforming security sector	Timid incremental improvements of security sector	Leadership and emerging merits-based reform of security sector
Intensified clan identification and division	Emerging reconciliation/ cohesion efforts at local level.	Diminishing tension along critical fault lines within and between clans
Increasing negative engagement of external actors	Moderately increasing both constructive and challenging engagement of external actors	Formalised constructive engagement of external actors on key issues. Government rejecting interference
Commitment to and effectiveness of AMISOM		
Key Troop and Police Contributing Countries rapidly disengaging from supplying troops, commanders and equipment	AMISOM contributions aligned with transition plan but with sub-standard equipment	AMISOM provided with key enablers allowing more effective military campaigns and functioning as a deterrent
Major security events with high numbers of casualties	Gradually reduced number of AMISOM casualties	Minimal AMISOM casualties
Loss of liberated areas	Continued incremental military gains and inability of Al-Shabaab to apply other strategies than asymmetrical warfare but still significant pockets of al-Shabaab control	Further consolidation of AMISOM/government control with minimal pockets of al-Shabaab control
Key donors pulling out of financing agreements	Funding sustained aligned with transition plan	Increasing budgets for AMISOM
Major human rights abuses continuously reported leading to backlash on many fronts	Confirmed reports of human rights abuses by AMISOM troops with limited repercussions	Effective human rights monitoring mechanisms implemented within AMISOM and externally in

		AMISOM Human Rights Section
Dysfunction of the civilian AMISOM pillar	Some but inadequate activity and reporting from AMISOM Civil Affairs	New leadership and strengthening of AMISOM Political Section and mandate leading to more effective bridging of military and civilian stabilisation efforts
Inability to generate formed police units and individuals police commanders	Inadequate bridging of mission components but meeting targets for Formed Police Units	AMISOM military component effectively handing over to AMISOM Police and SNP
Regional political cooperation		
Worsening regional cooperation impacting on regional initiatives such as AML, border collaboration, EASF and IGAD CVE	Some challenging regional dynamics but overall collaborative environment	Increased trust between regional actors. Appetite for regional collaboration at political as well as operative levels across a range of sectors
Developments in Kenya and Ethiopia		
Political conflict flaring up shifting political attention towards domestic issues to the detriment of regional engagement. Backlash against engagement in Somalia.	Domestic stability and governments prioritising regional collaboration within sectorial and historic constraints	Increased "East-Pan-Africanism" leading to high-level commitment to regional collaboration translating into enhances regional collaboration in key focus sectors
Programme Response	**Programme Responses**	**Programme Response**
- Reduced funding and increasing technical assistance. Increasing analytical work, including conflict analysis. - Review of work plans - Identification of new partners and/or modalities. - Enhanced political dialogue. - Consolidate and safeguard results rather than expand activities.	This is the scenario the Programme formulation is based on.	- Increase focus on longer capacity development of local actors rather than short term legitimacy building. - Reduce funding for immediate stabilisation (peace dividend) and increase for longer term state-building. - Expand support to broader geographical scope - Extend more trust and responsibility to implementing partners.

3.8 Budget at thematic programme level

Table 3 summarises the budget at thematic programme level, noting that it does not differentiate between the programme's three funding sources. A detailed budget is presented in Annex 4.

Table 3: Thematic Programme indicative budget per year (four years)

	Thematic Programme	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Total DKK million
1	Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.	19.8	23.5	21.6	17.6	2.3	84.7
2	Reduced levels of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa with a particular focus on Somalia through prevention and disengagement.	7.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	0	27
3	Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders	24.9	8.8	9.8	10.8	1.9	57.2
	Management, M&E, and knowledge (including TA and their security)	1.4	6.7	5.7	9.7	1.4	24
	Unallocated	0	6.5	8.5	10	0	25
	Total	**55**	**53**	**53**	**53**	**5.8**	**219**

4 Thematic Programme 1: Regional conflict management capacity and stabilisation and security in Somalia

4.1 Strategic considerations and justification

The objective of TP1 is: *Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.* The main purpose of the engagement is to continue and consolidate the further development of the EASF as a relevant and efficient response mechanism towards peace and security and to endow AMISOM with much needed capacities in order to increase its operational capacity. These efforts are complemented with support to civilian stabilisation efforts in Somalia undertaken by AMISOM to consolidate military gains and successively by the Somalia Stability Fund to sustain and build on those gains through supporting political settlements and reconciliation, state-building and confidence-building service delivery.

The overall outcomes of these efforts are expected to be:

- East African peace support personnel (military, police and civilians) are able to conduct effective Peace Support Operations according to AU/UN international standards
- Increased security and stability in south central Somalia
- State and local authority and legitimacy in Somalia is enhanced, and political and local conflict is reduced

Strategic considerations

At the regional level, the East African Standby Force (EASF) has seen significant achievements and, while yet to be deployed, constitutes a promising component of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The region thus faces the paradox of having the most operationally capable regional standby force in Africa while also hosting several of the most protracted and violent conflicts on the continent. Kenya and Ethiopia are core members of the EASF and TCCs to AMISOM and are also contributing with bilateral military engagements outside AMISOM.

Somalia has made important progress towards establishing the main foundations for the Somali state formation to consolidate continuous peace and stabilisation efforts. The federal structure is advancing and in the process of being reaffirmed at the regional and local level. The National Leadership Forum comprising federal and FMS leaders is functioning as a high level political forum for consultation. However, there is no consolidated national political settlement, which genuinely addresses underlying grievances often associated with resource and power sharing, and clan identity - nor has Somalia seen consolidated reconciliation efforts at the local level.

African Union peacekeepers (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) have made progress in reclaiming territory from al-Shabaab since 2012 though these gains remain fragile. State-building continues to be undermined by numerous sources of instability, including violent extremism and competition between multiple armed groups. As a result, the state and its institutions lack capacity to provide security guarantees, governance, rule of law, as well as basic social services. These deficiencies conversely makes it difficult to persuade communities to shift their loyalty from al-Shabaab to the Somali state.

Thematic programme focus

The objective of TP 1 focuses on two interlinked areas. Firstly, it supports the EASF's and regional peace support training centres' capacity to contribute to regional peace and security. It seeks to further develop regional conflict management capacity through integrated training of military, police and civilian capacities under the EASF and supported through a Danish Whole-

of-Government approach involving specialised Danish capacities. The training includes military and police from key troop and police contributing countries to AMISOM. While AMISOM is not an Eastern African regional force, military forces are drawn from the region and the countries trained as part of the EASF. Contingents from these countries have benefitted from the training and operational preparedness standards that have been part of the Danish Armed Forces support to the EASF under the Nordic Defence Cooperation since 2008[5]. The supply chains to AMISOM, EASF and the national forces comprising them are often the same. In this TP Denmark is drawing on, and reinforcing the success of, its previous engagements to develop the capacity of the region's armed forces to respond to and deter conflict in the region, incl. Somalia.

Furthermore, TP1 aims to increase the operational preparedness of AMISOM to better handle the threat from C-IED in the Somalia mission theatre. The Danish Defence will through the close partnership with BPST support pre-deployment training of primarily Kenyan and Ugandan troop contributions in handling the IED threat. The pre-deployment training might be further expanded relative to the security dynamics in the mission area and according to requests from troop contributing countries.

Secondly, it will support civilian stabilisation efforts in areas at risk of falling back into the hands of al-Shabaab. It is critical that sub-federal level institutions (state and non-state; local and federal member state administrations) build trust with those they govern and that they deliver in their roles. These efforts are undertaken by AMISOM's civilian component in high-risk areas with immediate and short-term stabilisation needs through early peace support efforts, Quick Impact Projects and support to key institutions and structures at the local level, including police. They are complemented by activities funded through the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) - a multi-partner funding arrangement managed by the United Kingdom. While AMISOM stabilisation support will be focused on short term peace support projects and capacity development and infrastructure for the Somalia National Police, SFF seeks to consolidate these early gains through addressing key fault lines within and between communities, federal member states and the federal government and through political processes and basic institution building with the aim to increase legitimacy.

Consolidation of security gains by AMISOM requires effective stabilisation efforts and the ability of the Somali Security Forces to gradually take over security responsibilities. The engagements thus supports the objectives outlined in the CAS and the Somalia Security Pact as well as UNSCR resolution on gradual reduction in AMISOM's military component with concomitant increases in the police component and increased AMISOM support to the development of the SNP and FMS police forces, eventually paving the way for a conditioned AMISOM drawdown.

Regional priorities
TP 1 supports on-going commitments by East African countries to build regional capacity to undertake peace support operations (PSO) in the region through supporting the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). The same countries, bilaterally and through IGAD and the African Union (AU) support - militarily and politically - the AMISOM PSO in Somalia including civilian efforts to ensure stability in areas at risk of falling back into the hands of al-Shabaab.

4.2 Results Framework (Outcome level)
Table 4: TP1 Results Framework, Outcome Indicators*

Thematic Programme Objective	Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.
Impact Indicator	Fragility score as measured by the Fund for Peace incl. measures for

	security apparatus, group grievances and state legitimacy. EASF demonstrates during field training exercise in late 2019 or 2020 that it is capable to deploy and carry out a mission relative to the mission objective and prerequisites in place for a step-by-step transition of the responsibility of the security in Somalia from AMISOM to SNA/SNP.
Engagement 1.1	**Strengthening regional conflict management capacity through EASF**
Outcome	Contribute to EASF's attainment of "Full Autonomy" by the end of 2020 by demonstrating that vital institutional capacities are in place and that planning, conducting and evaluation of needed training activities/exercises can take place without substantial support from partners. Enhancement of EASF's ability to plan, prepare and operate as a multilateral, integrated and multifunctional force ready to respond to threats towards peace and security in the region and across the continent.
Outcome indicators	Decisive institutional capacities such as EASF Movement Coordination Centre (MCC), EASF Early Warning and EASF CIS are prepared by 2020 according to existing concepts EASF plan/conduct/evaluate by 2020 most training activities autonomously (100 % African instructors) only supported by partners in the mentor role. EASF demonstrates during various exercises (MAPEX, CPX and FTX) in 2019 and 2020 that its member states can provide requisite force contributions, deploy, and operate its FHQ and its Mission Headquarters (MHQ) according to evaluation- and advisor reports.
Engagement 1.2	**AMISOM Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia**
Outcome	*AMISOM engages more effectively in early stabilisation efforts in liberated and at-risk areas in Somalia to sustain military gains*
Outcome indicator	Increase in number of functioning police stations, answering to functioning local administrations, in AMISOM, SNA and SNP held areas
Engagement 1.3	**SSF- led Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia**
Outcome	State legitimacy is enhanced and political and communal conflict is reduced
Outcome indicator	Status of communal conflicts in targeted areas. Status of political conflicts in targeted areas. Government legitimacy.

Indicators are indicative and will be finalized when the entire results framework has been completed in terms of indicators, baselines and targets when PSEDs have been agreed/signed with partners.

4.3 Theory of Change

If Denmark continues to support the further development of preventive conflict management capacity in EASF as a regional response mechanism to challenges towards peace and security and as a platform for regional dialogue and cooperation, then the Eastern African region will become a more stable and peaceful place, which is a prerequisite for development, prosperity and job

opportunities. Furthermore, if Denmark continues to support training of AMISOM troop contributions with its partners in the regional peace support training centres, then AMISOM will have improved capacity to neutralise Al-Shabaab in Somalia as a prerequisite for the gradual transition of the responsibility for the security in Somalia to SNA/SNP, which will be essential for a peaceful and prosperous Somalia in the longer term. Moreover, if Denmark supports activities that strengthen the legitimacy, visibility and efficiency of Somali authorities and contributes to conflict resolution that addresses fault-lines for political conflict, it will weaken al-Shabaab and contribute to longer term stability in Somalia.

Table 5: TP1 Theory of Change*

Assumption 1	If the FGS and AMISOM are capable of engaging with, absorbing and operationalizing support for planning, capacity-development and early recovery efforts in newly liberated and contested areas in Somalia, and…
Assumption 2	- If EASF provides a suitable framework for capacity development of the Force, and - EASF is willing and capable to absorb the support provided by Denmark, other Nordic countries and other partners, and - EASF member states continue to demonstrate political will and commitment, and - AMISOM is willing and capable to absorb the support provided by Denmark and other partners as a part of the pre-deployment training, and
Assumption 3	Context-specific efforts in newly accessible or at-risk areas will contribute to creating the conditions under which local political settlements can be negotiated, stability can be sustained, and peace dividends can be delivered, then if…
Inputs	Denmark provides: - Financial support, strategic guidance and technical expertise for EASF and support to AMISOM pre-deployment training and… - Financial support and strategic guidance for early recovery, stabilisation and critical local governance interventions then…
Short term changes	- Regional security organizations engaged in Somalia develop their strategic, tactical and technical skills leading to the limitation of Al-Shabaab ability to operate freely in Somalia and improvement of the security situation; and - AMISOM better trained to provide security in the newly accessible or at-risk areas; transportation routes are secured, enabling freer movement of people and goods; and - The foundations for the Somali security forces (including police) to sustainably control territory begin to be established; and - Local administrations begin to be formed based on governance and service delivery that is more inclusive, accountable, non-discriminatory and transparent; and - Local political settlements outside Al-Shabaab's influence are promoted, leading to…

Medium term changes	• Regional standby forces and security organisations have stronger management and operational capacities to support deployment and sustain readiness; and • Somalia local administrations, including local police services, in newly accessible and at-risk areas have greater presence and capacity and assume greater responsibility for security from AMISOM; and • Al-Shabaab's appeal is undermined and combatants increasingly defects; leading to…
Long term changes	• Local/regional political settlements in South Central Somalia take root; and • al-Shabaab is discredited as provider of public services at local level including justice and security services, • AMISOM gradually withdraws from Somalia without jeopardising the security situation; and • Regional standby forces/security organisations able to address Peace Support Operations' needs without significant international support.

* Time wise, short term refers to the first half of programme duration (0-2 years). Medium term refers to the second half of programmes duration (2-4 years). Long term (impact) refers to results that are expected to emerge by the end programme and beyond (4+).

Apart from the Defence Attaché, four Danish advisors (military, police, civilian) will support the regional institutions and be an integral part of the engagement. At the same time it is essential to realise that the military advisers (like the police) are a prerequisite and a platform for accessibility to military organisations. Without deployed military advisers, Denmark would not be able to work in and influence organisations like the EASF (military component) and the Kenyan Navy.

4.4 Summary of Engagements

Engagement 1.1 Peace Support Operations in Somalia and in the region – EASF

Objective. The objective of the engagement is: *Strengthening regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.*

The importance of EASF as a platform for cooperation and dialogue among its 10 Eastern Africa member states cannot be overestimated. Former belligerent armed forces, etc. are now working together on a daily basis in EASFs four permanent institutions (EASF Secretariat, EASF Planning Element, EASF Force Headquarters and EASF Log Base) and regular meetings take place among chiefs of defence and ministers of defence. EASF is therefore instrumental to regional integration and enhancement of mutual confidence and security among the countries in the region.

Summary description. Continuing support for EASF will enhance its capacity to implement the EASF 2015-2020 Strategic Plan, including in the delivery of effective training and pre-deployment exercises for EASF's components (military, police and civilian). EASF is also indirectly relevant to AMISOM's operations in Somalia as mentioned above. All of the AMISOM troop contributing countries[1] (TCCs) are also EASF members. The capacity of EASF members is directly relevant to AMISOM. At the same time, the programme contributes to the capability of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) to undertake critical conflict management

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[1] Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.

operations in the region and hence is an investment in future regional stability. EASF is currently in a process of exploring and analysing how its standing capabilities can be utilised in periods where the Force is not deployed. Possible options include potential training role of SNA/SNP in Somalia. Denmark is furthermore supporting AMISOM with training provided in close partnership with the British Peace Support Team to troop contingents from primarily Kenya and Uganda within, but not limited to, the thematic areas of C-IED and CIMIC. The training takes place as a part of the pre-deployment training before rotation with troops in AMISOM.

Partner. An essential part of the Nordic Defence cooperation in Eastern Africa has been support to EASF and since 2009 a Nordic military advisor group has been placed together with the EASF headquarter in Nairobi, Kenya. A strong partnership has developed, and the Nordic countries have played an important role in the development of EASF. Denmark has used the PSF/PSP HoA 2011-2014 and 2015-2018 to provide this support. It should be noted that it has been decided that NORDEFCO assistance to EASF gradually will be scaled down towards 2020. As a result, the Danish adviser will be withdrawn at the end of 2019.

Management and financing modality. The Defence Attaché in RDE Nairobi will be the Engagement Manager. The Defence Command (DCD) will be the engagement owner for the financial and technical contributions to capacity-development of EASF (DKK 21 million). The financial management of this engagement is under DCD.

Engagement 1.2 AMISOM Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia
Objective. The objective of the engagement is: *AMISOM engages more effectively in early stabilisation efforts in liberated and at-risk areas in Somalia thereby sustaining military gains with the view to transfer responsibility for security from AMISOM to Somalia security actors.*

Summary description. The purpose of the Danish support is to enable AMISOM to engage effectively in stabilization and early recovery in south central Somalia, thereby enabling the FGS to extend its state authority in order to prevent al-Shabaab from regaining territory and political influence. It will be critical to support the UN-mandated transition from AMISOM-led security to Somali-led security as stipulated in the "Transition Plan", including to support an enhanced AMISOM focus on policing. This engagement supports AMISOM, through the AU, in providing non-military stabilisation support to liberated or at-risk communities. The aim is that military gains by AMISOM can be sustained and pave the way for Somali security forces (army and police) to take over. Local administrations begin to be formed based on governance and service delivery that is more inclusive, accountable, non-discriminatory and transparent.

The engagement is implemented in alignment with the Somali National Security Architecture and the Comprehensive Approach to Security in Somalia (CAS) agreed in June 2017 following the Somali Security Pact agreed at the London Conference in May 2017. This support enables AMISOM to deliver QIPs and PSPs in areas under their control and in support of the AMISOM mandate. Currently, liberated and contested areas of South Central Somalia cannot be held and stability sustained without a continued AMISOM military presence in the short term. The Danish support contributes to the areas mentioned above by focusing on three types of engagements:

- Promotion of reconciliation platforms through workshops, conferences, town halls and community mobilization and sensitization;
- Implementation of community initiated QIPs and PSPs including the rehabilitation of water, health, education and social infrastructure;
- Capacity development and infrastructure development of the Somalia National Police as stipulated in the National Security Policy (NSP). The NSP is a FGS accepted stabilization

document stipulating timeframes for police activities. AMISOM will therefore support the NSP as relates to police activities.

Partner. This engagement builds upon Denmark's relationship with the AU and AMISOM established under PSP Phase II. It has been designed with lessons from Phase II in mind and provides a unique source and support to the AU / AMISOM. Key lessons include the importance of close and continues dialogue, incl. higher level dialogue with the AU and AMISOM leadership.

Management and financing modality. The RDE Addis Ababa will be the engagement owner for the financial support to AMISOM operations (DKK 24 million). Quarterly technical meetings between AMISOM and the embassies in Addis Ababa and Nairobi will maintain coherence between the AMISOM, SSF, the Somalia Country Programme, and engagement 1.1. The modality used will be a direct contract under a MoU between Denmark (RDE Addis) and the AU Peace Support Operations Division.

Engagement 1.3 Somalia Stability Fund Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia

Objective. The objective of this engagement is: *Immediate local political settlements processes sustain stability and allow peace dividends to be delivered.*

Summary description. The new strategy of the SSF will address: 1) Political conflict between the Federal Government and Federal Member states; 2) Inter- and intra-state conflict; 3) the need to extend state authority and address drivers of conflict; 4) the need to deepen popular participation and voice, particularly for women. The objectives are pursued through support to community-driven processes, to bolster community confidence in state and local authorities and through conflict prevention and mitigation. Also SSF include targeted activities on women and youth. The SSF bridges initial early recovery work and more conventional long-term state building initiatives such as the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and other capacity building programmes supported under the bilateral Somalia Country Programme. As such, the SSF places itself in the centre of the Wadajir and CRESTA/A frameworks and contributes directly to the implementation of the government-led stabilisation strategy. The expected outcome is dialogue and cooperation between local state and community actors involved in stabilisation.

Apart from the objective of strengthening the indigenous capacity to prevent, manage and solve conflict, the engagement with the SSF as a joint mechanism also constitutes an important strategic partnership with a number of likeminded stabilisation actors in Somalia including the lead donor UK. Moreover, the SSF is a prime knowledge partner when it comes to political economy analysis.

Partner. The SSF was conceived at the London Conference on Somalia of February 2012 associated with the Somalia New Deal Compact. Denmark commenced support to the SSF as part of PSP HoA II (2015-2017) supporting the SSF with a total of DKK 39.5 million under the 'Stabilisation' pillar of the SSF with a focus on supporting newly recovered areas. SSF has during the implementation period put more efforts into state-building, in contrast to stabilization support narrowly defined, such as early recovery, with the objective to enhance state legitimacy. It is a priority for Denmark to advocate for SSF to maintain a focus on providing immediate peace dividends in contested and newly recovered areas.

Management and financing modalities. The RDE Nairobi is engagement owner. The engagement will be managed under a Delegated Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with DFID. The management setup includes a Joint Donor Committee (JDC) where Denmark is an active member, with the UK as Lead Donor and a UK and Netherlands staffed Secretariat Office

responsible for managing the relationship with the Fund Manager (currently Adam Smith International).

5 Thematic Programme 2: Countering violent extremism

5.1 Strategic considerations and justification

The objective of TP2 is: *Reduced violent extremism in geographical areas of programme implementation through prevention and disengagement efforts with a focus on Somalia.* TP2 includes engagements that focus on prevention and disengagement through support to strengthened regional cooperation and critical infrastructures and initiatives that motivates individuals to disengage from al-Shabaab.

The overall outcomes of these efforts are expected to include the following achievements:

- IGAD's Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism is delivered on
- Improved regional capacity for preventing and countering violent extremism
- Increased number of disengaged Al-Shabaab members and successful reintegration into society.

Strategic considerations

Violent extremism is feeding off a mix of factors such as civil wars, local conflicts and insurgencies, tapping into criminal networks, occupying weakly governed and sparsely populated spaces as safe havens and exploiting widespread grievances relating to poverty, unemployment, exclusion, lack of security, injustice and repression. These factors are actively used in radicalisation efforts and to recruit individuals to engage in violent extremist action using social media platforms. To counter this there is a need to develop a combination of local, national and regional technical capabilities, diplomatic convening power, and political will. IGAD has a long history of efforts to promote peace in the region including in Somalia. In 2005, its member states formed the Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) to end civil wars, defeat terrorism and restore law and order in Somalia, the precursor to the current mission in Somalia, AMISOM. IGAD and its member states remain committed and engaged in resolving the conflict in Somalia.

The threat from al-Shabaab in the region differs significantly between the countries and within sub-national regions of the countries. Addressing violent extremism requires differentiation of responses to the varied threats in the different contexts in the region. Whereas in Somalia itself disengagement and discrediting of the al-Shabaab narrative is of key priority in contributing to stability alongside more long-term preventive initiatives, regionally, prevention plays an essential role to curb the further spread of extremism and recruitment to violent extremism. Disengagement of returning regional foreign fighters and management of the risk of radicalisation and promoting rehabilitation in prisons of violent extremist offenders are other important topics that require national-to-regional policy harmonisation and guidance.

Thematic programme focus

TP2 comprises a *CVE direct* engagement at country-level in Somalia and *CVE direct* regional level support to the operationalization of IGAD's regional P/CVE policies, strategies and capacities. Continued support to disengagement of combatants from Al-Shabaab will be provided through rehabilitation and reintegration support at the Serendi Centre, support to the National Disengagement Programme, and include a Strategic Communications component aimed at countering al-Shabaab's narrative to generate further defections. The engagements contributes to Strand 4 (CVE) of the Somalia Comprehensive Approach to Security.

The regional P/CVE dimension of engagement is aligned with the APP Phase IV support to Pillar 3 of IGAD's Peace and Security Strategy 2016-2020 and includes support to transboundary responses to violent extremism by IGAD member states and civil society.

TP2 builds on Denmark's partnership with the UK FCO in Somalia that focuses on encouraging and sustaining disengagement from al-Shabaab, as well as Denmark's long-term partnership with IGAD through other engagements, foremost with the Security Sector Program (SSP).

Regional priorities

IGAD's Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in East Africa (February 2017) identifies three categories of state vulnerability to violent extremism including: "the epicentre" (Somalia), "spillover states" (Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Ethiopia) and "at-risk states" (Tanzania, South Sudan and Sudan). The IGAD CVE strategy elaborates on the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy 2016-2020 that Denmark supports under the APP.

5.2 Results Framework (Outcome level)

Table 6: TP2 Outcome Indicator

Thematic Programme 2	Counter violent extremism in the Horn of Africa with Somalia as its epicentre through prevention and disengagement
Impact indicator	Reduced impact of violent extremist attacks in the region as measured by Global Terrorism Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace and/or similar indexes.
Engagement 2.1 Objective	IGAD's Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism is delivered and improved regional capacity for preventing and countering violent extremism
Outcome	Improved regional capacity for preventing and countering violent extremism
Outcome indicators	Outcome and output indicators as well as targets will be taken from the results framework that IGAD is in process of developing for the implementation of the regional strategy on preventing and countering violent extremism in Eastern Africa. A results framework is not yet in place since the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, responsible for implementation of the regional strategy, was only inaugurated in April 2018.
Engagement 2.2 Objective	Increased number of disengaged al-Shabaab members successfully re-integrated into society.
Outcome	Increased defection from al-Shabaab
Outcome indicators	Number of al-Shabaab defectors received in Serendi over the engagement period
	Number of defectors who say they knew of Serendi before defecting
	Number of defectors defecting because of the FGS announced amnesty
	Number of defectors who say they defected because of Serendi

* Time wise, short term refers to the first half of programme duration (0-2 years). Medium term refers to the second half of programmes duration (2-4 years). Long term (impact) refers to results that are expected to emerge by the end programme and beyond (4+).

5.3 Theory of Change

The theory of change for TP2 suggests that if Danish and other international support to P/CVE at regional and national levels with simultaneous support to reintegration of defectors from al-Shabaab can be effectively delivered on, it will improve the national responses to extremism, resulting in less extremism in the region, and weaken al-Shabaab thus contributing to the long-term peace and stability in the region.

Table 7: TP2 Theory of Change*

Assumption 1	If improving local capacities in several countries on P/CVE issues can reduce the threats they generate, and…
Assumption 2	Inter-agency cooperation and the promotion of trust between security actors and communities will reduce the radicalisation of individuals and the incidence of violent extremism in the Region, and…
Assumption 3	National defector related frameworks, coordination and standards are developed and will ensure coercive efforts and minimising risk of human rights violations and
Assumption 4	Successful reintegration and enhanced knowledge about defection, experiences of rehabilitation and reintegration can be the evidence base for improved outreach and enhance disengagement rates, then if…
Inputs	Denmark provides • Financial and technical support for regional capacities to counter extremism and… • Financing and technical support for P/CVE efforts in Somalia, and… • Financial and technical support for al-Shabaab defection and rehabilitation, then..
Short Term Changes	• Regional bodies are through an enhanced evidence base better able to support regional states to prevent the growth of violent extremism and support disengagement; • National standards for rehabilitation and reintegration is developed and adhered to; • Strong outreach to the front lines to share information about opportunities for defection; • Former al-Shabaab combatants receive support to demobilise and retrain; leading to…
Medium Term Changes	• P/CVE dialogue between IGAD member states improve policy on politically sensitive areas including a 'whole of society approach' to terrorism prevention • Local administrations, including in newly accessible areas of Somalia, have greater presence and capacity including security sector coordination for HBRA based reintegration of defectors; • Former al-Shabaab combatants can return safely to their communities, and; • National and regional partners have enhanced knowledge and practical experience in addressing and preventing individuals from engaging in ideologically motivated violence.
Long Term Changes	• The rate of disengagement by al-Shabaab fighters increases, hampering its recruitment and operations and… • Successful disengagement and reintegration examples are used to further delegitimise al-Shabaab. • al-Shabaab is discredited as an alternative to the norms of Somali life, culture and livelihoods; • Extremism and extremists are further marginalised in local political settlements in the Horn of Africa.

* Time wise, short term refers to the first half of programme duration (0-2 years). Medium term refers to the second half of programmes duration (2-4 years). Long term (impact) refers to results that are expected to emerge by the end programme and beyond (4+).

5.4 Summary of Engagements

Engagement 2.1 Support to the delivery of IGAD's Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Objective. The objective of this engagement is *to improve regional capacity for preventing and countering violent extremism in the Horn of Africa through implementing IGAD's Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.*

Summary description. The implementation of IGAD's 'Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Eastern Africa' will be supported. This strategy was initiated under IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) coordination in 2016. It brought in the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE) established in 2017. The strategy argues that because violent extremists are operating regionally across territorial borders, effective response must also take a regional and global approach.

The engagement with IGAD comes at an early stage which is also an advantage as the work-plan is still being developed and can still be influenced through strategic dialogue with IGAD and through that the implementation of the regional strategy. Therefore, the specific activities supported during the Programme will be decided upon on an annual basis during the programme period with biannual assessments of the need for adjustment. A part of this process will include consultation with other actors contributing to the implementation of the strategy and taking stock of work already initiated such as Development and Implementation of national PCVE strategies.

Some possible areas of focus include: (i) increased regional policy exchange and uptake on CVE; (ii) improving Regional Dialogue between civil society and government actors in cooperation with the IGAD Centre of Excellence in Djibouti; (iii) furthering national CVE projects, such as the initiatives already implemented by the ISSP in Somalia including StratCom initiatives countering narratives and counter-radicalisation; (iv) enhancing knowledge of regional of violent extremism and other regionally relevant topics; and (v) support to the IGAD Sanctions Monitoring and Analysis Team under the ISSP Transnational Security Threats Initiative.

By 2022 the IGAD is expected to have: Supported implementation of the Regional Strategy, supported the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism to be increasingly sustainable; Evolved a regional platform for policy engagement and uptake of policy recommendations into the IGAD member states; Executed, where applicable, national programmes depending on the threats and opportunities in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, respectively

Partner. IGAD is well placed as a partner to this engagement due to its experience, strategic position and regional reach. IGAD is the only regional organisation in a position to play a normative role as well as ensuring a coordinated and comprehensive approach across the region. A number of specific activities related to P/CVE are implemented by the ICEPCVE and as such funds will be directed through IGAD to the Centre for implementation of its work plan.

Management and financing modality. During the first six month the ISSP will prioritise the various areas outlined in the strategy and produce a work plan and results framework to operationalise the strategy. Every six month the ISSP team will provide a progress overview and will in consultation with Denmark and other international partners agree to next steps of implementation. The RDE Addis will base the actual support on the progress attained. Progress will be measured based on the IGAD ISSP's monitoring framework. The financing modality will be an agreement with IGAD ISSP in line with Danish agreements under the APP.

Engagement 2.2 Countering al-Shabaab through disengagement of combatants and strategic communication

Objective: The objective of this engagement is to: *Increase the number of disengaged al-Shabaab members and ensured their successful reintegration in the society.*

Summary description.
The purpose of contributing to the Somali National Programme for Disengagement and strategic communication under this PSED is two-fold: (1) encourage sustained defection from al-Shabaab by creating an attractive exit path out of violent extremism, thus reducing al-Shabaab's combat capabilities as well as contributing to undermining its narrative and appeal and, (2) to rehabilitate and reintegrate al-Shabaab defectors into their communities in a manner that ensures their safety and provides them with viable economic opportunities and livelihoods as a viable alternative to al-Shabaab and other violent groups.

Defection and disengagement of al-Shabaab fighters is a corner stone for the transition to a stable Somalia. This is an important element of a comprehensive response to al-Shabaab as a source of organised violence, thereby contributing to stabilisation in Somalia and the broader region. Support within this engagement is implicitly relevant for youth since a significant proportion of al-Shabaab defectors are youth and the broad range of education activities offered at the rehabilitation centre is particularly well-targeted for youth.

The defector rehabilitation centre in Mogadishu receives defectors cleared as low risk by Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency. In total, since the case management system was set up and a formal exit process was established (October 2015) 226 defectors had been cleared through the Exit Board as of May 2018. The support to the rehabilitation centre in Mogadishu has evolved and significantly improved over the previous phases of Danish support. Initially, this support focussed on rehabilitation. Under the Programme, Denmark will be supporting all stages of the national programme and support a strategic communication component, currently under review by the UK. In summary, the support will include: (i) national coordination and policy development regarding handling disengaged combatants in accordance with international norms and standards, (ii) strategic communications and outreach campaigns to inform the target group of how to defect and the opportunities available in the rehabilitation centres, (iii) reception, rehabilitation and re-integration of disengaged combatants back in to the communities.

Partner. The Danish support under the PSED is fully aligned with the UK support to the National Rehabilitation Programme through a delegated cooperation agreement and in continuation of a well-functioning relationship based on a longstanding MoU. Denmark is on the Joint Steering Committee for the Mogadishu centre and attends as well national level meetings on NRP.

Management and financing modality. RDE Nairobi is Engagement owner. This engagement is administered through delegated cooperation with the UK. Denmark receives briefings and updates from the contractors and with the increased programme components on strategic communication, Denmark will also in this area be invited for steering meetings with the communication contractors that will be identified and selected.

Alongside the support provided via the UK, it is planned to second a CVE/disengagement advisor to UNSOM for an initial two-year period, with a possibility of extending for the full duration of the programme. It is intended to establish the position as a secondment under the Peace and Stabilisation Response instrument (FSB), or alternatively financed from unallocated funds under this Programme. The position will be subject to a separate approval procedure in accordance with established procedures for secondment of advisors to high risk areas.

6 Thematic Programme 3: Regional and governmental authority enforcement across land and maritime borders

6.1 Strategic considerations and justification

The objective of TP 3 is *Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders.* The support will aim at strengthening the capacity of regional and national actors to exercise their authority in relation to regional land and maritime borders through sustained support to Ethiopian authorities to intercept illicit flows of money and through supporting key national and regional authorities in their efforts to reduce illicit and unregulated flow of goods and people, which constitute a critically destabilising factor in the region.

The overall outcomes of these efforts are expected to include the following achievements:

- Member States have increased law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and analytical capacity to combat illicit and unregulated flows of people and goods including effective enforcement structures (including maritime) in selected sea/dry ports
- Ethiopia has strengthened capacity to enforce legislation against illicit financial flows according to international standards leading to successful prosecutions
- The Kenyan Navy has increased operational capacity and maritime awareness

Strategic Considerations
The borders of the region are porous and have historically accommodated the movement of legitimate traders, pastoralists, seasonal migrants etc. Land borders are also often flashpoints for localised conflict, poor border management, and unregulated flows of goods and people. The HoA maritime domain spans the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Aden and the Red Sea. The region's sea borders are virtually unpoliced and serve as transport routes for a range of illegal actors benefitting from the lawlessness and war economy in and around Somalia and from Kenya as an entry point to East Africa. While piracy is temporarily reduced, the drivers of piracy have been left largely unchanged and coast guarding and naval capacity in the region remains inadequate to undertake patrolling and interception activities. The lack of maritime domain awareness (MDA) capacities in the region hinders legitimate authority within national territorial waters and is considered one of the main causes for the continued threat from piracy, trafficking of goods, and smuggling of humans.

Organised criminal activities, illicit financial flows and money laundering activities have significant regional destabilizing potential. Curbing criminal and terrorist access to financial support depends on the financial integrity of all members of the international community and is inherently related to global, European and Danish interest. Both the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) have identified a number of states in the HoA as demonstrating weak implementation of international standards on anti–money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT).

Regional priorities
Building the capacity of financial intelligence units (FIU) is a stated priority of IGAD's Regional CVE Strategy and all three focus countries of the PSP HoA. (i.e Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia). As of 2017, Ethiopia is the only IGAD country on the FAFT list of jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies with weak measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). Ethiopia is proactively cooperating to address this and has expressed interest in strengthening its participation in regional exchanges, including those supported by the EU. A

range of regional initiatives seek to address transboundary crime and improve the management of borders and the flows of goods and people crossing them.

6.2   **Results Framework (outcome level)**

Table 8: TP3 Results Framework (Outcome Indicators)

Thematic Programme 3 Objective:	**Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders**
Impact indicator	Reduced transnational organised crime across the borders of the three countries of the programme as assessed by UNODC and other relevant agencies/organisations such as the Global Initiative against Transnational organised crime
Engagement 3.1	**Regional action on countering and prevention of human trafficking, and smuggling of weapons and drugs – UNODC**
Outcome	Member States have increased land and maritime law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and analytical capacity to combat organized crime, including drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, cybercrime (including online child sexual exploitation and abuse), wildlife and forest crimes, and other forms of transnational organised crime.
Outcome indicators	Number of officials citing usefulness of training provided by UNODC in preventing, investigating and prosecuting drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, wildlife and forest crimes, cybercrime, money laundering, and other forms of transnational organized crime.

Number of Member States in receipt of integrated UNODC assistance that have developed coherent policies to tackle illicit financial flows - linked to UNODC mandate areas - and predicate crimes.
Number of Member States that have developed and operationalized action plans, policies and comprehensive strategies against TOC with support from UNODC.
Number of networks supporting prosecutors, investigations, mutual legal assistance and countering and handling cases of TOC. |
Outcome 2	Member States have enforcement structures in selected sea/dry ports to minimise the risk of maritime containers being exploited for trafficking of various illicit goods, and other forms of organized crime.
Outcome indicator	Number of cases of illicit goods detected from close examined containers, based on profiling and risk assessment.
Outcome 3	Member States have improved capabilities and capacities of their criminal justice systems to carry out effective prevention and prosecution of maritime crimes
Outcome indicator	Number of Member States that have adopted a legal framework, strategies and policies on maritime crime.
Number of facilities refurbished or new facilities constructed and equipment provided by UNODC in use by Member States.
Engagement 3.2	**Strengthen Anti Money Laundering Institutions and regional collaboration**
Outcome 1	Compliance with FATF recommendations
Outcome indicator	FATF positive Compliant and Largely Compliant assessments

Outcome 2	Increased enforcement against illicit financial flows and expanding public awareness
Outcome indicator	Number of cases initiated for suspected AML/CFT violations
Outcome 3	EU regional AML/CFT programme fully active in in Ethiopia
Outcome indicator	Ethiopian engagement in regional activities under EU regional programme in country and in the region.
Outcome 4	More support to AML from Ethiopian Government and foreign partners
Outcome indicator	More support to AML from Ethiopian Government and foreign partners
Outcome indicator	PSF no longer required on AML
Engagement 3.3	**Promote the exercise of legitimate authority at sea to contribute to maritime security**
Outcome 1	Strand 1. Increasing the number of operational ships and radar stations and reducing downtime.
Outcome indicator	Maritime surveillance capacity, number of ships, measuring downtime.
Outcome 2	Strand 2. Interagency cooperation between Kenyan maritime agencies enhanced.
Outcome indicator	By 2022 development of a working framework between maritime agencies (including: KMA – KPA – KMP – KeFS – KN).
Outcome 3	Strand 3. Enhancing Kenya Navy capacity from Initial Operational Capability to Full Operational Capability within the expertise of the full bridge / navigation simulator, the test cell and other relevant areas according to *"The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers"* (STCW) requirements in order to achieve Centre of Excellence status by 2022. Enhancing Kenya Navy capacity from Initial Operational Capability to Full Operational Capability within the area of multi-agency training and Anti-Surface Warfare.
Outcome indicator	Number of certified personnel / instructors (subject matter experts) Number of training sessions and exercises

Indicators are indicative and will be finalized when the entire results framework has been completed in terms of indicators, baselines and targets when PSEDs have been agreed/signed with partners.

6.3 Theory of Change

The theory of change for TP3 suggests that by focusing on a small number of niche interventions Denmark is able to contribute to strengthening regional maritime and land border security, countering violent extremism and reducing financial flows to violent extremist groups and illegal businesses including piracy.

Table 9: TP3 Theory of Change*

Assumption 1	Ethiopia is willing to continue to invest in strengthening and enforcing its AML/IFF regulations, then if...
Assumption 2	Kenya is willing to continue to invest in developing its maritime domain awareness and to assist other regional organisations such as EASF and nations to do the same, and…
Assumption 3	Strengthened regional AML/CFT cooperation will prevent illicit financial flows in support of P/CVE and CT, and…

Assumption 4	Support to regional border management agencies and forces can contribute to reducing human (trafficking and) smuggling, trafficking of weapons and drugs, then if…
Inputs	• Denmark provides: • Strategic and technical advice and targeted financial support to Kenyan Navy, relevant civilian Kenyan maritime actors, other maritime actors, and to Somali Maritime Police Units to improve maritime domain awareness systems around the coast of the Horn of Africa; • Strategic and technical advice to strengthen Ethiopia's AML-capacity and regional linkages; • Technical equipment and financial support to border policing and management services (on land and sea) in the Region; leading to
Short term Changes	• Kenya establishes an effective national MDA capability; • Somalia begins to establish an effective national MDA capability and to mature its response capacity; • Ethiopia continues progress within its AML-regime and puts in place necessary regulations and legislation to combat illegal financial flows internally and with other Horn of Africa nations;
Medium term Changes	• Kenya is the leading regional actor in championing effective national MDA capability in other countries in the Horn of Africa; • Somalia establishes an effective national MDA capability and matures its response capacities; • Ethiopia increases its enforcement of regulations and legislation restricting illicit financial flows, reducing financial flows to violent extremist groups and illegal businesses including piracy
Long term Changes	• The seas around the Horn of Africa are better policed and managed, including maritime law enforcement, within international norms and in accordance with the needs of international maritime safety and trade; • Regional and national AML/CFT mechanisms are functional and contribute to the stability, safety and security of the region.

* Time wise, short term refers to the first half of programme duration (0-2 years). Medium term refers to the second half of programmes duration (2-4 years). Long term (impact) refers to results that are expected to emerge by the end programme and beyond (4+).

6.4   Summary of Engagements

Engagement 3.1 Prevention of human trafficking and smuggling of weapons and drugs

Objective. The˙objective of this engagement is that: *Illegal flows of goods and people are intercepted at land and sea borders particularly where these are linked to terrorism and armed conflict.*

Summary description. Denmark will build on prior engagements and develop a strategic partnership with UNODC in support of prioritised activities foreseen in UNODC's Regional Programme for Eastern Africa 2016 -2021 (RP), which was adopted in 2016 as well as UNODC's Global Maritime Crime Programme. The programmes provide a coherent framework for harmonising Denmark's stabilisation support with other development partners, as well as alignment with priorities of countries in the region. UNODC's status as a member state organisation, which includes Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya and which works with state

organisations and authorities, provides an important state-centric dimension to addressing transboundary crime and instability. Activities fall mainly under this strategies' Pillar I: Countering Transnational Organized Crime and Trafficking and related activities under Pillar III: Terrorism Prevention. The engagement will support three priorities: maritime borders, land borders and prisons with focus on monitoring. The legacy linkages between the maritime and prisons activities relate to the incarceration of pirates (as part of Denmark's maritime patrolling) in prisons supported under the previous Peace and Stabilisation Programmes.

At the end of the project, Denmark will have contributed to countries in the region having increased law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and analytical capacity to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in persons, and other forms of transnational organized crime. Somalia and Kenya will have enforcement structures in selected sea/dry ports to reduce the risk of containers being exploited for illicit trafficking of goods and people.

The engagement will be supported by a Transboundary Organised Crime and Trafficking Police Expert (on assignment from the International Department of the Danish National Police ID-DNP). The purpose of the position is to provide technical advice on Countering Transnational Organized Crime and Trafficking in the HoA that directly or indirectly impact stability, irregular migration flows and violent extremism. The expert will be located in the UNODC Regional Office in East Africa and act as liaison with regular meetings at the RDE Nairobi.

Partners. Having been part of the Danish PSPs from 2011-2017, UNODC understands the development and security policies on which these programmes are based as well as Danish security interests, particularly in the maritime domain. Denmark has also played a key role in defining core activities under the Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) through its involvement in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which played a key role in setting up the GMCP's programme of support to prisons in Somalia

Management and financing modality. RDE Nairobi will be Engagement Owner. UNODC will manage the support from its Regional Office in East Africa in Nairobi under a UNODC Financing Agreement (DKK 28 milion). Activities will be implemented jointly under two UNODC Programmes: The Countering Transnational Organised Crime and Trafficking Programme (Land) and the Global Maritime Crime Programme GMCP (Sea and Prisons).

Engagement 3.2 Strengthening Ethiopia's capacity and regional engagement on countering Money Laundering and Illicit Financial Flows

Objective. The objective of this engagement is *that illicit financial flows are effectively curbed and AML/CFT frameworks and regional coordination mechanisms are strengthened to promote increased financial transparency and integrity across the region and ensure perpetrators are being prosecuted, thereby reducing the risk of Ethiopia being used as a safe haven for illicit financial transactions which undermine regional stability.*

Summary description. Money laundering, illicit financial flows and terrorist financing represent major, interconnected challenges for East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Both the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) have identified a number of states in the Horn of Africa, which demonstrate weak implementation of international standards on anti–money laundering (AML) and in countering the financing of terrorism (CFT). As of 2017, Ethiopia is the only IGAD country on the FAFT list of Jurisdictions with weak measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). Ethiopia is proactively cooperating to address these issues. As a region with predominantly informal and cash-based economies, East Africa is vulnerable to money laundering and terrorism financing. This vulnerability is compounded by absent, nascent, or incomplete financial regulatory mechanisms, limited law enforcement and judicial capacities to

respond to money laundering and financing of, or proceeds from, criminality potentially including terrorism.

Ethiopia has proactively made a high-level political commitment captured in its national action plan to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen its effectiveness and address any related technical deficiencies. At the national level, The FATF acknowledges (November 2017) that Ethiopia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by establishing committees aimed at implementing the national action plan and the FATF Action Plan, and issuing a risk-based AML/CFT supervisory manual.

The purpose of funding under this PSED is to support the further development of Ethiopia's institutional capacity in Anti Money Laundering (AML) and countering IFFs and contributing to full compliance with FATF standards by supporting, in close association with the European Union, Ethiopia's stated objectives in this regard. Ethiopia has requested Danish and European Union support to implement its action plan to accomplish the following objectives, (1) implementing the results of its national risk assessment; (2) fully integrating designated non-financial businesses and professions into its AML/CFT regime; (3) ensuring that the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are confiscated; (4) consistently implementing terrorism-related targeted financial sanctions and proportionately regulating non-profit organizations in line with a risk based approach; and (5) establishing and implementing WMD-related targeted financial sanctions.

The aim is that Ethiopia continues progress within its AML-regime and puts in place necessary regulations and legislation to combat illegal financial flows internally and with other Horn of Africa nations, including through relevant EU regional initiatives.

Partner. The national partners of this engagement are the Ethiopian Attorney General's Office and Financial Intelligence Center (EFIC) who will receive technical support from an international centre of excellence/commercial service provider to be contracted as Implementing Partner (see below). The EU is a key partner in Ethiopia and the region and has requested increased coordination and collaboration leveraging Denmark's experience and access in Ethiopia and conversely enhancing Ethiopia's regional engagement. This process will be taken forward during the remainder of the second phase of the Programme ending in June 2018.

Management and financing modality. RDE Addis Ababa will, through international competitive bidding, secure the services of a specialised Implementing Partner and sign a contribution agreement for a budget of DKK 14 million with the Implementing Partner reflecting the results, budget and management arrangements described in the PSED. RDE Addis Ababa will consult with EFIC, MOJ and other relevant stakeholders to establish a new agreement with the Government of Ethiopia, which will be signed by the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED). Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures. The agreement with the partner will reflect the implementing partner's responsibility for following financial management best practices.

Engagement 3.3 Promote the exercise of legitimate authority at sea to contribute to maritime security -Kenyan Navy

Objective. The objective of this engagement is that: *Kenyan Maritime Domain Awareness and the capacity to exercise authority in territorial waters continues to increase while naval capacity benefits the regional security architecture.*

Summary description. This engagement will focus on three work strands: increasing the number of operational ships and radar stations and reducing operational downtime for ships;

establishment of a framework for cooperation between maritime agencies, both in Kenya and regionally; and reduction of skills gaps in the Kenya Navy through improvements in the training establishments.

Security in the Indian Ocean has been a particular problem for countries in the Horn of Africa, driven in large part by insecurity in Somalia. Considerable effort was devoted under earlier PSP programming to address problems of piracy. While these have diminished to some degree, it remains necessary for the countries in the Horn to develop their capacity – individually and collectively (e. g. EASF) – to address the maritime security challenges that remain and to combat the full range of illicit maritime activities that are, at least in part, fuelled by the continuing conflicts and insecurity in Somalia and the resultant lack of an effective maritime security mechanisms. In line with the strategic deliberations discussed in the Danish Counter-Piracy Strategy, it is the aim of multiple engagements under PSP-HOA III to develop an effective maritime security capacity in the Horn of Africa. This requires attention at several levels – individual countries (Kenya and Somalia), regional (EASF, where Kenya provides important support to the EASF maritime component) and continental (African Union).

The ability of countries in the Horn of Africa to manage their maritime domains will be crucial to their ability to protect themselves from threats to their security and marine resources. While the threat of piracy in the Indian Ocean has declined, the countries in the Horn of Africa continue to face numerous maritime related challenges to their physical, economic and environmental security.

Strand 1. Increasing the number of operational ships and radar stations and reducing downtime. The ships of the Kenya Navy patrol and provide national response capability in the Kenyan EEZ, support AMISOM in securing the coast of South Central Somalia from being used as a supply line by Al-Shabaab and provide the necessary training platforms for the Kenya Navy professional training. Strand 2. Establishment of a framework for cooperation between maritime agencies. Strand 3. Reduction of skills gaps and conformity to international standards in the Kenya Navy. This strand is the logical continuation of the previous Danish – Kenya maritime cooperation and supports the request to assist Kenya with the development of a Centre of Excellence for maritime training in the Kenya Navy's Mombasa base as conveyed to the Danish Chief of Army Staff in January 2017 during his visit to Kenya.

By 2022 the Kenyan Navy is expected to have: (a) effectively established a Maritime Centre of Excellence at Mombasa which will have the necessary IMO accreditation to deliver training outside the Kenyan Navy, (b) established the basis for a Quality Management System (logistics/maintenance/ procurement) to improve vessel availability, (c) Established the basis of, and begun to functionalise, a Kenyan MDA system.

Partner: Kenyan Navy & maritime agencies and international partners such as UK, US, France etc.

Management and financing modality. The support will have a total budget of DKK 11 million and be agreed upon with partners and finally negotiated and agreed in a new version of the PSED. The support will be directly managed by the Defence Attaché (DA) in RDE Nairobi. The Danish Liaison Officer to the Kenyan Navy coordinates all bilateral naval and maritime activity and reports to the Defence Attaché in RDE Nairobi.

7 Programme Management

The Danish Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have since 2011 developed a constructive collaborative relationship in implementing the Peace- and Stabilisation Programmes. However, the modus for the implementation differs substantially. The Defence is implementing its engagements itself through the deployed adviser, whereas the MFA implements its engagements through third partners such as UN, regional organisations, private organisations etc.

Decentralised management of MFA financed engagements was introduced in the latter part of Phase II of the PSP HoA in 2016. Management of MoD financed engagements remain principally centralised at the Defence Command in Denmark but the actual day-to-day management of the engagements lies with the Defence Attaché in Nairobi as Engagement Manager. Furthermore, the MTR identified action points and lessons to fine-tune these management arrangements to ensure coherence between programme level delivery, outcomes and engagement level delivery.

This has been rectified in the present management structure. The main management tasks of the programme and adjacent engagements are carried out by the Programme Coordinator and Engagement Managers as defined below. Apart from the annual Whole-of-Government Steering Committee meeting with focus on the Programme progress and the annual Programme Committee meeting, the Programme Coordinator and Engagement Managers will meet on a quarterly basis to coordinate and review progress, risk and financial status (commitments and disbursements). The Programme Coordinator and Defence Attaché will have a monthly coordination meeting. More structured coordination will ensure coherence across the programme.

- **The Programme Coordinator** functions as per the PSF Guidelines Annex D and is based at the RDE Nairobi. The programme coordinator coordinates the overall programme implementation, including preparation of programme committee meetings and reporting.
- **The Defence Attaché** based in Nairobi represents the MOD and DCD in day-to-day management while adhering to MOD's centralised chain of command and procedures.
- **Engagement Managers** are designated staff by the **Engagement Owner** which is the unit overall responsible for the engagement – RDE Nairobi, RDE Addis, and Defence Command. The Engagement managers, including the Defence Attaché, will meet on a quarterly basis convened by the Nairobi embassy to take stock on programmatic and financial performance.

Table 10 below provides further detail on the broader governance institutions of the programme.

Table 10: Programme management hierarchy and responsibilities

Programme Management Level	Composition	Role and responsibility
Whole of Government Steering Committee (WGSC)	As per PSF Guidelines	- Acts as the principal decision-making body of the PSF and responsible for ensuring the coherence of policies and strategies affecting the Danish stabilisation agenda. - On an annual basis the embassies will present programme progress to the WGSC
Secretariat	Staff from the MFA's Department for Stabilisation and Security Policy (SSP) and the International Department	- Supports the WGSC - Responsible for overseeing the implementation of the stabilisation policy and PSF coordination and management.

Programme Management Level	Composition	Role and responsibility
	of MOD. (PSF Guidelines)	- Oversees stabilisation and fragile states policy implementation.
Programme Committee	MFA Africa Department, MFA Department for Security and Stability, MOD International Department, RDE Addis and RDE Nairobi and other relevant authorities as required.	- Meets annually (or more often if urgent issues arise) with approximately 6 months between the Programme Committee meetings and the relevant WGSC meeting. - Ensure broader synergies with other regional programmes such as APP. - Guide programme implementation and direction and take stock on contextual developments and risks in the region. - Recommends possible actions and adjustments of the programme activities.
Programme Coordination/coordinator	The Programme Coordinator at the Embassy in Nairobi will coordinate the programme Programme Coordination Meetings (quarterly) RDE Nairobi, RDE Addis Ababa, MOD/DCD (represented by the Defence Attaché)	- Organise quarterly programme progress meeting with the Nairobi and Addis embassies. Review progress, risks and financial status. - Prepares 6 monthly program level progress reports as per PSF procedures. - Organises annual Programme Committee meetings (see above). - Prepare for the annual progress reporting to the Whole-of Government Steering Committee.
Engagement managers	Staff assigned by the engagement owner to be responsible for the management of the engagement as as per responsibility assignment in the table below	- Manage and oversee engagement implementation. - Prepare and/or review engagement level progress reports as per PSF procedures.

The eight engagements of the Programme will be managed from Nairobi and Addis Ababa. The RDE Addis Ababa will manage three engagements and RDE in Nairobi five engagements. CVE/Disengagement Advisor (Engagement 2.2) will refer to Nairobi. The International Department of the Danish Police will field a Transboundary organised Crime & Trafficking (TOCT) Policing Expert who will be based in Nairobi and support the strategic partnership with UNODC. The Defence Attaché manages the two engagements that are funded from the MoD appropriation (Engagement 1.1 and 3.3). The Defence Attaché manages the Whole-of-Government Team involved in regional peace support operations and maritime security (MILAD, NAVAD, POLAD and CIVAD see table 12). Overview tables of engagement owners and of advisors and secondments are found below.

Table 11: Overview of engagement management responsibilities

Engagement	Engagement owner
1.1 Strengthening regional conflict management capacity - EASF and Peace Support Training Centers.	Defence Command Denmark. Engagement manager is the Defence Attaché in Nairobi.

Engagement	Engagement owner
1.2: AMISOM-led Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia -	RDE Addis Ababa in close coordination with RDE Nairobi.
1.3: SSF-led Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia – SSF	RDE Nairobi
2.1: Support to the delivery of IGAD's Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism - ISSP	RDE Addis Ababa
2.2: Countering Al-Shabaab through disengagement of combatants and strategic communication	RDE Nairobi
2.1: Regional action on against human trafficking, and smuggling of weapons and drugs – UNODC	RDE Nairobi
3.2: Curb illicit financial flows/AML	RDE Addis Ababa
3.3: Promote the exercise of legitimate authority at sea to contribute to maritime security	Defence Command Denmark. Engagement manager is the Defence Attaché in Nairobi.

Table 12: Overview of advisors and secondments

Position	Engagement	Location	Remarks	Refers to
Defence Attaché	1.1, 3.3	Nairobi	Continuation Phase II	Defence Command
Military Advisor (MILAD)	1.1	Nairobi	Continuation Phase II	Defence Attaché
Police Advisor (POLAD)	1.1	Nairobi	Continuation Phase II, is seconded staff of the International Department of the Danish National Police	Defence Attaché
Civilian Advisor (CIVAD)	3.1	Nairobi	New position, draft ToR prepared	Defence Attaché
Navy Advisor (NAVAD)	3.3	Mombasa	Continuation Phase II	Defence Attaché
CVE / Disengagement Expert (intended from Peace and Stabilisation response, FSB)	2.2	Mogadishu	CVE /Disengagement secondment to provide strategic support to UNSOM and FGS on CVE and disengagement.	Programme coordinator
Transboundary Organised Crime and Trafficking Police Expert	3.1	Nairobi	Seconded staff of the International Department of the Danish National Police	Programme coordinator

Exit/phasing out considerations are included systematically in all PSEDs. They define some conditions under which exit will be possible and when continued engagement is necessary. Conditions differ across engagements given the diverse nature of the engagements and contexts. Sufficient level of sustainability, ownership and capacity are some of the basic criteria for

considering exit (i..e. handing over to national partners) but also new donors' engagement is a potential factor. Denmark is phasing out of the PREVENT partnership between Denmark and the Kenya National Counter Terrorism Centre, for instance, as the engagement objectives generally have been achieved, and the Kenyan authorities now "own" the concept promoted by PREVENT. The same is expected to be the case for EASF during this programme period.

7.1   Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation

Reporting

The PSP-HOA monitoring and evaluation system follows PSF Guidelines and incorporates lessons and follow the common PSF reporting formats for the Biannual Programme Report introduced in 2016. Where Denmark is the only donor, the standard PSED reporting format will be applied, whereas for engagements where several partners are involved the partners' report format will be accepted. Generally, quarterly progress and financial reporting is expected from implementing partners. Further training on the use of these reporting formats has been provided in January and February 2018 in Copenhagen and Nairobi, respectively.

The Programme Coordinator will compile biannual programme progress reports based on information obtained from Engagement Managers, including the Defence Attaché. Engagement Managers will receive engagement progress reports from implementing partners that will be shared with the Programme Coordinator. The biannual programme progress reports will inform discussions in the Whole-of-Government Steering Committee and the PSP HoA Programme Committee respectively (one meeting in each Committee every year). Generally, a final report from the implementing partner will be required upon completion of the engagement, however this may not be the case for engagements where several donors are involved and where timelines are not aligned. Finally, a final Programme Completion Report will be produced. This report will be coordinated by the Programme Coordinator.

In terms of substance (outcomes, outputs and indicators), reporting format has been aligned with implementing partners' own reporting systems to the extent possible and reflect the results frameworks listed in the PSEDs. Partner reporting responsibilities will be specified in the respective administrative agreements for each engagement. The Defence Attaché will forward relevant reports to MOD International Department via the Defence Command and share reports with the Programme Coordinator in Nairobi.

Knowledge: Monitoring, review, studies

Partner monitoring systems. The ability of partners to provide robust monitoring of progress *and* risks has been a factor in the proposed arrangements. This is, for example, the case with the SSF and UK FCO – both arrangements include third party monitoring (TPM). For the AML engagement, the monitoring capacity is a parameter in the internationally competitive procurement of a service provider. The MOD funded engagements are monitored directly by the Defence Attaché (Nairobi) and the implementing advisors.

Third Party Monitoring. For engagements, which are either already covered by international partner's TPM or are monitored closely by embassy and defence staff, additional third-party monitoring will not necessarily add value. For some engagements, however, there will be a need for additional monitoring of the least – to Danish personnel - accessible locations and activities, or which contain the most uncertainty of methods, impacts and potential negative side effects. This includes the AMISOM stabilisation engagement, where a TPM agent will be contracted.

Flexible Knowledge and Monitoring Retainer. An operational monitoring and evaluation system will be established mainly based on partner reports, incl. TPM-reporting for engagements covered by international partner's TPM agents. The Programme will include a Monitoring Retainer contract arrangement, however, to provide monitoring consulting services and support in relation to required technical reviews/studies. Based on experience, there will be need for advisory support in relation to the establishment of the operational M&E system and for dialogue with partners on M&E frameworks and reporting. Moreover the same contractor can provide support when occasional, flexible and quick response technical review or analytical work are commissioned.

Programme review and Evaluation. A mid-term review will be undertaken after 24 months, i.e. tentatively in the 3rd quarter of 2020.

7.2   Financial Management

The financial management arrangements will reflect the nature and structure of the individual engagements. These arrangements will be specified in the respective administrative agreements and may vary but will, as a minimum, follow Danish requirements. They will reflect the principles and requirements of the programme's two funding sources (MFA and MoD funding). As outlined in the PSP-HOA's risk matrix in Annex 5, the programme is inevitably subject to some financial and fiduciary risks. If these risks become manifest, they should trigger consideration of steps such as initiating audits, reclaiming funds or adjusting work-plans with partners to reflect new feasibility and performance information.

7.3   Summary for anti-corruption measures

Administrative agreements with partners specify that Denmark's Anti-Corruption Policy and Code of Conduct apply and include the standard MFA Anti-Corruption Clause.[6] Upon suspicion or awareness of specific cases of corruption involving staff members and/or implementing partners in programmes and projects, the implementing is obliged to immediately notify the RDE Nairobi or RDE Addis.

7.4   Communication of programme results

A Programme Communication Plan has been developed. The plan contains multi-pronged communication activities aimed at a variety of audiences including, but not necessarily limited to: decision makers in the focus countries and the region; stakeholders in Denmark, stakeholders/general public in host country/region; thought leaders, i.e. engaging and influencing the expert communities and opinion-makers in the relevant programme areas.

The Communication of results will build on the ways and modalities that engagement partners use to communicate results. Given the various administrative modalities to be used for the engagements, this plan will build on specific clauses in the respective administrative agreements. For example, the SSF, UNODC, AMISOM and EASF have their established communication mechanisms, while a contract with the service provider for AML/CFT will specify communication responsibilities. Modalities to be specified may include social media, traditional media, online publishing of reports, workshops, public meetings, infographics etc.

The RDEs will draw on these to respond, where relevant, to specific internal and external communication needs and requests to communicate programme results, for example, related to high level Danish visits or at international summits and conferences etc. Communication activities over and above what is funded at engagement level is budgeted for under the *Management, M&E and Knowledge* budget line. See also Annex 7.

8 Budget

Table 13 summarises the budget at thematic programme level for a 48 months implementation period starting in July 2018 to June 2022. A detailed budget with estimated annual disbursements is presented in Annex 4. Budget allocations have considered the overall resource envelope based on the MFA and MOD budget appropriations, and an assessment by the embassies of priorities striking a balance between political and policy priorities as well as partner absorption capacity based on experience in the preceding iterations of the PSP, where relevant.

*Table 13: Budget 2018-2022 (four years)**

	TOTAL 2018-22		
	MFA	MOD	Total
TP-1 Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia			
Regional capacity - EASF and peace support training centers	7.5	18.00	25.50
AMISOM Civilian Stabilisation	24.0		24.00
Somalia Stability Fund	35.0		35.00
Subtotal	66.5	18.0	84.50
TP-2 Counter Violent Extremism through prevention and disengagement			
CVE under IGAD Security Sector Program	9.0		9.00
Disengagement, National Defectors Program & counter narrati	18.0		18.00
Subtotal	27.0	0.0	27.00
TP-3 Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders			
UNODC regional on organized crime (land and martime)	28.0		28.00
Police advisor to UNODC program	4.0		4.00
Regional AML/CFT	14.0		14.00
Maritime security - Kenya Navy		11.0	11.00
	46.0	11.0	57.00
Subtotal Engagements	139.5	29.00	168.50
Management, knowledge (M&E, review, studies) and commun	14.0	11.0	25.00
Unallocated	25.0		25.00
Total	179	40	219

* Finance Act: § 06.32.08.80 (MFA - ODA) and § 12.21.01.50. (MOD - non-ODA)

The "management, knowledge (M&E, review, studies) and communications" budget line covers management costs for the Defence engagements, including the costs associated with the Defence Attaché; budget for the M&E retainer contract, reviews, studies and TPM (AMISOM); as well as budget for communications, including events, related to the programme.

In terms of ODA-eligibility (cf. OECD DAC standards), the Programme includes ODA-funding from MFA (FL §06.32.08.80.) and non-ODA-funding from the MOD (FL §12.21.01.50.). Most Engagements are carried over from the previous programme. Those Engagement funded by MFA ODA budget have previously been assessed ODA-eligible. New engagements, including the IGAD CVE and UNODC engagements, are assessed to be in line with the OECD directives

as outlined and exemplified in the OECD ODA Case book from 2017. Moreover, in the partner agreements a clause will make clear that Danish funding from MFA ODA-budget can only be used for ODA-eligible activities.

Unallocated funds

A comparative advantage of the PSF is its flexibility to respond to opportunities in fluid contexts, such as in Somalia. The PSP HoA 2018-2022 include DKK 25 million of unallocated MFA funds. The priority in programming these unallocated funds will be to extend or expand existing engagements or current thematic priorities as new options arise. The anticipated MTR will inform the distribution of unallocated funds. This also include the consideration of the continuation of advisor positions funded only for the first part of the programme (UNSOM, CIVAD, POLAD). It is intended to establish the UNSOM CVE position as a secondment under the Peace and Stabilisation Response instrument (FSB). If this is not feasible, it will be financed from unallocated funds under this programme.

Apart from this general principle, AMISOM will be considered specifically given the medium-term uncertainty around funding requirements because of the ongoing work on a transition plan for the transfer of responsibility of security from AMISOM to Somalia's authorities. Based on the scope of new mandates, the pace of the transition and needs on the ground, and AMISOM implementation performance, further stabilisation support in partnership with AMISOM will be considered after the MTR. Another area of priority for unallocated funds is relevant, additional activities implemented by the advisors/secondments under the programme.

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[1] https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12972.doc.htm

[2] Human Trafficking and Smuggling in the Horn of Africa-Central Mediterranean Route. Sahan Foundation & IGAD SSP 2016

[3] A Gendered Perspective on the Impact of Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Cawo M. Abdi, 2011

[4] *ibid*

[5] http://www.nordefco.org/Nordic-progress-in-East-Africa

[6] "No offer, payment, consideration or benefit of any kind, which could be regarded as an illegal or corrupt practice, shall be made, promised, sought or accepted – neither directly nor indirectly – as an inducement or reward in relation to activities funded under this agreement, including tendering, award or execution of contracts. Any such practice will be grounds for the immediate cancellation of this agreement and for such additional action, civil and/or criminal, as may be appropriate. At the discretion of the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a further consequence of any such practice can be the definite exclusion from any projects funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs"

Annex 1: Context Analysis

Briefly summarise the key conclusions from the analyses consulted and their implications for the programme regarding each of the following points:

- General peace and stabilisation challenges.

The Horn of Africa is a region where rapidly emerging economies and increasing global confidence co-exist with protracted conflict, violent extremism, weak governance including in the security domain and large-scale displacement. The population of the Horn of Africa is expected to increase from a quarter of a billion currently to half a billion by 2050. At the same time it will be among the youngest populations in the world constituting an enormous labour force and sub-continental centre for economic growth.

Realizing this substantial economic potential is, however, contingent on the situation in the region with regards to stability and security. On-going instability and violent extremism plagues the region in which all countries rank poorly on the Fragile States Index. Al Shabaab has a stronghold in Somalia and undeniable presence in Kenya. Across the region Al Shabaab manipulates local grievances and long standing conflicts to recruit disillusioned and often poor individuals. So far, Al Shabaab has not been successful in undertaking attacks in Ethiopia.

The root causes of fragility and instability are complex but relate to poor security and state governance; unresolved political disputes; contested or lacking border demarcation; and unsettled conflicts among identity groups. Within the region, these conflict drivers are exacerbated by climate change, natural disaster and commercial and natural resource exploitation leading to struggles over resources, often with displacement and migration as a result. Adding to this, the region experiences interference and influence from external actors, some traditional and some new, such as China and the Gulf States. In particular the Gulf States are spanning financial, political, security and religious domains. Recognising that the conflict in Somalia is caused and maintained by a wide range of underlying and interconnected factors, the country remains the epicentre of conflict but with collateral effects throughout the region.

The protracted conflict in the Horn directs governments' engagements away from public financial management and general development initiatives exacerbating entrenched poverty. Most initiatives in the region are reactive rather than proactive, thus not tackling the underlying drivers of conflict and thereby failing to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and stability, which in turn is a critical enabler for improving human development. There is also the continued risk of sudden disruptive events causing unrest and set-backs, such as the 2007-2008 Kenyan elections that raked up ethnic rivalries and unsettled societal cohesion.

- Development in key economic indicators: GDP, economic growth, employment, domestic resource mobilisation, etc.

Some countries on the Horn of Africa experience flourishing economies despite regional conflicts and continued re-occurring crisis, however the wealth generation is rarely distributed equitably. For example, Ethiopia and Kenya have experienced consistent economic growth with 2015 GDP growth rates of 9.6% and 5.6%, respectively. However, Kenya with an estimated GDP per capita of USD 1.516 in 2016 still ranks number 144 out of the world's 193 countries, though it is now considered as

a lower-middle income country[1]. Ethiopia's 2016 estimated GDP per capita of USD 795 places it at number 164 on the list, and Somalia ranked number 172 in GDP per capita with USD 549 according to World Bank 2015 measures. Ethiopia managed to decrease extreme poverty rates substantially from 55 pct. in 2000 to 33 pct. in 2011.

The countries' public revenues are modest, standing at USD 12.89bn (Kenya 2016), 10.07Bn (Ethiopia 2016), and 145.3Mn (Somalia 2014). This allows them limited space for public spending. In 2016 Kenya had an estimated public expenditure per capita of USD 381.5, Ethiopia's stood at USD 115.8 and Somalia's ranged as low as USD 14.4 according to 2014 measures.

Consequently, with the current governance and tax-generation, the countries in the Horn are financially ill-equipped to address the challenges they face with regards to poverty relief and bringing stability to the region through large-scale security sector investments.

- Status and progress in relation to SDGs, in particular those that are special priorities for Denmark.

The support under the proposed programme will specifically target Sustainable Development Goals 16, peace, justice and strong institutions, where it directly addresses several of the 12 targets, and 17, partnerships for the goals, by creating partnerships with African organisations that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, and financial resources, to support the achievement of the SDGs.

While Africa has seen some progress towards reducing violent conflict, it is still the region with the highest number of violent conflicts, and the last five years have seen an increasingly negative trend, so continued focus in this area is required.

- Political economy, including drivers of change (political, institutional, economic) (e.g. political will, CSO space, role of opposition, level of donor funding to government expenses, level of corruption, foreign investment, remittances, role of diaspora, youth, gender, discovery of natural resources or impact of climate change etc.)

Although state formation processes differ in the three focus countries of the programme they all face challenges concerning legitimacy, corruption, centre-periphery relations, marginalisation and inclusion.

Ethiopia has seen contraction of constructive outlets for political opposition leading to confrontational political mobilisation and violent protests - worryingly mainly along ethnic lines. There is a legitimate desire for broader inclusion in policy- and decision-making processes and in addressing socio-economic disparities, which the government publicly is committed to addressing.

Kenya has made significant progress in areas of economic development and institution building but still suffer from prevalent elite power grab combined with elite fragmentation, identity politics, devolved corruption, scarce local representation at national level and lack of channels for communities to voice their concerns.

In Somalia, in the face of lacking reliable, legitimate and capable security force, communities resort to clan networks or money to ensure safety. Official security provision is complicated by the fluidity of

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[1] https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/World-Bank-confirms-Kenya-lower-middle-income-status/539546-2773210-hf1ya0z/index.html

the individuals making up the security forces; individuals and groups interchangeably act as police officers, private security contractors and militia members. This unsystematic and diverse security provision fabric is conducive to conflicts, often revolving around access to resources, clan dynamics and unresolved power struggles. Not only in the security sector is governance and a real or perceived unfair distribution of resources and services along clan lines a key driver of tension in Somalia. Competition over resources in terms of politics, employment, land and business continues to drive conflicts across the conflict and in particular in South Central Somalia. Despites attempts to address this in the political system the perception is still that distribution is unfair and favouring dominant clans.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Central Intelligence Agency "The World Factbook"
- World Bank "data bank" Human Development Indicators
- IMF GDP database
- Bereketeab, Redie Obi, Cyril 2013, "Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State
Conflicts and Security, Pluto Press
-Conference notes: "Understanding current and future drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa".

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

2. Fragility, conflict, migration and resilience

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

- Situation with regards to peace and stability based on conflict analysis and fragility assessments highlighting key drivers of conflict and fragility, protection and resilience, organised transnational crime and illicit money flows and how conflict and fragility affect inclusive private sector development and women and youth;

Violent conflicts and instability revolving around access to political and economic resources and adherence to disparate ideologies affect all program focus countries. Political establishments have failed to deploy effective solutions and address the root causes and drivers of conflict, and have rather predominantly responded with harsh security measures leveraging identity politics thus escalating violence. The multifaceted and interdependent nature of the conflicts unfolding in the Horn necessitates a regional response with locally considered dimensions.

The main objective of the Programme is to contribute to peace and stability in the region and pave the way for traditional development actors to engage. The Programme is thus based on the assumption that peace and stability are critical enablers for sustainable development, poverty reduction and protection of Human Rights in the region. It also presumes that peace and stability must first and foremost be ensured by local and regional authorities and stakeholders and that international support should therefore strengthen the region's capacity to prevent and manage conflict. Finally, the programme is cognisant of its nature as a "Peace and Stabilisation Programme" and will thus focus on activities, which fall outside but complement other engagements, such as bilateral country programmes.

For further analysis, please consult "Conference notes 2016: "Understanding current and future

drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa".

- Identifying on-going stabilisation/development and resilience efforts and the potential for establishing partnerships and alliances with national, regional and other international partners in order to maximise effects of the engagements.

The Programme will draw on and benefit from the unique dialogue and partnership with organisations across the Horn of Africa, which have been established and developed over the course of the previous phases. Partnership relations have benefited from combining engagement at the political and programmatic levels and across the civilian and military domain and have secured rare levels of access and policy impact.

- Issues and concerns of relevance to Danish interest in the area of security and migration.

Denmark prioritizes the prevention of conflict and stabilisation in and around fragile countries and situations. This is one of four key priorities in the new Danish strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action. The Programme is also placed within a larger policy context, encompassing broader development frameworks and operational guidelines regarding the future programme cycle of the Peace and Stabilisation Fund. The "Prioritisation Note" recently agreed by the Peace and Stabilisation Fund's Inter-Ministerial Steering Group, will form the basis for the overall focus and informed discussions at the April 2017 Internal Strategy Seminar. The Programme also applies the focus criteria listed in Ambassador Taksøe Jensen's report on Danish foreign and security policy highlighting the importance of: 'Danish interests, the prevalence of strong partners and the prospect of a positive impact'. The program thus focuses specifically on areas where Denmark has significant economic and security interests such as maritime security, countering violent extremism, stabilisation, curbing irregular migration, and regional peacekeeping capacity, engagement areas where suitable and capable partners can be identified, and interventions where the likelihood of achieving results aligned with Danish interests is high.

- Identify where Denmark has comparative advantages that may lead to more effective and efficient programming and better results including where Denmark may contribute with deployment of specific expertise and capacities.

1) Danish experiences with prevention and disengagement shared through CVE and disengagement efforts regionally and in Somalia
2) Danish advisor deployed to assist the Kenya Navy with specialist advise
3) Danish military and police advisor deployed within the Easter African Standby Force and proposal to deploy civilian advisor
4) Danish experience in the Civ-Mil stabilisation space bridging civilian and military domain as well as security- and development focussed interventions
5) Danish relations with the AU and IGAD through the Africa for Peace Programme first initiated in 2005
6) Strategic sector partnership between the Danish State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime and the Ethiopian State Prosecutor as the launching pad for cooperation on anti-money-laundering efforts in Ethiopia

- Considerations regarding the humanitarian situation, migration, refugee and displacement issues, including the need to integrate humanitarian-development linkages and long term strategies;

Insecurity and lack of reliable livelihoods contributes to triggering considerable amounts of migration

and displacement. The cyclic droughts severely affect Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia and worsens conditions for many pushing them to migrate. There are also 'pull' factors that facilitate migration such as 'enabling infrastructure' and migration cultures alongside with the dream of a better life. Currently there are more than 7 million internally displaced people and 3.5 million refugees on the Horn, making it one of the most vulnerable regions in the world in terms of humanitarian need.

The proposed programme addresses humanitarian issues from a preventative and long-term view by addressing conflict as a driver of forced displacement and by strengthening regional collaboration on border management thereby improving capacities to manage flows of people and preventing cross-border criminal networks and activities including the smuggling of people.

- Relevant issues and considerations related to radicalisation and violent extremism and the potential for Danish engagement to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE)

Violent extremism is a particular concern for Danish interests, which is reflected in the programme priorities. The causes of recruitment and radicalisation are a complex combination of political, economic, communal and individual factors and ideological convictions. The most dominating violent extremist organisations operating in the Horn of Africa are so called "home-grown", some with links to international organisations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, which is reported to have an expanding presence in the region. The organisations are primarily operating in Somalia but across the region there are spin-offs and local groups as well. In particular Al Shabaab continues to attract regional and a limited number of global foreign fighters to join their operations.

Al Shabaab remains a key player in Somalia and the region and diligently exploits local grievances to their advantage. Youth and minority groups often remain excluded from political processes as well as from economic development and are a vital recruitment ground for violent extremist groups. In their support networks a great range of actors including elders, women and business people play integral roles. In Somalia where Al Shabaab holds significant geographical areas under their control recruitment is less voluntary and to a larger extend forced. Prevention and disengagement programmes such as the Danish supported centre based in Mogadishu must therefore be considered in that light.

The third phase of PSP HoA will particularly focus on the prevention aspect of addressing violent extremism as well as offering those wanting to leave the path towards violence a chance to do so. Prevention is an area of high Danish expertise and it is with the programme support considered an important and integral part of reducing violent extremism. The approach Denmark is taken are build on lessons learned and good practice in the sector, where as an example the evidence suggests that disengaged former violent extremists are often efficient conveyers of the brutal and hypocritical ideas behind violent extremist ideologies and organisations. Further, the focus on prevention and disengagement is well aligned with the key attributes of the "Danish model" for countering violent extremism and remains a space where too little is done across the region, including as was pointed out in the above mentioned CVE study knowledge and lessons sharing, thus offering the potential for genuine value added.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Conference notes 2016: "Understanding current and future drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa"
- Draft Concept Note for a third phase of the Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa

- The World 2030 - Towards a framework for Danish support to Countering Violent Extremism in Africa, Verner Kristiansen Ltd (April 2017).
Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

3. Assessment of human rights situation (HRBA) and gender[2]

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

Human Right Standards (international, regional and national legislation)
The human rights situation in the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, remains challenging across a number of fundamental human rights. Patterns of (political) repression including intimidation against media and activists are widespread. Moreover, governments' inability or unwillingness to respond to serious allegation of unlawful killings, torture and other serious violations create a reinforcing environment of impunity. Another issue is security forces' and related services' inability to operate in a human rights compliant manner – being it AMISOM, coast guard or police. Often it is the result of a unidimensional ("tough") approach to security combined with lack of training and absence of standard procedures.

The human rights situation in Somalia remains dire, especially when it comes to protection of civilians. In the period January 2016 to October 2017 UNSOM documented a total of 4,585 civilian casualties (2,078 killed and 2,507 injured), 60 per cent of which were attributed to al-Shabaab. State- and non-state actors also carried out extrajudicial executions; sexual and gender-based violence; arbitrary arrests and detention; and abductions. Somali children are disproportionately affected by the conflict, and are exposed to grave violations during military operations, including killing, maiming, and arrest and detention by Somali security forces.

The proposed programme will work directly with human rights compliance in the institutional framework of the security sector as it aims to strengthen effective security provision grounded in respect for human rights for all. The programme also takes a preventative approach to ensure human rights by shifting focus to prevention of Violent Extremism to lower the risk of occurrence of human rights violations.

Further, human rights considerations are to be sustained throughout the programme in every engagement. Further, conflict and the lack of stability is one of the most critical detriments to achieving gender equality, reducing Sexual and Gender Based Violence, and to protect civilians and human rights. With its focus on reducing armed conflict and violence, the program thus aims to create the enabling conditions for promoting Human Rights compliance more broadly.

Identify key **rights holders** in the programme

The main right-holders of the programme are the populations of Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and

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[2] The purpose of the analysis is to facilitate and strengthen the application of the Human Rights Based Approach, and integrate gender in Danish development cooperation. The analysis should identify the main human rights issues in respect of social and economic rights, cultural rights, and civil and political rights. Gender is an integral part of all three categories.

in particular, marginalized and excluded groups that experience repeated acts of violence, human rights violations and oppression. This includes youth, displaced people and refugees, marginalized ethnic groups, or clans and women.

Identify key **duty bearers** in the programme

The key duty bearers in this context are the partner governments in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia and actors such as AU, IGAD and AMISOM as well as certain implementing partners.

Gender

Women experience disproportionate marginalisation and exclusion, particularly from select parts of society, typically the higher layers of politics, in the Horn of Africa, and which in turn increases their vulnerability to negative impacts from conflict and violence. Women and girls continue to experience sexual and gender-based violence and other violations of their rights. Simultaneously, women play crucial roles in terms of community organisation, business and local politics in e.g. Somalia, and are widely perceived as conduits for social cohesion, reconciliation and expanded inclusion in settlement processes.

Women play an active role in al-Shabaab and Islamic state both in Somalia and Kenya as well as in clan conflicts in Somalia. This includes intelligence gathering, financial contributions and enabling financial transfers, recruitment, support roles and more rarely active fighting. On the other hand, women also play an important role in peace processes, especially community level reconciliation, including disengagement of al-Shabaab combatants (sons).

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- United Nation Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2015 Report
- UNSOM & OHCHR "Report on the Right to Freedom of Expression: Striving to Widen Democratic Space in Somalia's Political Transition", August 2016.

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

4. Capacity of public sector, public financial management and corruption

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

- Capacity of the public sector for policy making, enforcement and service delivery.

While state formation in the three different focus countries is at different levels they all face challenges such as weak security and rule of law structures and failures to address grievances leading to societal unrest. Lack of inclusion in national governance processes and inefficient devolution of service provision causes local communities to look for solutions elsewhere than central government. Despite continuous lacking institutional capacities, progress has been made across the Horn; In Ethiopia, there is a legitimate willingness to expand the inclusivity of political processes; Kenya has made considerable progress with regards to institution-building; In Somalia, positive developments have included the approval of the National Development Plan, improvement in election processes and the formation process of the federal state. These diverse states of affairs across the Horn

highlight the need for context-specific approaches.

AU and IGAD have financial and administrative management systems of variable quality, though often weak, which requires close monitoring. All three organisations are in the process of passing the EU's seven pillar assessment, which is expected in late 2017 or early 2018. AU has achieved IPSAS status in accounting and financial management. IGAD is expected to achieve this status in early 2018. In short the organisations' own management systems can to a large part be used to manage the Danish funding, but it requires close monitoring, and external financial monitoring at regular intervals. The embassy will work closely with the EU that has extensive financial monitoring mechanisms in place for all the organisations.

- Quality and capacity of PFM, including budget credibility, comprehensiveness and transparency as well as control and external scrutiny / audit in all phases of the budget process as well as participation of citizens / CSOs in monitoring public budgets and corruption;

The absence of performance-based indicators and the unstable political environment complicates assessments of the PFM system in Somalia. The government's self-assessment report pointed to a need to update the existing legal framework and a prevalence of transgressions of PFM legislation, demanding an adequate sanctioning system. The capacity for budget development and ensuring alignment with policies is weak and the budget mainly covers recurrent spending, and contains financing gaps with no indication of how those gaps are to be financed. There is evidence of spending without recourse to the approved budget and nonadherence to established expenditure controls. There is a lack of active oversight of PFM by parliament, CSOs, NGOs and the private sector as well as a lack of an effective auditor general.

In Kenya, effective internal control systems are partly in place. The Legislature's budget scrutiny is improving and there is a well-established and professional external auditing function, although Auditor General reports do not yet reflect international auditing standards. Fiscal information is increasingly available to the public, however, in many respects the comprehensiveness and transparency of the budget are still lacking. Weaknesses in PFM impact strategic resource allocation and service delivery negatively, however, the Government of Kenya is continuously taking measures to address the shortcomings.

Budget credibility in Ethiopia has improved from 2006 to 2013 as a result of better forecasting of domestic revenue and external grants, and improved budget discipline. The budget is fairly comprehensive, and internal controls are generally comprehensive and sound, however, the overall fiscal transparency of the Federal Government continues to be low. Performance audits are undertaken and external audits are comprehensive and follow international standards.

AU and IGAD will have implementing responsibility in line with the responsibility bestowed upon the organisations under the Africa for Peace programme since 2005. The partners are an integral part of the budget process in the organisations, which provide a platform for budget scrutiny. All organisations are externally audited yearly on the overall level, and conducts a series of specific external audits of partner funds every year (the AU, for example, conducts more than 100 external audits of partner funding yearly).

- The corruption situation and relevant anti-corruption measures and reforms.

Corruption is rampant in the Horn of Africa. Rent-seeking behaviour redirects funds earmarked for public expenditure thus undermining, for example, security sector spending and accordingly

perpetuates conflicts. Somalia ranks number 176 as the most corrupt country on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. In Somalia, corruption continues to perpetuate Al Shabaab's claim to power as it feeds off the grievances of communities that are excluded from political processes and rent-seeking opportunities.

Corruption is also a big problem in Kenya, which ranks number 145 on the index - both at the senior-most levels manifested in elite capture, and at a community level where business and political interests are entangled. Kenya has however taken important measures to prevent corruption with the new constitution adopted in 2010 representing a milestone.

Although Ethiopia has a relatively (relative to Somalia and Kenya) high score on the index ranking 108 and has a strong legislative framework to prevent corruption, corruption and rentseeking still flourishes with rare enforcement of anti-corruption legislation.

The risk of corruption within AU and IGAD is assessed to be low. Though external audits of the organisations repeatedly point to areas in need of improvement, these are almost always aimed at limited knowledge, or lack of, internal rules and regulations, rather than intentional fraud or corruption, and very rarely points to loss of resources.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Transparency International "Corruption Perception Index"
- GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal, "Ethiopia Corruption Report", June 2015
- Anti-corruption Resource Centre, "Kenya: overview of corruption and anti corruption", 2012
- ACE & ECORYS Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Assessment, Final Report, 2012
- M Warsame & E. Ireri 2016, "Public financial management reforms in Somalia: A case study on Somalia's finance professionals", Journal of Public Affairs
- The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, "The Financial Management Performance of the Federal Government", Final Report, June 2015
- Federal Republic of Somalia, "Public Financial Management (PFM) Self-assessment Report and Proposed Public Financial Management Strengthening Initiative 2013-2016", April 4 2013.

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

5. Matching with Danish strengths and interests, engaging Danish actors, seeking synergy

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

Identify: - where we have the most at stake – interests and values, - where we can (have) influence through strategic use of positions of strength, expertise and experience, and - where we see that Denmark can play a role through active partnerships for a common	The proposed programme addresses the aims in Denmark's strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action (The World 2030) of promoting peace, security and protection, and preventing irregular migration as well as promoting human rights, democracy and gender equality.

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aim/agenda or see the need for Denmark to take lead in pushing an agenda forward.	The Programme also applies the focus criteria listed in Ambassador Taksøe-Jensen's report on Danish foreign and security policy highlighting the importance of: Danish interests, the prevalence of strong partners and the prospect of a positive impact. The program thus focuses specifically on areas where Denmark has significant economic and security interests such as maritime security, countering violent extremism, stabilisation; curbing regular migration, and regional peacekeeping capacity; engagement areas where suitable and capable partners can be identified; and interventions where the likelihood of achieving results aligned with Danish interests is high.
- Brief mapping of areas where there is potential for increased commercial engagement, trade relations and investment as well as involvement of Danish local and central authorities, civil society organisations and academia.	Danish companies are increasingly showing interest to engage in expanding and emerging markets in Kenya and Ethiopia as the two countries' economies flourish and populations grow. Demand for products, which Danish companies are specialized in such as energy production and medicine is expected to rise. This immense potential for expanded trade relationships can however not be fully realized in the face of on-going instability and insecurity with piracy being perhaps the most evident direct example.
- Assessment of the donor landscape and coordination, and opportunities for Denmark to deliver results through partners including through multilaterals and EU;	The program will prioritize to cultivate and expand strategic partnerships with similar conflict-focussed programming instruments such at the UK Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), the EU and with regional peace and security actors such as Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) as well as, evidently, with the involved partner governments.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- The World 2030
- Conference notes 2016: "Understanding current and future drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa"

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

Annex 2: Partners

1. Summary of stakeholder analysis

A variety of actors are involved in stabilization across the region. In Somalia the Federal Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation is leading the government stabilization work (narrowly defined), while the Prime Minister's Office and Ministry for Internal Security is leading on Preventing / Countering Violent Extremism, including al-Shabaab disengagement. They are the key ministries but also Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defence are relevant stakeholders. In addition comes the Federal Member states that all have stakes in stabilization.

On the international side, UNSOM is leading the CRESTA/A framework (coordination of international community's stabilization efforts) while AMISOM also is a key partner in security and stabilization. Central bilateral stabilization partners include UK, US, EU that have comprehensive engagement as well as Germany (policing, CVE) and Sweden (CVE). UK is arguably the leading stakeholder in Somalia and offer the best prospect for close partnership for Denmark as seen in the partnership on al-Shabaab disengagement, SSF and BPST. The mentioned stakeholders are also lead stakeholders in the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) structure which is the central framework for coordination and cooperation on security and stabilization in Somalia. Formally there is consensus around the international engagement in Somalia, illustrated by an extraordinarily consensual UN Security Council when it comes to Somalia. However, Gulf States and other actors are not always aligning their activities with the rest of the international community, occasionally undermining state-building and stabilization efforts.

In Kenya related to the Kenya Navy partners like UK, US and France are critical (apart from the Kenyans), and in relation to EASF key partners include the EASF Secretariat, EASF member states as well as UK and Nordics and others. In Ethiopia, EU is among the largest partners on AML/CTF. When it comes to IGAD CVE a broad range of actors are involved including US, EU, Austria and Netherlands. Generally, both recipients, implementing partners/agencies, and other international partners have been extensively consulted during the formulation phase.

Criteria for selecting programme partners

Overall, the PSF principles as also outlined in chapter 3 in the programme document combined with the PSF prioritisation note from 2017 have guided the selection of programme partners. It has been a deliberate choice to include a portfolio of more well proven existing partners such as SSF with more risk-oriented engagements such as AMISOM stabilisation and al-Shabaab Disengagement as well as new engagements such as the UNODC transnational crime and IGAD CVE.

More specific criteria that have guided programme partner selection include: *match between thematic programme objective and the organisations experience and mandate* (such as UNODC on organised crime); *proven capability*; *lean administration* - potential for delegated cooperation agreement (al-Shabaab Disengagement – FCO; SSF – DFID); access to the partner (difficult to work directly with AMISOM on the military side without physical presence in Somalia compared to EASF or the training centres for instance).

The PSP HoA benefits from experience and considerable continuity by building on existing partnerships with the UK (FCO, DFID and military), the UNODC and AMSIOM. The only new partner, in the context of the PSP HOA, is the IGAD Security Sector Programme. However it is a well-known partner in the APP. The same desk officer in the RDE Addis Ababa manages the APP development engagement and the PSP HoA Peace and stabilization engagement. The only partners that have been "de-selected" are: National Centre for Counter Terrorism, UNSOS Trust Fund, and AU

maritime. NCTC deselection was a logical step given the level NCTC has reached during the Danish support; the UNSOS trust fund has provided much needed support for AMISOM and SNA but has also proved challenging to work with, including lack of sufficient reporting and transparency; Support to AU Maritime strategy was terminated to enable MOD to engage in Western Africa/Gulf of Guinea..

PSP HOA partners 2015-18	PSP HOA partners 2018-22	Comment
EASF	EASF	Continued
Peacekeeping Training Centres: IPSTC and BPST	IPSTC and BPST	Continues but no seconded/embedded advisors in the new phase
AMISOM and Somalia Security Forces through UNSOS	N/A	Not continued
FCO – al-Shabaab disengagement	FCO – al-Shabaab disengagement	Expanded beyond support to Serendi Centre, i.e. also capacity development of national disengagement programme and Strategic Communications.
Somalia Stability Fund I/II	Somalia Stability Fund II	Continued
AMISOM Civil affairs Stabilisation	AMISOM Civil affairs Stabilisation	Continued but with adjusted activities given changes in context, including UNSC resolution for AMISOM.
PREVENT – PET / NCTC	N/A	Engagement will not be continued but a no cost-extension into 2019 is under consideration for consolidation of results.
Anti-Money Laundering (AML)	Anti-Money Laundering (AML)	Implementing partner to be contracted through open tender.
Kenya Navy	Kenya Navy	Continued, new activities
AU Maritime Strategy	N/A	Not continued
UNODC (Maritime Crime, prisons)	UNODC (Transnational Organized Crime, maritime land).	Change of focus while retaining UNODC as partner
N/A	IGAD CVE, ICEPCVE	New partner under the PSP but IGAD is a partner under the APP

2. Brief presentation of partners

Thematic Programme 1

The Eastern African Standby Force (EASF).
The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), formerly Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), is one of the five regional forces for Peace Support Operations (PSOs) of the African Standby Force, consisting of military, police and civilian components. EASF constitutes the regional operational arm of the peacekeeping elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture, put in place by the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

As of May 2018, EASF has ten member states: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. From April 2013, the Republic of South Sudan has the status of an observer and. EASF achieved full operational capability (FOC) in late 2014 in conjunction with a validation exercise in Ethiopia. EASF constituted the first continental Standby Force in the first half of 2017 in accordance with AU newly implemented continental rostering system of the five regional standby forces.

EASF has three policy organs: The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, The Council of Ministers of Defence and Security and The Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff. The EASF has a structure of four permanent institutions comprising the EASF Secretariat based in Nairobi, the Force Headquarters based in Addis Ababa, a Planning Element (PLANELM) based in Nairobi and a Logistics Base in Addis Ababa.

The "Friends of EASF" is a composed of a group of supporting (largely Western) nations and organisations and is currently chaired by the Danish Defence Attaché in RDE Nairobi.

Website: http://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate. AMISOM's deployment was authorised by the UN under SCR 1744(2007)13. The AMISOM mandate has been regularly reviewed and extended by the UNSC.

On 30 August 2017 the UNSC extended its authorisation of AMISOM until 31 May 2018, approving a reduction of its uniformed personnel to a maximum 21,626 by 31 December 2017 combined with a transition of responsibilities to Somali security forces. The downsizing included establishing a minimum of 1,040 AMISOM police personnel comprising individuals and five Formed Police Units (FPUs). A further reduction to 20,626 uniformed personnel would take place by 30 October 2018, unless the Council decided to accelerate that pace, taking into account the capabilities of Somali security forces.

AMISOM soldiers, police and civilian component provide the international peace support operations forces on the ground in Somalia. Their mandate includes support to, and support to the development of, the Somali national security forces and of Somali regional / Federal Member States governments.

Website: http://amisom-au.org/

The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF).
The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) was conceived at the London Conference on Somalia in February 2012 in a decision which recognised that all support to local areas of stability should be in accordance with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. It was also recognised that improved coordination of international support was required to build stability and integrate a range of diverse initiatives in Somalia. The SSF is a multi-donor fund and Denmark is one of the long-term donors to the fund. The fund is designed to strengthen local stability, improve the co-ordination of international support and enhance its delivery. The SSF's objectives are to support representative and responsive local governance and to support the resolution and mitigation of conflicts. The SSF prioritises support to Somali-owned organisations and networks, Somali private sector and government entities and also works with international for profit and non-profit organisations.

The SSF makes targeted investments which support representative and responsive Somali governance, as well as the mitigation and resolution of conflict. It invests in a broad range of initiatives across Somalia. Existing investments include community driven development programmes, youth empowerment projects, and peacebuilding and community safety initiatives. With the exception of humanitarian assistance, the SSF is able to invest in any initiative than can make a significant contribution to the fund's broad objectives and principles. The SSF invests in locations where local governance is at its weakest and security is poor, but where there is potential to make progress. This includes the newly-recovered areas of Somalia and other conflict-affected locations.

Adam Smith International (ASI) have been contracted as the Fund Manager for the SSF since late 2013. They are responsible for the day–to-day oversight of implementing partners, managing the Fund's communications and developing the capacity of investees.

Website: http://stabilityfund.so/

Thematic Programme 2

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

IGAD consists of a number of programmes and specialised institutions working within peace and security; The Addis Ababa based IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) - previously known as the IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT) – operating alongside the IGAD early warning programme (CEWARN) in Addis Ababa within IGAD's Peace and Security Division and the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE) in Djibouti working as a specialised institution reporting directly to the Executive Secretary.

IGAD as an institution developed a Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, to which implementation both ISSP, CEWARN and ICEPCVE is expected to contribute. However, ICEPCVE is the institution within IGAD with overall responsibility of activities relating to preventing and countering violent extremism. ICEPCVE is a regional center dedicated to preventing and countering the threats of violent extremism.

Website: www.icepcve.org

Serendi Centre, Adam Smith International (ASI) and Altai Consulting.

The Mogadishu based **Serendi Disengagement Centre** is the facility around which the Danish disengaged Al Shabaab fighters programme is based. The defector rehabilitation project receives defectors cleared as low risk by Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), which conducts initial interviews and screening. In total 191 defectors has been cleared through the Serendi Exit Board since October 2015. The Serendi Centre is a safe haven and a non-violent alternative for al-Shabaab defectors. It provides support for rehabilitation in the centre, including basic education, vocational education and training and life skills, psychosocial support, medical care and nutrition, recreation and sports, family visits and weekend leave. The centre includes a fully functioning case management system for the defectors and provides post-centre support in terms of job placements, support grants and in some cases safe housing. The Centre also provides the opportunity for continued research on post-exit experiences, the role of women and families, communication and outreach.

The Serendi Centre has been operated under a UK government contract by **Adam Smith International (ASI)** since March 2015, when they took over the role from the previous implementing partners, G41 and Ronin. The contract for implementation will be retendered in early 2018 (to be concluded by the end of March 2018). As implementing partner ASI manages and develops the centres' operations. This includes building the capacity of the centres' staff, strengthening their performance and establishment and maintenance of technical standards. A Security Adviser accredited by the FGS will have the responsibility to provide security planning and management at the centre, including direction and oversight of NISA personnel seconded to the centre.

Altai Consulting will undertake Third Party Monitoring (TPM) of the project until the TPM contract is open for retendering. The TPM Agent provides regular reports of findings in order to allow donors and FGS to more accurately to learn from the different processes at the centre, make adjustments, assess and to assess the impact of the centres and to communicate that impact to the international community. Data collected by the TPM Agent may be informative in the development of

communication plans regarding further outreach. The FGS is responsible for ensuring that Altai Consulting is able to visit the centres as required to fulfil its role effectively. The FGS will also ensure access to the centres for other monitoring organisations if requested to do so by the UK and the UN. TPM is an essential element of the system ensuring that human rights standards are met in the Serendi Centre.

Communication Partner is to be identified, procurement process led by the UK.

Websites:

https://www.adamsmithinternational.com/explore-our-work/east-africa/somalia

http://www.altaiconsulting.com/

Thematic Programme 3.

United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
UNODC is a global leader in the fight against illicit drugs and international crime. Established in 1997 UNODC operates in all regions of the world. UNODC relies on voluntary contributions, mainly from Governments, for 90 per cent of its budget.

UNODC is mandated to assist UN Member States in their struggle against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. The three pillars of the UNODC work programme are:

- Field-based technical cooperation projects to enhance the capacity of Member States to counteract illicit drugs, crime and terrorism.
- Research and analytical work to increase knowledge and understanding of drugs and crime issues and expand the evidence base for policy and operational decisions.
- Normative work to assist States in the ratification and implementation of the relevant international treaties, the development of domestic legislation on drugs, crime and terrorism, and the provision of secretariat and substantive services to the treaty-based and governing bodies.

UNODC has a number of active programmes in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa Maritime Counter-Piracy (MCP) programme aims to strengthen maritime and criminal justice capacity, working together with Somali law enforcement agencies in South Central Somalia, Galmudug, Somaliland and Puntland. UNODC took over the Secretariat function for the Kampala Process in 2014, when the process became the Regional Maritime Coordination Mechanism (RMCM). In 2013 UNODC launched a new programme to support maritime law enforcement authorities in the Horn of Africa. Denmark supported this process under PSP II. UNODC also works in the area of prison reform, and has significant experience in prison assistance to Puntland and Somaliland as part of the Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme of the MCP.

Website: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/horn-of-africa-division.html

The Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC).
The Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) was established in 2009. The FIC sits under the oversight and management of the Ethiopian Attorney General's department. The implementation of national AML/CFT started in 2012. In 2015 a number of shortfalls in the Ethiopian AML/CFT system were identified including: the designation of terrorists and follow up action, more precise guidance to designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), better coordination of asset freezing, confiscation and management, and a system for the implementation of sanctions related to non-

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In 2015 it was identified that in order to align public and private efforts and ensure a common understanding of vulnerabilities and how to address them, it would be important that the national AML/CFT risk assessment process, which was initiated mid-2013, be completed expeditiously and that a comprehensive action plan based on that assessment be adopted.

In June 2017 as part of its on-going review of compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified a number of jurisdictions that had strategic AML/CFT deficiencies including Ethiopia. Subsequent Danish support to the FIC under PSP II has been aimed at resolving the deficiencies identified by the FATF.

Website: None

The Kenya Navy (KN).
The Kenyan Navy was established on 12 December 1964, one year after Kenya gained independence. It was preceded by the colonial Royal East African Navy (REAN). The Kenya Navy constitutes the sole fully functional navy in the Horn of Africa / East Africa with a total of approximately 4000 personnel and 15 ships and a functioning, but incomplete, coastal radar chain.

The Kenya Navy has the national lead for maritime sovereignty issues though maritime safety and security and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) are not the exclusive responsibility of the navy. As in Denmark a number of different maritime agencies and forces have a role to play.

The Kenya Navy has been actively involved in support of AMISOM in Somalia. On 4 September 2012 the Kenyan Navy shelled the Somali city of Kismayo as part of an African Union offensive to capture the city from al Shabaab. The Kenya Navy has continued to support AMISOM, including by patrols off the Somali coast as far north as Mogadishu. The Kenya Navy receives some support from the UN Support Office for Somalia (fuel and maintenance costs) for its contributions to AMISOM.

Website: None

3. Summary of key partner features

Partner name *What is the name of the partner?*	Core business *What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?*	Importance *How important is the programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?*	Influence *How much influence does the partner have over the programme (low, medium, high)?*	Contribution *What will be the partner's main contribution?*	Capacity *What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?*	Exit strategy *What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?*
Engagement 1.1 *EASF*	*The core rational for supporting EASF is to enable the region, as an element under AU and the African Peace and Security Architecture, to be able to respond effective to challenges to peace and security.* *EASF is a Standby Force with high readiness and should ideally utilize its capacities preventively – implying before a threatening situation evolves into an armed conflict.* *Denmark and the Nordic countries have since 2009 supported EASF with focus on thematic areas such as "Headquarters training, exercises, equipment for operationalizing EASF Forward Force Headquarters, communication, maritime component, etc.*	*High* *The Nordic countries with Denmark as the lead nation developed during the years to become EASF's most important partner. This is signified by the fact that the Nordic countries provide 4 out of the 5 current advisers and also provide the largest contribution financially. The importance is further by the span of involvement and the results achieved since 2009.* *Its significance accentuates the importance of a durable and mutual agreed exit-strategy, which will enable the partner to continue on its own after the programme terminates.*	*High* *From the outset of the partnership one of the fundamental premises for the cooperation was that the cooperation takes its point of departure in the needs and priorities of the partner. This principle has been a leading principle ever since.* *All support is provided in accordance to EASF priorities as outlined in the EASF Strategic Plan 2015 – 2020 and annual Activity Plans.*	*EASF is providing the framework for the cooperation via its permanent institutions. Furthermore, EASF provides the personnel to the 5.200 strong Force comprising military, police and civilians. EASF is also providing the finances for the running costs, which pays for salaries for staff, electricity, rent, etc.*	*Strength: The regionality of EASF comprising 10 Eastern African member states and its significance for cooperation, confidence—building and regional integration and obviously – the Force constituting a real response mechanism.* *Weakness: EASF's institutional capacity is rather weak and does not constitute requisite redundancy. Consequently, EASF is extremely dependent on the quality of each individual staff member.* *Opportunities: EASF should also be seen as a political ambition. If EASF is deployed in a successful accomplishment of a mission, then EASF might further develop as a very strong and relevant platform, not only for providing stability and security, but also for enhanced dialogue between the 10 member states.* *Threats: The most significant threat for EASF is its risk for not being utilized and consequently being deemed irrelevant.*	*The Nordic military cooperation on support to EASF will cease no later than by the end of 2020 and expected termination of Nordic advisory support by the end of 2019.* *Denmark might continue supporting the police and civilian components throughout the lifetime of this programme due to the fact that these components are less developed than the military component. Emphasis in this phase should be on ensuring needed integration of all three components.*

Partner name	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
					This might lead to lack of political support from member states and lack of interest from international partners.	
Engagement 1.2 AMISOM Stabilisation	*The core objective of the civilian component of AMISOM is to enable and strengthen stabilisation and security actors engaged in Somalia and regional conflict management capacity through ensuring that AMISOM's military engagement is complemented by much-needed civilian stabilisation efforts.*	*High Denmark is by far the main contributor to the implementation of Quick-Impact Projects and other elements of the AMISOM civilian component. While implementation in the previous phase has been slow, the quick-impact projects that are implemented have been considered of very high value to the AMISOM mission. As such, the Danish contribution will provide much needed support for the broader AMISOM engagement in Somali to sustain endures military gains and gradually handover security responsibilities to Somalia government.*	*High The partnership is based on AUC and AMISOM's priorities as stipulated in the work plan of AMISOM. Partner ownership of the project is therefore high.*	*The AMISOM civilian component will provide early stabilization and support the FGS's effort of state building and peace building. This will increase the likelihood that liberated areas will not fall under al Shabaab domination again and increase the level of community trust in AMISOM as well as in the local and federal authorities.*	*Strength: AMISSOM is **the** regional peacekeeping mission in Somalia mandated by the UN. Since its deployment AMISOM has liberated many areas from Al-Shabaab and degraded the militant group. As a result, AMISOM is paving the way for Somalian political actors to work towards political stability.* *Weakness: The AMISOM Civilian Component suffers from rather weak implementation capacity due to shortage of civil staff on the ground.* *Opportunities: AMISOM is likely to remain the only viable platform to provide stabilization efforts in Somalia in the near future. A key element of the coming phase of the support (and coming mandates of AMISOM) will be the gradual transition of power and responsibility to Somali authorities.*	*By 2022 AMISOM is expected to have transitioned power and responsibility to the FGS. As part hereof it may also have handed over the mandate for the projects under the civilian component. Any future changes to the AMISOM mandate (latest provided through UNSCR 2372 in 2017) will be assessed against the purpose and intended outcomes of this engagement. Where ne-cessary the engagement will be modified.* *In the event of the closure of AMISOM and its replacement by another international mechanism of support to the development of peace and stability in Somalia RDE Addis will review the provision under this engagement and make recommendations as to the way forward.* *It is anticipated that within the timeframe of PSP-HOA Phase III (2018 – 2022) there will be a continued requirement for international support to peace and stabilisation in Somalia.*
Engagement 1.3	*Support development of*	*Low*	*Medium*	*Same as core business.*	*Strength: Comprehensive*	*SSF will remain a relevant*

Partner name	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
Somalia Stability Fund	*legitimate and inclusive state-building at federal member state and local level.* *Mitigation and resolution of conflict across Somalia. Community driven development programmes, youth empowerment projects, and peacebuilding and community safety initiatives.* *Knowledge products (Political Economy Analysis etc.)*	*Projected spending between August 2016 and March 2020 is USD 83 million. DK contribution under the PSP HOA 2018-2022 is projected to DK 35 million.*	*The administrative arrangement is a delegated cooperation agreement in the form of a MoU without detailed specification. However, the budget approved by the Joint Steering Committee which the RDE is part of is specified at output level.*		*spectrum of activities; high leverage vs. authorities; very professional organization, knowledge powerhouse transparency and accountability towards donors. Broad donor base.* *Weakness: Occasionally perceived as not aligned with government priorities.* *Opportunities: Closer cooperation with government (may also constitute a risk); play an active role in the transition plan.* *Threats: Security issues that may undermine investments. Lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the government (but not necessarily of the Somali population)*	*and highly required instrument for the foreseeable future and certainly beyond the current Programme phase. However, when Somalia has developed proper institutions, including public financial management, SSF will gradually be able to phase out. In the meantime, Denmark could phase out support to SSF and/or redirect to other partners if other and new donors provide financing or with a reduction in SSF activity level.* *The Somalia Stability Fund Phase II (SSF II) runs from November 2016 through to March 2020. The proposed budget envelope is based on the expectation that a third phase of the SSF will follow the current phase as a continued need for SSF engagement in Somalia is foreseen.*
Engagement 2.1 *IGAD CVE*	*Preventing and countering the threat of violent extremism.*	*Medium* *Denmark will be one of the largest partners to ICEPCVE. But a number of donors have already contributed and more have expressed interest.*	*High* *The partner is the primary responsible entity for implementing the regional strategy on preventing and countering violent extremism. Collaboration internally with other IGAD entities is required.*	*Ensuring implementation and operationalisation of the IGAD regional strategy on preventing and countering violent extremism.*	*As the ICEPCVE has recently been established, it still lacks capacity within the entity to carry out all required activities. It will rely on the IGAD Secretariat for assistance on programmatic and financial management.*	*IGAD is aiming to increase its contributions from Member States. Once the ICEPCVE is fully operational, it is also expected that other donors will contribute to the Center.*
Engagement 2.2 *Al-Shabaab disengagement. Adam Smith International*	*Disengagement and rehabilitation of al-Shabaab combatants.*	*High* *DK contribution constitute a relatively large part of the national*	*Medium* *While the National Program management has significant influence*	*National Program will contribute with concrete centre management of Serendi. Will coordinate*	*Strengths: Relatively knowledgeable core staff. Important political agenda*	*Gradual transfer of responsibility to the Somali authorities. Mobilisation of new*

Partner name	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
through delegated cooperation with FCO. Will focus on the national partners, i.e. the Disengagement and Rehabilitation Program ("National Program")		*disengagement initiatives since only UK, DE and DK is involved.*	*over the program substance they are fully dependent on international partners. UK and DK only partners that work with national authorities. Germany work exclusively through IOM.*	*national framework for disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration.*	*Weakness: Limited own financing. Difficult to prioritize. Challenging to harmonize approaches of the two main providers of the rehabilitation services (IOM/ASI).* *Opportunities: Playing an important role in al-Shabaab rehabilitation in case of further AMISOM offences. Closer cooperation with frontline (AMISOM/SNA) and outreach to ensure more defectors who end up at Serendi.* *Threats: Politicising of the defectors rehabilitation agenda. More focus on punishment in contrast to rehabilitation and reconciliation. Recruitment of non-qualified staff based in clan instead of the merits. Institutional risks, in particular human rights abuses at the centre.*	*donors. SE and NO might be interested.*
Engagement 3.1 UNODC	*International cooperation and capacity building on organized crime and drugs, including on correctional services, border control and maritime crime.*	*High UNODC has a large regional presence in the Horn of Africa. However, the Danish contribution for support to maritime law enforcement units and prisons (even if small) is relatively important for UNODC (and the recipients) since not many are involved in this area,*	*Medium The Danish support builds on existing UNODC strands of work but Denmark has trusted partner for UNOSD and vice versa has significant influence on the direction of the programme.*	*UNODC will deliver technical expertise and programme management expertise within an existing strategic framework.*	*Strength: UNODC is the UN mandated organisation to work on organised crime. Strong technical expertise.* *Weaknesses: Does not have same institutional strength as other UN organisations and is not as politically sensitive as UNDP for instance (also in*	

Partner name	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
		including supports UNODCs work.			*relation to donor human rights concerns). Often driven by topical donor agendas (I piracy for period, CVE now etc.)* *Opportunities: To build on and benefit from the new national security architecture regarding the maritime law enforcement units. Form stronger partnerships with EUCAP for instance.* *Threats: Lack of control of project after they have been handed over to government, entailing reputational risks, for instance if government does not follow international human rights standards in UNODC built infrastructure*	
Engagement 3.2 Ethiopia AML	*The core rationale to support the development of Ethiopia's institutional capacity in Anti Money Laundering (AML) and countering IFFs and contributing to full compliance with FATF standards. The regional importance of Ethiopia's growing integration with regional and international financial markets. Of greatest interest are the links between Ethiopian financial systems and money associated with piracy and violent*	*Medium* *The Danish engagement with FIC and the AG is very welcome by the organisations and the Ethiopian authorities. Denmark has built a strong level of trust during the previous phases of support, which allows for a very close collaboration. The EU also has a large regional programme addressing AML/CFT, but has found it difficult to engage productively with the Ethiopian organisations.*	*Medium* *The Ethiopian partners have so far worked constructively with the selected service provider. The choice of service provider for the current phase of support will be crucial to ensure that this cooperation is continued and that the service provider provides the trainings demanded and of use to the Ethiopian authorities.*	*Is expected to have an important positive impact on the ability of Ethiopia to be removed from the so-called FATF grey list.*	*The capacity of the service provider will be assessed as part of the tender process.*	*Part of the expected outcomes of the programme is to increase the Ethiopian authorities own spending on AML/CFT. If successful this will be an important step towards making further donor funding obsolete.*

Partner name	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
	extremist groups in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.					
Engagement 3.3 Kenyan Navy	*The core rationale for the Danish support to the Kenyan Navy is to enable the navy to conduct requisite sea surveillance and legitimate exercise of authority within territorial waters and the extended economic zone.* *These competences are fundamental obligations for any nation with a coast line and the only sustainable solution to counter piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing, etc.*	*Medium* *The significance of the Danish contribution is of high importance and the projected continuation of the previous engagement. However, Kenyan Navy has other international partners and the projected spending in this project is rather modest (11 million DKK).*	*High* *Kenyan Navy has been involved in the full planning process of the current programme. Thus, taking its point of departure in "the Logical Framework Approach", two workshops has been done in order to develop the programme in full with Kenyan partners.* *Kenyan partners has formulated the "Impact" and "Outcome" concepts, which provides the basis for developing the rest of the programme.*	*Kenyan Navy has throughout the cooperation provided significantly to the individual projects such as the "Full Mission Bridge Simulator – 50/50".* *Kenyan Navy is providing the platforms and personnel for the onwards cooperation. The Simulator constitutes one of the themes for the continuation of the cooperation, which, as indicated above, was financed on an equal basis between Kenya and Denmark.*	*Strength: The Kenyan Navy constitutes the only real navy in Eastern Africa with assets, which can counter effectively threats from piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing, etc.* *Weakness: The main challenge by the Kenyan partner is to keep the political aim focused towards our joint endeavor and to avoid duplication among international partners.* *Opportunities: The Danish – Kenyan cooperation constitutes a platform for including the commercial or merchant fleet and the "Blue Economy". At the same time the "Simulator – project" is stipulated to reach out to the region thereby contributing to regional integration.* *Threat: The largest threat to the joint endeavor would be change in political focus and support.*	*The ambition is to make the Center of Excellence revolving around the "Simulator – project" self-sustainable by 2021.* *Within the same timespan it is the ambition to enhance the operational capacity at the Kenyan Navy to increase its operational platforms (vessels and radar stations) enabling the navy to conduct requisite sea surveillance and exercise legitimate authority at its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.* *If this is not achieved fully by the 2021 it might be considered to continue the effort.*

Annex 3

Results framework Peace and Stabilisation Programme – Horn of Africa – 2018-2022

Note for Whole-of-Government Steering Committee: Indicators, baselines and targets are indicative and will be finalized when the entire results framework has been completed once PSEDs have been agreed/signed with partners.

Thematic Programme 1		**Regional conflict management capacity – stabilisation and security in Somalia**
TP 1 Objective		Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.
Impact indicator		Score of security apparatus, group grievances and state legitimacy respectively as measured by the Fund for Peace ("Fragility Index"). EASF demonstrates during field training exercise in late 2019 or 2020 that it is capable to deploy and carry out a mission relative to the mission objective.
Engagement 1.1		EASF
Outcome Indicator		EASF has demonstrated during field training exercise in late 2019 or 2020 that it is capable to deploy and carry out a mission relative to the mission objective. Prerequisites in place for a step-by-step transition of the responsibility of the security in Somalia from AMISOM to SNA/SNP.
Baseline	2018	EASF has achieved "Enhanced Autonomy" meaning that most training activities are conducted with up to 75 % representation of African instructors on international training teams. Furthermore, initial institutional capacity in place within vital functions such as EASF Forward Force Headquarters (FHQ) (EASF Start up Kit and CIS[1]) and Early Warning.

AMISOM has gained significant capacity to handle IED and using CIMIC in its planning to achieve its operational targets. Prerequisites need to be put in place to enable the incremental transition of authority from AMISOM to SNA/SNP. |
| Target | 2020 | EASF has achieved "Full Autonomy" meaning that most needed institutional capacity are in place and operational and most training activities are conducted without significant support from partners.

AMISOM operations contribute to the prerequisites for a progressively transfer of the responsibility of the security in Somalia to the SNA/SNP. |
| Engagement Title 1 | | **Strengthened regional conflict management capacity – EASF** |
| Outcome 1 | | Contribution to EASF's attainment of "Full Autonomy" by the end of 2020 by demonstrating that vital institutional capacities are in place and that planning, conducting and evaluation of needed training activities/exercises can take place without substantial support from partners.

Contribution to EASF's ability to plan, prepare and operate as a multilateral, integrated and multifunctional force ready to respond to threats towards peace and security in the region and across the continent. |
| Outcome indicator | | Decisive institutional capacities such as EASF Movement Coordination Centre (MCC), EASF Early Warning, EASF CIS, EASF Maritime and Air concepts are prepared. |

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[1] CIS: Communication and Information Systems.

		EASF plan/conduct/evaluate most training activities autonomously (100 % African instructors) only supported by partners in the mentor role.
		EASF demonstrates during various exercises (MAPEX, CPX and FTX)[2] that its member states can provide requisite force contributions, deploy, and operate its FHQ and its Mission Headquarters (MHQ) according to evaluation- and advisor reports.
Baseline	2018	EASF needs to enhance its institutional capacity. Initial capacity has been established within the areas of Early Warning, CIS and Maritime domains. However, substantial further development is required. Within the areas of MCC and the Air component, EASF is still in its very early development and needs significant progress.
		EASF demonstrated during the FTX in Port Sudan in late 2017 that it has increased its operational capacity significantly compared to the reports from the last exercise that took place in Ethiopia in late 2014. Most significantly EASF demonstrated increased capacity to operate its headquarters (FHQ and MHQ). Nevertheless, EASF also revealed significant gaps in its capability to plan and execute the concrete exercise.
Target	2020	Critical institutional capacities (Early Warning, CIS, Maritime, Air and MCC) are in place and without essential gaps. Most essential concepts/SOPs are in place and being rehearsed during exercises.
		EASF demonstrates during the FTX in late 2019 or in 2020 that it can plan and execute an exercise according to the scenario and mission tasked. Furthermore, EASF should demonstrate that it is capable to plan and execute apposite operations relative to the mission given.

Output 1.1		Requisite institutional capacity provided within the functions of MCC, Early Warning, Maritime and Air components.
Output indicator		
Baseline	2018	
Target	2019	
Target	2020	

Output 1.2		Requisite capacities in place enabling EASF to plan, conduct and evaluate all relevant training by own means without substantial support by partners. This encompass requisite SOPs/training policies/plans/rosters within all three components (military, police and civilian).
Output indicator		
Baseline	2018	
Target	2019	
Target	2020	

Output 1.3		Essential normative and behavioural training provided for key EASF personnel through the partnership with IPSTC. This includes training within the areas of HR, IHL, POC, etc.
Output indicator		
Baseline	2018	
Target	2019	
Target	2020	

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[2] MAPEX/CPX/FTX: Mapping Exercise/Command Post Exercise/Field Training Exercise.

Outcome 2		Contribution to the operational preparedness of AMISOM	
Outcome indicator		AMISOM demonstrates increased capacity to handle the C-IED threats in theatre leading to a decrease of fatalities to IEDs. AMISOM increases its ability to generate better operational security for its own troops by utilising the "CIMIC tool" as an enabler to establish better relations and cooperation with local communities within its area of operation (AOR).	
Baseline	2018	AMISOM has gained significant capacity to handle IED and using CIMIC in its planning to achieve its operational targets.	
Target	2020	AMISOM operations contribute to the prerequisites for a progressively transfer of the responsibility of the security in Somalia to the SNA/SNP.	
Output 1.1		Training provided in close partnership with BPST to troop contingents from primarily Kenya and Uganda within, but not limited to, the thematic areas of C-IED and CIMIC. The training takes place as a part of the pre-deployment training before rotation with troops in AMISOM.	
Output indicator			
Baseline	2018		
Target	2019		
Target	2020		
Engagement Title 2		**AMISOM Civilian Stabilisation in Somalia**	
Outcome		**AMISOM engages more effectively in early stabilization efforts in liberated and at-risk areas in Somalia to sustain military gains**	
Outcome indicator		Functioning police stations and functioning local administrations with adequate (human and other) resources effectively responding to local community's needs in AMISOM and government controlled areas.	
Baseline	2018		TBD
Target	2022		Functioning police stations and local administrations, in *majority/all* (TBD) AMISOM and government held areas.
Output 1.1		**Promotion of reconciliation platforms trough workshops, town halls, conferences, and community mobilization and sensitization**	
Output indicator		Youth, women, elders and civil society organizations are sensitized on preventing and countering violent extremism, and preventing the recruitment and use of child soldiers.	
Baseline	2018	400	400 people (youth, women, elders, religious leaders, members of the civil society) were sensitized on issues of de-radicalization and preventing recruitment of child soldiers.
Target	2019	2,300	2300 people (youth, women, elders, religious leaders, members of the civil society) to be sensitized on issues of de-radicalization and preventing recruitment of child soldiers, prevention of female genital mutilation, and women rights.
Target	2020	1,400	1400 people (youth, women, elders, religious leaders, members of the civil society) to be sensitized on issues of de-radicalization and preventing recruitment of child soldiers.
Target	2021	400	400 people (youth, women, elders, religious leaders, members of the civil society) to be sensitized on issues of women protection.
Target	2022	TBD	XX people (youth, women, elders, religious leaders, members of the civil society) to be sensitized on issues of women protection .
Output 1.2		**Implementation of community initiated Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs)**	
Output indicator		Improve livelihood: providing basic facilities and amenities to the community (Water, Health, Education and Social support)	
Baseline	2018		4 activities planned: Donate 20 desks and assorted school stationaries to

			school(s); distribute 500 mosquito nets; renovate/construct and equip 1 district hospital; 500 kgs of assorted food items to be distributed during flood and/or fasting period.
Target	2019	4 of 6	4 of the following 6 activity targets successfully completed: 1 school to be renovated and equipped; provision of assorted medication; 2 district hospitals to be renovated/constructed and equipped; 50 desks to donate to schools; 1000 mosquito nets to be distributed, 2 boreholes to be renovated.
Target	2020	4 of 5	4 of the following 5 activity targets successfully completed: 1 school to be renovated and equipped; 2 district hospitals to be renovated/constructed and equipped; 1000 mosquito nets to be distributed, 3 boreholes to be renovated; assorted medication to be distributed to hospitals.
Target	2021	3 of 4	3 of the following 4 activity targets successfully completed: 1000 mosquito nets to be distributed; 2 district hospitals to be renovated/constructed and equipped; 2 boreholes to be renovated; assorted medication to be distributed to hospitals.
Target	2022	TBD	TBD
Output 1.3			Capacity development and infrastructure development of the Somalia National Police as stipulated in the National Security Policy (NSP)
Output indicator			The Somali Police Force and the local community are supported with infrastructure renovation, provided with training material and delivery of specific training, and essential equipment is availed
Baseline	2018		330 Somali Police Officers trained on various courses; 10 SPF took a study tour to Nigeria for data gathering in designing the new Somali Functional Framework; 1 police stations were renovated/constructed;
Target	2019		At least 2 of the following 3 successfully achieved: 460 Somali Police Officers to be trained on the management of police stations and crime prevention; 10 police stations to be equipped (laptops, printers, projector); 4 police stations to be renovated/constructed;
Target	2020		At least 2 of the following 3 successfully achieved: 60 Somali Police Officers to be trained on the management of police stations; 3 police stations to be equipped (laptops, printers, projector); 4 police stations to be renovated/constructed and equipped;
Target	2021		At least 2 of the following 3 successfully achieved: 45 Somali Police Officers to be trained on the management of police stations; 2 police stations to be renovated/constructed; 2 police stations to be equipped;
Target	2022	TBD	TBD
Engagement Title 3			**Civilian-led stabilisation in Somalia – SSF** (This results framework is based on SSF Results Framework updated on 13 April 2018)
Outcome 1			**State authority and legitimacy is enhanced (SSF Outcome 1)**
Outcome indicator			Government legitimacy (SSF RF Outcome indicator 4)
Baseline	2018		3.6 This baseline and related targets were set in November 2017 based on a comprehensive baseline study that was undertaken by a consortium of consulting firms (i.e. Wasafiri and Forcier) hired to carryout SSF's baseline study. The score for this indicator was obtained from the Oct. 12 Stakeholder Workshop in which a panel of experts on Somalia provided their scores based on a presentation of the results from the baseline study. SSF will hold two subsequent experts workshop in October 2018 and October 2019 where experts will score on this indicator following the same methodology as Year 1.
Target	2022		Current phase ends in 2020. Therefore only targets up to 2019

Output 1.1		Enhanced popular participation in governance, particularly for women and excluded communities (SSF RF Output 2)	
Output indicator		Total number of women, youth and minorities supported by SSF to improve their participation in governance (SSF RF Output Indicator 2.2). Figures are on Women	
Baseline	2018	230	This is target for 2018. To be updated with actual
Target	2019	529	
Target	2020		
Target	2021		
Target	2022		Current phase ends in 2020. Therefore only targets up to 2019

Output 1.2		Increased government visibility and community engagement (SSF RF Output 3)	
Output indicator		Quality of engagement between the FMS and targeted communities (SSF RF Output Indicator 3.2). Quantitative survey using FGD participants as respondents. In order to produce this score, each question relating to the output indicators was 'normalised', i.e. the answers were converted into a figure between 1 and 7 to have comparability across various different questions and components.	
Baseline	2018	3.9	Target for 2018 No regression
Target	2019	4.5	
Target	2020		
Target	2021		Current phase ends in 2020. Therefore only targets up to 2019

Outcome 2		**Political and communal conflict is reduced (SSF Outcome 1)**	
Outcome indicator		Status of communal conflicts in targeted areas. Status of political conflicts in targeted areas.	
Baseline	2018	5.4 / 3	Based on Expert Challenge Workshop scoring in line with scoring indices based on the same 1-7 scale used to assess the baseline (developed internally by the SSF team – see SSF RF and IRF).
Target	2022		Target for 2018 and 2019 is "no regression" Current phase ends in 2020. Therefore only targets up to 2019

Output 2.1		Fault-lines for political conflict (FGS-FMS, inter & intra state) are identified and appropriately addressed (SSF RF Output 1)	
Output indicator		Quality, relevance and effectiveness of SSF-delivered work contributing to addressing identified fault-lines (SSF RF Output indicator 1.1). The Experts Challenge workshop (same workshop for outcome indicator 3) will ask the experts to score this indicator based on a narrative prepared by the SSF team on the fault lines identified by the project and the work undertaken during the year in question to address these key fault lines. Individual scores per expert will aggregate into the final milestone scores for 2018 and 2019, based on a 1-7 scale.	
Baseline	2018	5	2018 Target. To be updated with actual.
Target	2019	6	
Target	2020		
Target	2021		
Target	2022		Current phase ends in 2020. Therefore only targets up to 2019

Output 2.2		Reduced community vulnerability to conflict (SSF RF Output 4)	
Output indicator		Quality, relevance and effectiveness of SSF interventions aimed at de-risking or de-escalating conflicts. (SSF Output Indicator 4.1)	

		W/F will tailor their FGDs and KIIs per district, to include questions on the quality, relevance and effectiveness of investments targeting specific districts. These results will be evaluated in parallel with deep dive case studies for specific investments that fall under this output. In 2018, W/F will conduct a deep dive case study on SSF's Wadaji Framework support in Hobyo, Balanbale and Abudwak, and SSF's Y2 work in Galkacyo (including CDI's investment and the youth centres), looking specifically at the projects' approaches to de-risking communal conflict. Scoring will be based on a 1-7 scale	
Baseline	2018	5	2018 Target. To be updated with actual.
Target	2019	6	
Target	2020		
Target	2021		
Target	2022		Current phase ends in 2020. Therefore only targets up to 2019

Thematic Programme 2	**Counter Violent Extremism through prevention and disengagement**
TP 2 Objective	**Reduced violent extremism in geographical areas of programme implementation through prevention and disengagement efforts with a focus on Somalia.**
Impact indicator	Reduced impact of violent extremist attacks in the region as measured by Global Terrorism Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace and/or similar indexes.

Engagement Title 2.1		**Countering Al Shabaab through strategic communication and disengagement of combatants**	
Outcome		**Increased defection to the FGS**	
Outcome indicator		Number of Al Shabaab defectors received in Serendi over the engagement period	
Baseline	2018		Figures from ASI
Target	2021		Figures from ASI/Altai
Outcome indicator		Number of defectors who say they knew of Serendi before defecting	
Baseline	2018		Figures from ASI
Target	2021		Figures from ASI/Altai
Outcome indicator		Number of defectors defecting because of the FGS announced amnesty	
Baseline	2018		Figures from ASI
Target	2021		Figures from ASI/Altai
Outcome indicator		Number of defectors who say they defected because of Serendi	
Baseline	2018		Figures from ASI
Target	2021		Figures from ASI/Altai
Output		Defectors are provided with secure accommodation; obtain support, education, vocational training and connections to social groups relevant to their exit	
Output indicator		Number of defectors able to demonstrate new educational skills (reading, writing, etc.) at exit	
Baseline	Year		Figures from ASI
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		Number of defectors able to demonstrate new vocational training skills (driving, welding, etc.) at exit	
Baseline	Year		Figures from ASI
Target	Year 1		

Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		Average time of residence in the defector rehabilitation centre	
Baseline	Year		Figures from ASI
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		% of defectors in the centre who are in contact with family or friends	
Baseline	Year		Figures from ASI
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		% of defectors in the centre taking weekend leave from 2 months after arrival	
Baseline	Year		Figures from ASI
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		Number of defectors at the centre with a exit plan	
Baseline	Year		Figures from ASI
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		Number of defectors receiving reinsertion grant (USD 400)	
Baseline	Year		Figures from ASI
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output		Defectors do not return to Al Shabaab	
Output indicator		% of repatriated defectors who have not returned to Al Shabaab	
Baseline	Year		Figures from Altai
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		Number of defectors contacted and interviewed by 3PM after exit	
Baseline	Year		Figures from Altai
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		% of defectors leaving the centre through the formal exit process	
Baseline	Year		Figures from ASI

Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		% of defectors exited on health grounds (no rehabilitation)	
Baseline	Year		Figures from ASI
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output		HR Compliant National Process of Disengagement	
Output indicator		Number of policy frameworks developed	
Baseline	Year		Figures after NRP consultation
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		Degree to which policy frameworks are implemented	
Baseline	Year		Figures after NRP consultation
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output		Comprehensive Communication Strategies implemented	
Output indicator		Number of Community Based Communication Plans developed	
Baseline	Year		Steering group consultation
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		
Output indicator		Number of Government Let Outreach Communication Campaigns	
Baseline	Year		Steering group consultation
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 2		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year		

Thematic Programme 3	Regional authority across land and maritime borders
Objective TP3	Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders.
Impact Indicator	Reduced transnational organised crime across the borders of the three countries of the programme as assessed by UNODC and other relevant agencies/organisations such as the Global Initiative against Transnational organised crime

Engagement 3.1		**Regional action on prevention of human trafficking, and smuggling of weapons and drugs – UNODC**
Outcome 1		Member States have increased law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and analytical capacity to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, cybercrime (including online child sexual exploitation and abuse), wildlife and forest crimes, and other forms of transnational organized crime.
Outcome indicator		1.1.1 Number of officials citing usefulness of training provided by UNODC in preventing, investigating and prosecuting drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, wildlife and forest crimes, cybercrime, money laundering, and other forms of transnational organized crime as well as mutual legal assistance, extradition and confiscation of proceeds of crime 1.1.2 Number of officials citing usefulness of, and assessed impact of, in-country mentor programmes for Somalia and Kenya including in relation to the equipment/material and infrastructural support delivered 1.1.3. Number of Member States in receipt of integrated UNODC assistance that have developed coherent policies to tackle illicit financial flows - linked to UNODC mandate areas - and predicate crimes. 1.1.4. Number of Member States that have developed and operationalized action plans, policies and comprehensive strategies against TOC with support from UNODC. 1.1.5. Number of networks supporting prosecutors, investigations, mutual legal assistance and countering and handling cases of TOC. 1.1.6 Activities regarding border control are expanded to four further locations namely Kismayo, Kilifi, and Mtwapa Creek 1.1.7 Bilateral and trilateral policy and operational meetings between Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia aimed at identifying common concerns and agreeing to frameworks for cooperation and operational protocols to enhance border security at and away from borders between each other are held
Baseline	2018	As per UNODC Regional Strategy
Target	2022	As per UNODC Regional Strategy
Outcome 2		A.1.3. Member States have improved capabilities and capacities of their criminal justice systems to carry out effective prevention and prosecution of maritime crimes
Outcome indicator		1.3.1. Number of Member States that have adopted a legal framework, strategies and policies on maritime crime. 1.3.2. Number of facilities refurbished or new facilities constructed and equipment provided by UNODC in use by Member States. 1.3.3 National authorities have entered agreements on and are committed towards the operations of the target facilities 1.3.4 Somali pirates continue to be transferred from Seychelles back to Somalia after trial through international cooperation on maritime crime including through active use of agreements related to Mutual Legal Assistance, Prisoner Transfers, and information sharing 1.3.5 Prisons continue to demonstrate progress including in the longer-term relating to good prison management linked to the training and mentoring provided by UNODC
Baseline	2018	As per UNODC Regional Strategy
Target	2011	As per UNODC Regional Strategy
Engagement Title 2		**Strengthened Anti Money Laundering Institutions and enhanced regional collaboration**

Outcome 1		Compliance with FATF recommendations	
Outcome indicator		Removal from the FAFT list	
Baseline	2018	n/a	Ethiopia is currently on Jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies FATF list, noting five areas where improvement is required
Target	2022	n/a	Ethiopia completed its action plan with the ICRG (developed as part of the enhanced Mutual Evaluation Report, MER, follow up) and has reduced the number of deficiencies sufficiently to be removed from the FATF list
Output 1.1		Advice on regulations and legislation	
Output indicator		Written and verbal advice confirmed by Ethiopian EFIC, AG and other relevant stakeholders	
Baseline	2018		Supervision manual developed for financial institutions as well as designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) – in particular Directive 1 on customer due diligence and know your customer for financial institutions and Directive 2 on compliance obligations for DNFBPs
Target	2019		Completion of sectoral risk assessments for non-profit organisations and real estate, resulting in further guidance on risk mitigation and risk-based approaches to supervision
Target	2020		Finalization of new legal frameworks on non-proliferation financing and revisions to the asset freezing, confiscation, and management frameworks
Target	2021		On-site inspection visits conducted to all reporting sectors in collaboration with relevant supervisory agency, with a focus on DFNBPs
Target	2022		Increased suspicious transaction reporting (STR) and currency transaction reporting (CTR) from all sectors, including DNFBPs, FEACC, and ERCA.
Outcome 2		Increased enforcement against illicit financial flows and expanding public awareness	
Outcome indicator		Number of cases initiated for suspected AML violations STRs disseminated by the FIU to police for investigation OR STRs submitted from new reporting entities, specifically DNFPBs	
Baseline	2018		Financial institutions submitting STRs, low levels of reporting from DNFBPs (received from insurance, NPOs, and licensing violations for hawalas)
Target	2022		All reporting entities submitting STR and CTR reports and quality disseminations of STRs to federal police for investigation.
Output 2.1		Relevant training delivered to FIC, AG and other relevant stakeholders	
Output indicator		Number of person-days of training	
Baseline	2018	564	A total of 564 participants representing 44 different institutions, organizations, or businesses across the country trained during 22 training sessions.
Target	2019	500	A minimum of 500 person-days of training achieved. At least one of the training sessions must be targeted technical assistance to regulatory bodies on the risk-based supervision manual, including developing on and off-site inspection and AML/CFT enforcement capacities.
Target	2020	500	A minimum of 500 person-days of training achieved. Implementing partner to continue engagement with Ethiopian Police University College (EPUC), potentially though creation of expanded AML/CFT training program.
Target	2021	500	A minimum of 500 person-days of training achieved. At least one of the training sessions must be targeted to Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Committee (FEACC) and Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA), in collaboration with the AG and EFIC on AML/CFT.

Target	2022	500	A minimum of 500 person-days of training achieved.
Outcome 3		EU regional AML programme fully active in in Ethiopia	
Outcome indicator		Ethiopian engagement in regional activities under EU regional programme in country and in the region.	
Baseline	2018		Agreed joint action plan with the Ethiopian authorities
Target	2022		Activities under action plan fully implemented
Output 3.1		Focus on the importance of regional cooperation will increase and be incorporated as in Ethiopia's AML-regime	
Output indicator		Active Ethiopian participation in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) and membership of other relevant AML groups.	
Baseline	2018		Regular attendance of ESAAMLG meetings. Pending application to Egmont Group.
Target	2019		Egmont Group on-site assessment.
Target	2020		Egmont Group membership.
Target	2021		Regular attendance at ESAAMLG meetings.
Target	2022		Regular attendance at ESAAMLG meetings.
Outcome 4		More support to AML from Ethiopian Government and foreign partners	
Outcome indicator		More support to AML from Ethiopian Government and foreign partners resulting in lack of need for continued Danish financial support.	
Baseline	2018		Ethiopia has demonstrated high levels of political commitment to AML/CFT and is benefiting from ongoing support from Denmark and limited engagement with an EU regional program. However, Ethiopia is still contingent on Danish support to continue the capacity building of the sector.
Target	2022		Ethiopia continues to prioritize AML/CFT issues as measured by the provision of sufficient budgetary, capital investment, and staffing support for the operations of core institutions (EFIC, AG, and financial investigation bodies) from national budgets.
Output 4.1		Increased FIC budget	
Output indicator		Size of FIC Budget including through funding opportunities with the World Bank, UNODC and IMF.	
Baseline	2018	TBD	Ethiopia working with Denmark – and to some extent EU. Prior requests to the World Bank for assistance with the NRA (declined). Ethiopian authorities to exploit renewed funding opportunities with the World Bank, UNODC and IMF as well as other donors..
Target	2019	10 %	10 % increase in the budget of FIC compared to previous fiscal year.
Target	2020	10 %	10 % increase in the budget of FIC compared to previous fiscal year.
Target	2021	10 %	10 % increase in the budget of FIC compared to previous fiscal year.
Target	2022	10 %	10 % increase in the budget of FIC compared to previous fiscal year. This amounts to a total increase in the FIC budgets of 46 percent compared to the baseline year (2018).

TP3 Objective	Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders
Impact indicator	Reduced transnational organised crime across the borders of the three countries of the programme as assessed by UNODC and other relevant agencies/organisations such as the Global Initiative against Transnational organised crime

Thematic Programme 3		regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders
TP3 Objective		Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders
Impact Indicator		Reduced transnational organised crime across the borders of the three countries of the programme as assessed by UNODC and other relevant agencies/organisations such as the Global Initiative against Transnational organised crime
Baseline	2018	
Target	2022	

Engagement Title		3.3: Promote the exercise of legitimate authority at sea to contribute to maritime security
Outcome 1		Strand 1. Increasing the number of operational ships and radar stations and reducing downtime.
Outcome indicator		Maritime surveillance capacity, number of ships, measuring downtime
Baseline	2018	Inadequate no of platforms and radar stations to meet optimum sea sovereignty and exercise of authority at sea.
Target	2022	Increased maritime surveillance established by 2022, due to upgrade of maritime surveillance system and extra operational ship.
Output 1.1		Capacity for maintenance improved by reducing spares order lead time so that turnaround time for equipment under maintenance is reduced by 50% in 2022
Output indicator		Lead-in time for spares delivery reduced. (ships/shore radar station)
Baseline	2018	45 days in average to deliver spares for ships and radar
Target	2019	40 days in average to deliver spares for ships and radar
Target	2020	36 days in average to deliver spares for ships and radar
Target	2021	30 days in average to deliver spares for ships and radar
Target	2022	22 days in average to deliver spares for ships and radar
Activities		
1.1.1		Analysis of maintenance plan.
1.1.2		Analysis of procurement process
1.1.3		Training (general training of technicians and test cell personnel)
1.1.4		Management of Test Cell

Output 1.2		Envisage resource allocation increased to ensure one more operational platform (ship) available by 2022
Output indicator		One more operational platforms (ship) available by 2022
Baseline	2018	Inadequate no of platforms to meet optimum sea sovereignty and exercise of authority at sea
Target	2019	Resource allocation increased
Target	2020	Resource allocation increased
Target	2021	Resource allocation increased
Target	2022	Envisage One more platform available
Activities		
1.2.1		Analysis of resource requirements
1.2.2		Increased/prioritized funding
1.2.3		Skilled personnel

Output 1.3		By 2022 contributing to increasing operational capability by introduction of new technology within the areas of maritime surveillance
Output indicator		Initialising the introduction of new technology via an Integrated Maritime

			Surveillance System and possibly satellite based surveillance by 2022.
Baseline	2018		Inadequate technology available to fulfil the task of optimal surveillance of Kenyan waters.
Target	2019		Project design for Integrated Maritime Surveillance System and possibly satellite based surveillance made and supplier identified/awarded.
Target	2020		Procurement process initiated.
Target	2021		Project implementation and training ongoing.
Target	2022		Implementation of an Integrated Maritime Surveillance System and possibly satellite based surveillance, initialised.
Activities			
1.3.1			Analysis of technology gap for meeting requirements
1.3.2			Develop implementation plan (including procurement)
Outcome 2			Strand 2. Interagency cooperation between Kenyan maritime agencies enhanced.
Outcome indicator			By 2022 development of a working framework between maritime agencies (including: KMA – KPA – KMP – KeFS – KN).
Baseline	2018		Inadequate framework to encapsulate multi-agency maritime cooperation.
Target	2022		Development of a working framework between maritime agencies (including: KMA – KPA – KMP – KeFS – KN).
Output 2.1			Information sharing improved among Kenyan maritime agencies.
Output indicator			Establishment of information sharing mechanism including regular meetings and possible creation of a common fusion database, among Kenyan maritime agencies.
Baseline	2018		Inadequate framework for maritime interagency cooperation.
Target	2019		Action plan prepared
Target	2020		Framework in place
Target	2021		Possible establishment of a common fusion database
Target	2022		Possible common fusion database operational among Kenyan maritime agencies.
Activities			
2.1.1			Stakeholder workshop
2.1.2			Stakeholder action plan
2.1.3			Benchmarking visits
Outcome 3			Strand 3. Enhancing Kenya Navy capacity from Initial Operational Capability to Full Operational Capability within the expertise of the full bridge / navigation simulator, the test cell and other relevant areas according to *"The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers"* (STCW) requirements in order to achieve Centre of Excellence status by 2022. Enhancing Kenya Navy capacity from Initial Operational Capability to Full Operational Capability within the area of multi-agency training and Anti-Surface Warfare.
Outcome indicator			Number of certified personnel / instructors (subject matter experts) Number of training sessions and exercises
Baseline	2018		Inadequate number of certified personnel according to set standards
Target	2022		Adequate number of certified personnel to enable full operational capability (FOC).
Output 3.1			Training Institution (Centre of Excellence) infrastructure in place
Output indicator			Infrastructure in place such as buildings, simulator, test cell, damage control unit, firefighting unit.
Baseline	2018		Simulator and test cell in place Tactical communication in simulator is lacking
Target	2019		Initiating firefighting structure

			Tactical communication in simulator established
Target	2020		Firefighting structure in place
Target	2021		Initiating damage control unit
Target	2022		All infrastructures in place.
Output 3.2			Curriculum and instructors in place
Output indicator			Training program review, curriculum development, instructor sustainment and learning management
Baseline	2018		IOC is established on curriculum and instructors.
Target	2019		Introduction of learning management system Curriculum is certified and decision on number of certified instructors
Target	2020		Actualisation of learning management system Initiation process of certification of Training institute
Target	2021		Finalising the process of certification of Training institute
Target	2022		Certification of Training Institute (STCW)
Output 3.3			Conformity to set standards on Anti-Surface Warfare and multi-agency operations by 2022
Output indicator			Number of training sessions and exercises undertaken – in simulator and live
Baseline	2018		Initial training performed
Target	2019		Basic training and exercises performed
Target	2020		Continued basic training and exercises performed
Target	2021		Advanced training and exercises performed
Target	2022		Conform to set standards
Activities			
3.3.1			Anti-surface warfare training in navigational trainer
3.3.2			Multi-agency training in navigational trainer
3.3.3			Visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training

ANNEX 4. BUDGET - PSP HOA 2018-22 (MFA commitments; MOD disbursements)

		6 month 2018			12 month 2019			12 month 2020			12 month 2021			6 months 2022			2018-2022		Grand total
TP	Engagement	MFA ODA	MOD	Total	MFA ODA	MOD	Total	MFA ODA	MOD	Total	MFA ODA	MOD	Total	MFA ODA	MOD	Total	MFA ODA	MOD	
1	**Regional conflict management capacity and stabilisation in Somalia**	18.50	2.28	20.78	19.00	4.55	23.55	18.00	4.55	22.55	11.00	4.55	15.55		2.28	2.28	66.50	18.20	85
1.1	EASF and peace support training centers	1.50	2.28	3.775	3.00	4.55	7.55	3.00	4.55	7.55		4.55	4.55		2.28	2.28	8	18	26
1.2	AMISOM Stabilisation	4.00		4	7.00		7	8.00		8	5.00		5.00				24		24
1.3	Somalia Stability Fund	13.00		13	9.00		9	7.00		7	6.00		6.00				35		35
2	**Counter Violent Extremism through prevention and disengagement**	7.50		7.50	6.50		6.50	6.50		6.50	6.50		6.50				27.00		27
2.1	Regional CVE - IGAD SSP	3.00		3	2.00		2	2.00		2	2.00		2.00				9		9
2.2	Al Shabaab disengagement & strategic communications	4.50		4.5	4.50		4.5	4.50		4.5	4.50		4.50				18		18
3	**Promote exercise of authority across regional land and maritime borders**	23.50	1.40	24.90	7.00	2.80	9.80	7.00	2.80	9.80	8.00	2.80	10.80	0.50	1.40	1.90	46.00	11.20	57
3.1	Prevention of transnational organized crime (UNODC)	9.00		9	6.00		6	6.00		6	7.00		7.00				28		28
	TOCT Police Expert (UNODC)	0.50		0.5	1.00		1	1.00		1	1.00		1.00	0.50		0.50	4		4
3.2	Regional AML/CFT	14.00		14													14		14
3.3	Maritime Domain Awareness/Kenyan Navy		1.40	1.4		2.80	2.8		2.80	2.8		2.80	2.80		1.40	1.40		11	11
	Subtotal Engagements	49.50	3.68	53.18	32.50	7.35	39.85	31.50	7.35	38.85	25.50	7.35	32.85	0.50	3.68	4.18	139.50	29.40	169
	Management, Knowledge (incl. M&E), Communications	0.40	1.33	1.725	4.00	2.65	6.65	3.00	2.65	5.65	7.00	2.65	9.65	0.10	1.33	1.43	15	11	25
	Unallocated				6.50		6.50	8.50		8.5	10.00		10.00				25		25
	Total	50	5	55	43	10	53	43	10	53	43	10	53	1	5	5.60	179	40	219

Annex 5: Risk Management Matrix

Contextual risks

Likelihood: Rarely – Unlikely – Likely – Almost certain. **Impact**: Insignificant – Minor – Major – Significant

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Internal disagreements within FGS, including political and for international resources, undermines possibilities for partnered planning and implementation	**Likely**	**Significant**	RDEs to maintain political monitoring and reporting. RDEs to consider greater emphasis on activities that can achieve objectives through local, non-government actors. In extremis, RDEs to cease disbursement and reclaim unspent funds.	**Major.** FGS internal stability is not a given. Previous Somali Governments have proven to be fragile.	Programmes that are based on government partnership, including the SNA/SNP, and some activities of the SSF, will no longer be able to meet their objectives.
Insecurity impacts on partner effectiveness in implementation	**Likely**	**Major**	RDEs to advocate for partners to include transparent and specific reporting on how insecurity affects operations. RDEs to monitor projected and actual value-for-money, including through TPM. RDEs to consider re-allocating money away from programmes made infeasible or inefficient by insecurity. RDEs to authorise delivery of QIPs via AMISOM CIMIC in order to ensure early delivery.	**Major.** Somalia in particular remains volatile and there is little that RDEs can do to reduce that risk.	This varies greatly by location and with time. Overall, reduced opportunities for partners to work directly with beneficiaries would inhibit expected impacts and results monitoring. More direct military and humanitarian-style cooperation could continue.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Islamic State (IS) become a relevant factor in Somalia, importing an unknown number of foreign fighters and occupying territory in Puntland primarily	**Unlikely**	**Minor**	RDEs monitor reports of IS presence in Somalia and share with partners where relevant. RDEs contribute to pooled funding arrangements in Somalia aimed at sharing risk and having flexibility between regions. RDEs support partners to cease programmes in highly insecure areas and allow flexibility to re-allocate funds.	**Minor.** Although IS are present in the HOA they are unlikely to become a widespread threat due to the nature of Al Shabaab.	A serious IS presence in Somalia would increase the risk to implementers of programs. New tactics and attack modalities used in Syria and Iraq would likely quickly follow. Withdrawals and disruptions would delay implementation and potentially threaten some partner modalities.
Gulf States and Near East involvement undermines Western development aims / programmes, particularly in the security sector	**Possible**	**Major**	Political / diplomatic engagement with the Gulf States, Egypt and Turkey from the region as well as from capitals. Information sharing on Danish programming with all relevant actors. Involvement of the Gulf States, Egypt and Turkey advisors in international coordination mechanisms. Where possible, inclusion of the Gulf States, Egypt and Turkey in multi-donor activities.	**Major.** Details of Gulf States and Turkish intentions and activities are not shared with the international community.	Regional programming takes place in a less well coordinated fashion. Alternative security arrangements develop which threaten the achievements made to date in regional security integration.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Diversion of funds and benefits reduces impact	**Likely**	**Major**	Close monitoring, with international partners, of potential diversion to Al Shabaab held areas. RDEs to delegate to strong partners' financial management systems. RDEs to commission external audit of Danish funding if severe allegations or evidence of diversion affect a partner. RDEs to cease disbursement and reclaim unspent funds from partners. M+E to include third-party checks on implementation.	**Major.** Diversion of funds is widespread in Somalia.	From a contextual point of view, the majority of money diverted is likely to benefit militia and powerful clans in some way. Diversion may not therefore be seen by Somalis as a bad thing. The most significant impacts of corruption for the international actors are: to reduce trust between donors and authorities; to undermine government prioritisation of stabilisation objectives; and to breed cynicism in relation to foreign aid cooperation.
Funding or political support for AMISOM declines to the point of reducing its capacity for security support to the FGS and the international community.	**Unlikely**	**Significant**	RDE Addis Ababa to monitor donor support to AMISOM. DK to advocate for continuing effective support to AMISOM. RDEs to advocate for partners to include transparent and specific reporting on how insecurity affects operations. RDEs to monitor projected and actual value-for-money. RDEs to consider re-allocating money away from programmes made unfeasible or inefficient by insecurity.	**Minor.** Although AMISOM partners (such as the EU) have reduced their support in the past there is no sign that they will withdraw their support completely.	The years prior to 2017 suggest that if AMISOM's capabilities decline to the point of a reduction in ground held, there is a strong possibility that non-state armed groups will become an unmanageable threat to the FGS and to development agencies. It will be several years before the Somali National Army is capable of mitigating these risks on its own.

Programmatic risks (for each thematic programme)

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Thematic Programme A – Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the stabilisation and security actors in Somalia and					

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Diversion of funds and benefits reduces impact	**Likely**	**Major**	RDEs to delegate to strong partners' financial management systems. Engagements to include options to audit, withdraw and re-allocate funding. RDEs to commission external audit of Danish funding if severe allegations or evidence of diversion affect a partner. Where crime is proven legal action is to be taken. RDEs to cease disbursement and reclaim unspent funds from partners. M+E to include third-party checks on implementation.	**Major.** The nature of delivery of programmes in Somalia is such that close oversight of engagements outside Mogadishu is extremely difficult.	From a programmatic point of view, the most significant issue with diversion relates to the fact that only a portion of aid funds reach their destination, leading to more restricted programming than originally anticipated in the PSP-HOA. The diversion of aid funds is a crime. As formulated only small amounts of Danish funding are spent in a way that they might be accessible to al Shabaab e.g. some support under engagement A2 to Somali policing, some support under engagement A3 to communities who may again come under the control of al Shabaab.
Insecurity affects intended activities	**Likely**	**Major**	RDEs monitor the security situation and share with partners where relevant. RDEs contribute to pooled funding arrangements in Somalia aimed at sharing risk and having flexibility between regions. RDEs support partners to cease programmes in highly insecure areas and allow flexibility to re-allocate funds.	**Major.** There is little that the RDEs can do to reduce the instability in rural Somalia. Past experience shows that stability and security are very unpredictable in rural Somalia.	This particularly affects engagement A3. Lack of access to areas has several consequences including (1) cessation of programming and redirection to other areas, (2) programming through remote management, leading to increased percentage of diversion and fewer quality control options, (3) dangerous operations or poor operational standards, leading to reputational risk.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
FGS instability reduces its capacity to implement engagements	**Likely**	**Major**	Political / diplomatic engagement with FGS and federal regional administrations. RDEs to monitor FGS stability and report on threats to implementation. RDEs and partners assess costs of continued implementation vs. impact of programs and review work-plan/ fund allocation accordingly. Inclusion of engagements that have more direct implementation modalities.	**Major.** There is little that the RDEs can do to directly counter instability in the FGS.	This particularly affects engagements A2 and A3. Instability in the FGS has serious consequences for all programmes requiring political leadership and policy setting by the FGS and regional administrations. This affects those related to security / the SNSF and those aimed at the development of government capacity, such as on maritime crime and the UNODC regional programmes.
Increased conflict and competition for resources between FGS and the FMS	**Likely**	**Major**	Political / diplomatic engagement with FGS and federal regional administrations. RDEs to consider entry points and possible conversations for enhanced access and impact. RDEs to monitor FGS and FMS stability and report on threats to implementation. RDEs and partners assess costs of continued implementation vs. impact of programs and review work-plan/ fund allocation accordingly.	**Major.** There is little that the RDEs can do that will directly reduce resource competition between FGS and FMS.	The lack of one conversation with the FGS and FMS can further complicate planning and implementation of stabilisation engagements under A2 through AMISOM and A3 through the SSF. All programmes implemented in FMSs with contested relationships with Mogadishu contribute to a risk to implementation of security led as well as stability enhancing activities.
Major terrorist attack on foreign civilians in Somalia or Kenya causes withdrawal of many civilians/agencies and increases security restrictions on implementation	**Unlikely**	**Significant**	RDEs and partners to re-assess feasibility and review work-plans. RDEs to consider reclaiming funds from non-feasible activities and re-allocating within PSP-HOA.	**Minor.** International engagement has proven resilient to such attacks as Westgate.	Withdrawals and disruptions would delay implementation and potentially threaten some partner modalities, particularly in engagement A3.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Donor focus shifts from Somalia and the Horn of Africa	**Unlikely**	**Major**	RDEs to monitor donor commitment and facilitate communication of feasibility and changing priorities. RDEs periodically conduct a feasibility assessment and review work plans	**Insignificant.** Although there are significant other pressures on scarce political and financial resources (e.g. Syria, migration, Yemen) Somalia remains a high priority for key Danish partners.	This affects engagements A1, A2 and A3. Significant declines in other donors' support to pooled funding initiatives would undermine their feasibility.
Thematic Programme B – Counter Violent Extremism through prevention and disengagement					
Insecurity affects intended activities	**Unlikely**	**Major**	RDEs monitor the security situation and share with partners where relevant. RDEs contribute to pooled funding arrangements in Somalia aimed at sharing risk and having flexibility between regions. RDEs support partners to cease programmes in highly insecure areas and allow flexibility to re-allocate funds.	**Major.** With most activity under engagement B2 taking place in Mogadishu local insecurity could always have a major effect on delivery.	This particularly affects engagement B2. Consequences could include (1) cessation of programming and redirection to other areas, (2) programming through remote management, leading to increased percentage of diversion and fewer quality control options, (3) poor operational standards, leading to reputational risk.
FGS instability reduces its capacity to implement engagements	**Likely**	**Major**	Political / diplomatic engagement with FGS and federal regional administrations. RDEs to monitor FGS stability and report on threats to implementation. RDEs and partners assess costs of continued implementation vs. impact of programs and review work-plan/ fund allocation accordingly. Inclusion of engagements that have more direct implementation modalities.	**Major.** Engagement B2 is highly dependent upon FGS activity and partnership.	Instability in the FGS could have serious consequences for engagement B2 (Countering Al Shabaab through strategic communication and disengagement of combatants). The SNSF and Somali intelligence service have an essential part to play in the engagement.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Donor focus shifts from Somalia and the Horn of Africa	**Unlikely**	**Major**	RDEs to monitor donor commitment and facilitate communication of feasibility and changing priorities. RDEs periodically conduct a feasibility assessment and review work plans	**Insignificant.** Although there are significant other pressures on scarce political and financial resources (e.g. Syria, migration, Yemen) Somalia remains a high priority for key Danish partners.	Significant declines in other donors' support to pooled funding initiatives would undermine their feasibility.
Increased tension among any combination of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya reduces interest or capacity to implement regional programme engagements	**Unlikely**	**Major**	Political / diplomatic engagement with AU and IGAD in support of regional programmes. Bilateral activities that are in national interest of all three countries have been included in the TP. In case of international tension affecting programme activities RDEs to consider reclaiming funds from non-feasible activities and re-allocating.	**Minor.** Engagement through IGAD, with its strong member state buy in, gives some guarantee of continuing interest from the region.	Reduced regional cooperation would bring into question the assumptions behind engagement B1. This would potentially also involve a deterioration of security and access in parts of Somalia and border regions of Ethiopia and Kenya.
Thematic Programme C – Promote exercise of authority across regional land and maritime borders					

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Diversion of funds and benefits reduces impact	**Likely**	**Major**	Close monitoring, with international partners, of potential diversion to Al Shabaab held areas. Engagements to include options to audit, withdraw and re-allocate funding. RDEs to commission external audit of Danish funding if severe allegations or evidence of diversion affect a partner. Where crime is proven legal action is to be taken. RDEs to cease disbursement and reclaim unspent funds from partners. M+E to include third-party checks on implementation.	**Major.** The nature of delivery of programmes in Somalia is such that close oversight of engagements outside Mogadishu is extremely difficult.	From a programmatic point of view, the most significant issue with diversion relates to the fact that only a portion of aid funds reach their destination, leading to more restricted programming than originally anticipated in the PSP-HOA. The diversion of aid funds is a crime. As formulated only small amounts of Danish funding are spent in a way that they might be accessible to al Shabaab e.g. some support to Somali MPUs through UNODC in engagement C1.
Insecurity affects intended activities	**Likely**	**Major**	RDEs monitor the security situation and share with partners where relevant. RDEs support partners to cease programmes in highly insecure areas and allow flexibility to re-allocate funds.	**Major.** With most activity under engagement B2 taking place in Mogadishu local insecurity could always have a major effect on delivery.	Lack of access to areas has several consequences including (1) cessation of programming and redirection to other areas, (2) programming through remote management, leading to increased percentage of diversion and fewer quality control options, (3) dangerous operations or poor operational standards, leading to reputational risk. This particularly affects engagement C1 with UNODC.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
FGS instability reduces its capacity to implement engagements	**Likely**	**Major**	Political / diplomatic engagement with FGS and federal regional administrations. RDEs to monitor FGS stability and report on threats to implementation. RDEs and partners assess costs of continued implementation vs. impact of programs and review work-plan/ fund allocation accordingly. Inclusion of engagements that have more direct implementation modalities.	**Major.** Engagement C1 is highly dependent upon FGS activity and partnership.	Instability in the FGS could have serious consequences for engagement C1 and UNODC regional programmes.
Major terrorist attack on or kidnapping of foreign civilians in Somalia causes withdrawal of many civilians/agencies and increases security restrictions on implementation	**Unlikely**	**Significant**	RDEs and partners to re-assess feasibility and review work-plans. RDEs to consider reclaiming funds from non-feasible activities and re-allocating within PSP-HOA.	**Minor.** International engagement has proven resilient to such attacks in the past.	Withdrawals and disruptions would delay implementation and potentially threaten some partner modalities. This particularly affects engagement C1 with UNODC.
Donor focus shifts from Somalia and the Horn of Africa	**Unlikely**	**Major**	RDEs to monitor donor commitment and facilitate communication of feasibility and changing priorities. RDEs periodically conduct a feasibility assessment and review work plans	**Insignificant.** Although there are significant other pressures on scarce political and financial resources (e.g. Syria, migration, Yemen) Somalia remains a high priority for key Danish partners.	Significant declines in other donors' support to pooled funding initiatives would undermine their feasibility. This particularly affects engagement C1 with UNODC.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Internal unrest in Ethiopia develops to a point where delivery of programmes is prevented	**Unlikely**	**Significant**	Political / diplomatic engagement with the Ethiopian and federal regional administrations Close liaison with AML/CFT implementing partners. Suspension of projects should there be threat to life and limb.	**Minor.** Despite a State of Emergency in 2016/7 and continuing rural unrest the Ethiopian government has continued to function normally.	Inability to deliver programmes in Ethiopia would have only limited effect on the PSP-HOA. This would principally be with engagement C2. AML / CFT.

Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Partner staff and programmes are affected by physical threats	**Likely**	**Significant**	RDEs to accept cessation of activities when partners face imminent threats to life and limb. RDEs and partners to review feasibility of work-plans and ambitions. RDEs to consider re-allocating geographically or to other partners.	**Minor.** RDEs are able to react to cease or postpone activities in the event of physical threats.	This probability is highest in Somalia. Large and small-scale attacks on aid-related targets are frequent. Somalia is now 3rd on the list of countries, with most attacks on aid workers, according to aidworkersecurity.org, up from 6th in 2015.
Diversion of funds and benefits reduces impact	**Likely**	**Major**	Partners to implement high-quality financial controls, audits and transparent reporting. RDEs to consider periodic external auditing of Danish funds. Mid-term review reports on disbursement of funds according to institutions' targets. RDEs to consider reclaiming funds and re-allocating. Where crime is proven legal action is to be taken.	**Major.** RDEs have little direct influence, especially in engagements in Somalia managed by local Somali staff.	Diversion and corruption are major issues in Somalia and Kenya. In Somalia, the UN Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group has reported that up to 70% of public funds have been diverted. The probability of some diversion to Al Shabaab held areas, and therefore accessible to Al Shabaab itself, is very high.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
FGS instability reduces its capacity to implement PSP-HOA-funded initiatives	**Likely**	**Minor**	Political / diplomatic engagement with FGS and federal regional administrations RDEs to monitor FGS stability and report on threats to implementation. RDEs and partners assess feasibility of continuation with programmes and review work-plan/ fund allocation accordingly. Inclusion of several initiatives in the PSP-HOA that depend less on strong FGS involvement.	**Minor.** Programmes have been designed not to require extensive implementation by FGS, although some have direct FGS involvement in the programming, e.g. A2, A3, B2 and C1.	The instability of the FGS is apparent in 1) lack of territorial control, 2) turnover in senior positions, 3) history of infighting and turmoil in Somali federal governments, 4) inter- and intra-regional conflicts as well as increased tensions with the FGS.
Partner agencies perpetrate human rights violations	**Likely**	**Significant**	All engagements are delivered within the Danish HRBA to development assistance. Engagements include training to improve civilian protection and respect human rights. RDEs to support investigations and punishments for human rights violations. Consider withdrawing funds and re-allocating to institutions more capable of mitigating risks and promoting HRBA.	**Major.** There is little that RDEs can do to directly reduce the risk of violations by SNA, SNP and NISA.	This is most possible in relation to military support particularly the SNA and SNP and collaboration with NISA in relation to Serendi. There is little history of effective control of military forces in Somalia and many examples of militias (in government uniforms or not) perpetrating human rights violations.
Denmark is accused of failing to take due account of human rights issues in its support, particularly to government agencies	**Likely**	**Major**	Close liaison and information sharing with UK lead in the Serendi project. All Danish engagements are delivered within the Danish HRBA to development. Most programs are public. Careful communication of partners and results. Effective investigation of any accusations.	**Minor.** RDEs are in a position to counter accusations and to demonstrate how the Danish HRBA is applied.	Many international development actors are accused of subsuming human rights concerns to national interests, particularly CT.